This is the American hawk’s red book on Chinese hawks.

The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower. By Michael Pillsbury (2015)

The Read

The Hundred-Year Marathon is written by a former intelligence official who, for decades, played a role in Sino-American relations, often meeting with key Chinese party and military officials. The book reads as part-reportage, part-memoir and part-analysis, and covers principally the period of the 1970s rapprochement to 2015.

A main part of the text explores the concept of shi as driving China’s strategic orientation towards the United States. This is partly rooted in the Warring States period. Overall, the book critically views China’s outreach efforts over the decades as a form of deception in a long marathon that will culminate in 2049.

Overall, the chapters explore covert weapons development, the charade of Chinese capitalism, and the attempts to project Chinese influence abroad. The final part of the text provides high-level recommendations for American policy officials.

Between the Lines

Pillsbury’s book was controversial when it was published, but today it seems quaint. It is now widely accepted that China and the United States are rivals and that China is openly ready for confrontation with America, at the very least as a contingency. But when it was released, there was still the thought that China could be part of an American-led global order, and economic integration was getting tighter, not being driven apart.

In that sense, The Hundred-Year Marathon is a seminal book because of its timing. It reoriented the thinking on China and firmly rooted a skepticism in some corners of Washington about Chinese intentions. Regardless of the veracity of the book’s claims, it makes for one of the more unique reads on the world’s rising power.

Long or Short?

Go long on The Hundred Year Marathon, but make sure you read it with more contemporaneous texts, including those with opposing views.

In the 2026 Iran War, Pakistan emerged as an unlikely would-be peace broker. The role of the mediator in recent decades had been of a soft intermediary, represented by smaller states with substantial wealth, such as Qatar, Norway, and Singapore. In a world of hard power, countries intervening today must possess hard power themselves. This enables them not only to command the respect of conflicting parties but also to bring resources to the table that can credibly shape or guarantee outcomes.

Geopolitical bargains in recent years have reflected this: China between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, Turkey in Syria in 2024, and the United States in multiple theaters, such as the Caucasus. ‘The Pakistan Gambit’ in the Iran War is no accident of history; it also represents a new trend. As European power fades, power is rising in the center of the world between East and West.

This is the unfolding story of an increasingly interconnected multi-region, termed in these pages and the 2040 World podcast as Middle Earth. It is where half the world’s population resides. The great game of the past was a geopolitical competition among global powers for control of parts of this vast geography. Today, the battle for power will also take place within and between the powers of Middle Earth.

Pakistan Gambit

At the height of the Cold War, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger understood that they could no longer afford to have China on the sidelines. Already alienated from the Soviets, the time was now to bring them into the fold. Kissinger needed to visit China to begin formal discussions with Zhou Enlai, the day-to-day administrator of the People’s Republic.

That encounter was facilitated by then-Pakistani President General Yahya Khan. During a formal visit to Pakistan, Kissinger surreptitiously flew in the middle of a hot summer night to Beijing. While Pakistan had been a key US military ally since 1954, its geographic location and rivalry with India also meant it maintained an open relationship with China.

Fast forward to the 2000s, and Pakistan’s stature was diminished due to a low-level domestic insurgency, chaos in Afghanistan, and global marginalization as a result of the war on terror. In the last several years, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan dissipated, the war on terror faded into the background, and domestic uprisings were quelled. Pakistan has itself remained a geostrategic lynchpin between India and China, while sitting adjacent to the Persian Gulf and Iran. Beyond its geographic position, Pakistan is a nuclear power with a formidable military that has proved its prowess in recent military skirmishes. It is also the fifth-most populous country, after China, India, Indonesia, and the United States.

Iran in 2026, like China in 1971, provided an opening for Pakistan. But this is a different moment, and a different time. It is not just about the United States or great powers. Pakistan has equally been constructing military pacts with Saudi Arabia and strengthening ties with Turkey and others. The gambit it is taking is not just to strike a deal between Iran and the United States through the Islamabad Talks, but also to play a growing role as a geopolitical actor in a widening neighborhood.

Rise of Middle Earth

Spanning over 80 countries in the heart of the world, Middle Earth comprises the regions of the Middle East, Africa, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Subcontinent – the area between East and West, and the power projection of China, Russia, and the United States.

Here lies half the world’s population at 4 billion people, with over 2 billion being under the age of 30. It is not just a population center; in a world of demographic decline, it is the consumer marketplace of tomorrow. This cross-border zone is also economically powerful, now representing a quarter of global GDP when adjusted for purchasing power. As its nominal flows catch up, this will add to the weight of capital that emerges.

Several countries possess hard power – military might, an industrial complex, and organized bureaucracy – that can be projected abroad, notably Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, and India, the latter three possessing nuclear capabilities. Egypt, Azerbaijan, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia have significant potential to join alongside. Iran’s fate is seemingly now being determined. This leaves many smaller countries with ambition trapped in the in-between, notably the United Arab Emirates.

Middle Earth itself is very much imbued with a Muslim civilizational ethos. The cultural character that has blended over centuries of shared history allows for greater exchange and synchronicity. This is already seen in the lines between regions, with shared peoples and languages. But this is not the driving force. That push is coming from the concurrent organization of multiple sources of hard power that are now finding one another. This is linking economic and industrial forces, in addition to cultural ones.

In 2024, there was significant discussion around the Quad, which brought together Japan, Australia, India, and the United States. In 2026, there is as much discussion of the quad in Middle Earth, comprising Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, all of which have strong ties with the United States.

Despite the rise of Middle Earth, its power remains disaggregated and decentralized, still very much in its nascent phase.

The Greatest Game

In the past, China, Russia, and the United States would seek to manage this multi-region. Today, these great powers still want to ensure their interests are met – and use force (or other coercive means) to achieve that where possible. But the consolidation of Middle Earth is primarily a competition from within.

This is what is now unfolding. The rise of Israel as a proto-empire (or “super Sparta”), the growing prowess of Turkey, the attempted relevance by Pakistan – these are all tied to a desire to play an expanded geostrategic role. Yet the vast geography means that integrated alliances are required to build a multifaceted industrial base to support the military coverage needed to hold sway. In effect, a new decentralized empire is being built from the ground up.

What is likely over the coming years is growing cross-border influence, networks of alliances, and collaboration on defense industrial projects. It is equally likely that countries will seek to test the limits of their power, and counter-alliances will form in response. The most salient confrontation on the horizon today is with Israel; should it seek accommodation with Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran, and vice versa?

From the outside looking in, it will be tempting for countries and institutions to choose sides. Yet, given the fast-moving dynamics, it will be important to stay out of the fray and facilitate relationships across all sides. The complexities of descending into a conflict involving 4 billion people across multiple regions are unnecessary burdens, including for China and the United States.

A World of Power

Pakistan’s gambit, as well as the vulnerability of Iran, makes it clear that the next arms race will not just be for AI but also for a nuclear weapon or equivalent. No country will want to be the odd one out surrounded by hard power buttressed by nuclear capability. Rising power also fuels predictions of a world war. The next great conflict, if it did occur, may be most similar to World War I, involving many smaller players and accidental conflicts arising from an interwoven web of alliances, driven from Middle Earth.

This raises the stakes even higher, as it could mean conflict between many disparate powers possessing nuclear weapons. For the world’s dominant power, America, it will need to learn to manage the power of others rather than just dominate through its own power.

The most salient book on revolutionary Iran and its civilizational depth.

The Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran. By Roy P. Mottahedeh (1985)

The Read

The Mantle of the Prophet traces the history of Iran through the lens of an Islamic cleric who left the country after the revolution. Ali Hashemi is the name the author, Roy Mottahedeh, used for him. Interspersed in his experiences from childhood to adulthood are historical vignettes from throughout the 20^th century that led up to the Islamic revolution, including the tug-and-pull of nationalism, imperialism, and monarchial rule.

This is a dense read, extremely detailed across all scenes. It is expertly written on the subject, and when it was released in 1985, it became a ‘starter’ book in many university courses. Notable in the book is the interplay between clerics and nationalist revolutionaries from the constitutional revolution in 1906 through the 1950s, and then into the 1970s.

Between the Lines

The book has retained its relevance after all these years. Roy Motahedeh drew heavily on Hossein Modarressi, who came to Princeton as a scholar and has remained a professor. The history that is covered feels very authentic and authenticated. Unlike many books today, it does not descend into a simplistic overview of U.S.-Iran relations or into pithy phrases written for the average reader. The academic weight, combined with Hashemi’s personal perspective, makes you feel as if you are in Iran, immersed in its civilizational tapestry.

Long or Short?

Go long on The Mantle of the Prophet. It is well worth the read – but it will take you multiple sittings. Keep The Mantle, on your mantle.

Contents

I. Iran in Context Over Time

II. An Abridged History of Iran and American Power

III. Epilogue: The Way Forward

Appendix: Resources

A city where kings are but lovers crowned,
A land from the dust of which friendship springs-
Who has laid waste that enchanted ground?
What has befallen the city of kings?

- Hafez (True Love)

On February 1, 1979, stepping onto the tarmac at Mehrabad Airport, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini received a rapturous welcome. While accompanied by a few aides, many of his closest supporters had remained in Iran, organizing on the ground while also spending time in and out of prison. One of them was 38-year-old Ali Khamenei, who had been tortured repeatedly by the notorious intelligence services of the Shah, SAVAK. Khamenei, who was ready to stand by his mentor Khomeini, also had a young family of his own. His second son, Mojtaba, just ten years old at the time, would now be reared in the Islamic education of a new Iran.

Half a world away, one of New York’s most celebrated Art Deco buildings was revealed on the front page of the January 26^th edition of The New York Times to be acquired by a previously unheralded 32-year-old real developer, Donald Trump. It would become the site of a building that would reshape the 5^th Avenue skyline: Trump Tower.

Meanwhile, in Jerusalem, 30-year-old Benjamin Netanyahu was organizing the first Conference on International Terrorism for the Jonathan Institute, named after his late brother, who had died in the Israeli operation at Entebbe a few years earlier. It would be a landmark event, attended by future officials in the Reagan administration. He would deliver these opening remarks to the dignitaries present later that year:

“This Conference was called to serve as the beginning of a new process — the process of rallying the democracies of the world to a struggle against terrorism and the dangers it represents.”

Badr Al Busaidi was just 18 years old, studying with private tutors in London in preparation for his education at Oxford University. The son of an advisor to the past two sultans of Oman, a vast career lay before him at a pivotal time for his country.

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On a late Thursday evening on February 26, 2026, Al Busaidi, now Oman’s foreign minister, realized that the talks in Geneva that his country had facilitated between Iran and the United States were faltering. While Iran’s foreign minister would be reporting back to Tehran and the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, about next steps, Al Busaidi knew that the mercurial American president may not wait that long to make his next move.

After he raced to Washington to meet with Vice President JD Vance, Al Busaidi also stopped to give an interview on American television. If there were any way to change the mind of President Donald Trump, it would be through the screen. As he sat across the studio from Margaret Brennan, the host of Face the Nation, Al Busaidi made his case.

“The single most important achievement, I believe, is the agreement that Iran will never, ever have nuclear material that will create a bomb.”

While the interview would air on Sunday, it was released online on Friday evening. As the clip circulated, the American military had well-positioned assets in the region to strike Tehran. The stakes were high. What Al Busaidi did not know, and few did, was that the die had already been cast.

Earlier on Monday, President Trump had received a call from the Israeli prime minister. Benjamin Netanyahu knew how to deliver a win for the president. He informed him that Israel knew the whereabouts of Ayatollah Khamenei in Tehran on Saturday morning, and that he could be reached. While the president would give the Geneva negotiations later in the week one last try, the decision, in some sense, had already been made.

At 1:15 am EST Saturday, February 28, 2026, the U.S. and Israel launched an aerial assault on Iran. For over half of Iranians, the only leader of their lifetime was soon to be dead. Americans woke up to find a late-night post on President Trump’s Truth Social announcing that the United States had gone to war.

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What started on a Saturday morning with an aerial bombardment quickly evolved into a fully-fledged war across a dozen countries, and the tipping point reached a near irreversible situation. With no clear ‘offramp’ and the United States loath to end the conflict on a weaker footing, especially as it takes the long view towards Russia and China on the horizon, what will be the outcome?

In many ways, the war between Iran and the United States has been an inevitable one since the time of the Islamic Revolution, which pitted the two countries against one another. The last Shah, as he is known, came to power ahead of the famous Tehran conference in 1943, which cemented the importance of Iran and the Persian Gulf – and energy security – in the coming world order.

But war was avoidable – and was avoided until now. The governing systems in both countries, across political currents, have at many points in recent history sat around the table; then, almost by pattern, have always diverged just when a grand bargain appeared close.

For the first time, direct war was the result. All wars – and especially those in the Middle East – are shaped by the law of unintended consequences. Complexity is a feature. For the United States, there is no full resolution possible, only a renewed balance of interests.

Throughout its history, in both modern and ancient times, Iran’s sovereignty has ebbed and flowed. Many great empires, orders, and countries have swept across the vast lands that the orientalists called Persia. But inevitably they were either subsumed by its sands, overcome by hidden forces, or kept at bay – even when they for a time conquered the territory.

Today, Iran is not a great power, unlike Russia and China. It is, however, firmly in the path of American power. The war launched in 2026 is bringing to the surface undercurrents of Iran’s civilizational path, but it is also revealing the limits of American power for all to see.

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Iran in Context Over Time

The Iran we know today is the product of the crisscrossing of civilizations across its land over time.

Threads throughout History

Mark Twain wrote in his novel The Gilded Age:

“History never repeats itself, but the kaleidoscopic combinations of the pictured present often seem to be constructed of the broken fragments of antique legends.”

Today, the abbreviated version of the second part of that sentence is “but it rhymes.” In reading the history of Iran and then its relationship with American power, Twain’s phrasing of the present as constructed from broken fragments of antique legends seems apropos.

The Islamic regime has held sway over a frozen dynamic of Shiism and Islamism.

Since 1979, through its efforts at regional hegemony and domination of Shiite communities and discourse, Iran has prevented the natural evolution of both ideologies and sub-national structures. This has led to frozen dynamics, particularly in Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain, and Yemen. It has also placed global Shiism in a dynamic whereby clerical authority has been conflated with the state.

Nationalism and Islamic revivalism are recurring themes in Iran’s modernity.

The grandfather of Islamic revivalism was Jamal al-Din Al Afghani, originally from Iran. Within Iran, and particularly in the 1920s and again in the 1950s and 1960s, debates around nationalism, sovereignty, Islam, and progressive thought were firmly entrenched, apart from the revolution presided over by Khomeini. They continue to form an ideological alternative – even if dormant and uncultivated – beyond monarchism and theocracy.

The borders of Iran are more fluid than we may anticipate

From antiquity to the present, Iran’s borders were defined and redefined. Iran has mostly been a Turko-Persian construct, with various minority groups in the peripheries. This has led to territorial contestation and the loss of parts of what was once in the “Lands of Iran.” A weaker central government would bring to the fore some of history’s forces.

American power in the Middle East has always been tied to Tehran.

America’s leadership in the new world order began in Tehran in 1943. It faced off against Soviet influence in Iran before doing so on the Korean Peninsula. And it countermanded the British Empire there, before the Suez Crisis. One of the CIA’s first coups took place in 1953. Iran was the central pillar in the Great Game for oil under the Shah. And following the Islamic Revolution, America has arguably had more sustained military attention related to Iran than any other country in the world.

There is a divergence in the interests of the United States and Israel in Iran.

While America has a targeted set of clear interests in Iran, its foreign policy priorities diverge from Israel’s. Throughout modern history, the American preference has been for a strong, contiguous Iran that supports American priorities and its allies in the Middle East. Iran, itself, has always viewed America as its greatest enemy and Israel as a secondary concern. For Israel, a weak Iran that does not ally with other geopolitical rivals, such as Turkey, is more paramount.

The threads of the past shape today’s geopolitical decision-making in ways that are still overlooked.

Contemporary Iran

Iran has a population of over 90 million, with over half under 35 years of age. It is bordered by Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Turkmenistan in the East, Azerbaijan and Armenia to the North, and Iraq and Turkey to the West. The Caspian Sea has an effective maritime arrangement between Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. In the Persian Gulf, sometimes called the Arabian Gulf, and the Gulf of Oman, it has a maritime border with all six countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. The Strait of Hormuz, which sits on its coastline, is where one-fifth of the world’s petroleum flows on tankers.

The neighborly complexity has historically made Iran a crossroads of empires on the march and a subject of ethnic influence from the East and West. The idea of Iran as Persian is itself a misnomer. While a majority of Iran is ethnically Persian (slightly upwards of 50%), the remainder consists of other groups with rough estimates: Azerbaijani (20%), Kurds (10%), Baloch (5%), Lurs (5%), Mazanderani/Gilak (5%), Arabs (3%), and Turkmen (2%).

There are 31 provinces in Iran. One third of these share land borders with other countries. These are the provinces also where significant minorities live. However, it should be made clear that the Twelver Shiite faith is mostly a unifying constant. At least nominally, 90 percent of the country is Twelver Shiite. There are small minorities of Sunnis, Christians, Jews, Zoroastrians, Baha’is, and Ismailis.

Iran is an urban country, with 70% of its population living in cities. Tehran is by far the largest city, with a population of nearly 10 million people. Mashhad, the next most populous city at around 3 to 4 million people, is predominantly Persian. The largest minority-led city is Tabriz (Azerbaijani) in the North, followed by Ahvaz (Arab) in the South. Kermanshah is the largest Kurdish city, and Zahedan is the largest Baloch city.

The ethnic stratification of Iran parallels in part the economic divides of the country, with the peri-urban peripheries where minorities often reside being somewhat excluded by the centralized commerce in urban centers.

It is hard to assess Iran’s overall economy because it has been under progressively crippling sanctions for nearly 5 decades. It remains an oil- and gas-rich country, accounting for 10 to 15% of global reserves, which in turn account for upwards of 20% of its GDP and 80% of government revenue. One of the main features of its economy today is the dominance of government-related entities, whether private companies or foundations.

While Iran’s population remains highly educated, there has been a recent rise in high school dropouts. As with most middle-income countries in the region, it has had a rising drug addiction problem. High levels of continuing youth unemployment and various crises – most recently the water shortage – contribute to sporadic economic protests that can quickly become political.

Of course, a significant number of Iranians now live in the diaspora. They number nearly 5 million, which seems large but represents only 5% of the total Iranian population. They are predominantly in the West and the Gulf, with the United States estimated to have a diaspora of 750,000, up to half of whom reside in California. Many of them are religious minorities, adding to the complexity of how closely they represent their relatives back home.

This is what we see about Iran on the surface, but of course, it is much more.

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An Abridged History of Iran and American Power

Before America, there was Iran.

Ancient Iran (550 BCE-650 AD)

The response to authoritarian Islamism in Iran deepens the lore of a primordial Iran, one that predates not just the Islamic Revolution, but Islam itself. Like many nationalist currents in the Middle East that emerged in the 20^th century, it is an exercise in rebuilding the nation along its ancient dynamic, imagined or real.

For many Iranians seeking change today, there is a desire to harness the spirit of pre-7^th-century Iran to build the future. Would the United Kingdom define itself only by the English language before its French influence and discard Christianity, null and void, as it came through external interlopers? Iran is best understood not as the genesis of a civilization that existed 2,500 years ago but as the confluence of an evolving civilization across 2,500 years.

Iran’s geography has been a civilizational entrepot since 3000 BC. Many cities are mentioned in the Old Testament, such as Susa, which itself was founded in 4200 BC. Yet it is around the 5^th and 6^th centuries that Persia and the Persians emerged in earnest in the civilizational consciousness. This was when the Achaemenids rose to power, led at their height by Darius I and Cyrus the Great. It is when the ancient monotheistic faith of Zoroastrianism became a dominant religion.

Cyrus the Great is mentioned repeatedly in the Old Testament and is credited with enabling the Jews to build the Second Temple when he subdued Jerusalem. Due to the vast reach of the Achaemenid Empire, Persian culture spread across the Middle East and Central Asia. This footprint became the common ground for inter-civilizational routes. It laid the groundwork for global transportation and trade infrastructure, including the Silk Road.

This was the ground that Alexander the Great traversed as he ventured East. He conquered Persia and much more in just a decade. Alexander the Great’s reign was short-lived and was followed by the rule of the Seleucids for several centuries, a dynasty descended from a Macedonian general of his.

The Parthian and then the Sasanian empires ruled for nearly a millennium, marking a long era of Persian rule. That continuum established true Zoroastrian continuity, with strong reverberations to this day. Nowruz is practiced across dozens of countries by upwards of 300 million people, a practice that began its formal promulgation then.

The Sasanian court restored a strong contiguous Persian empire. They also created a unified structure for the Zoroastrian faith. The royal court adopted the Pahlavi script for writing Persian (Farsi). And the Sasanians introduced the term Iran, calling their empire Eranshahr.

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Islamic Iran (651-1500)

Like Alexander the Great a thousand years earlier, the successors to Prophet Mohammed took the lands of Iran and the Sassanian empire in just over a decade. Today, this period is referred to as the Arab conquest and the beginning of Islamic Iran. After the death of the last of Ali ibn Talib (or Imam Ali), the last of what are termed the right-guided caliphs, Islam had a schism into Shiites and Sunnis.

The biggest difference between Shiite and Sunni Islam is the hereditary papacy (or imamate), which traces back to Imam Ali, the Prophet’s cousin, and his wife, Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter. His sons were Hussein and Hassan, who were subsequently killed. That origin story of martyrdom embeds a revolutionary eschatology within the faith.

In Twelver Shiism, this went a step further. Like most branches of Shiism (except for Nizari Ismailism), the imamate was extinguished (temporally) when there was no successor. In Twelver Shiism, this occurred with the twelfth imam in the late 9^th century. It was said that the twelfth Imam, an infant, went into occultation. Today, he is known as the Mahdi, essentially the savior. In this ideology, he will return with the Prophet Jesus on the Day of Judgment.

While the Ismailis and Twelvers believe in hereditary succession, the Zaydis believe that an imam needs only to be chosen from the descendants of the Prophet’s family. In Yemen, a Zaidi Imamate had ruled for a thousand years but was upended in the 1970s by communist forces. The Zaidis are relevant again today due to the rise of the Houthis. Regardless, the vast majority of Shiite Muslims today are Twelvers.

Following the deaths of the first caliphs of Islam, the caliphate passed to the Umayyads in Damascus, then to the Abbasids, who ruled from Baghdad. The Abbasids leveraged the Shiite ideology but governed under Sunni Islam. Najaf, where Imam Ali was buried, and Kerbela, where his son Husayn was killed, are in modern-day Iraq. To this day, they are the holiest cities in Shiite Islam. This adjacency, in part, led to various elements of Shiite influence entering Iran around that time.

The first notable examples of this, emanating from the political sphere, were the Zaidi Alid dynasties in northern Iran in the 9^th and 10^th centuries. Then in the mid-10^th century, the Buyids rose, effectively establishing the first Twelver Shiite dynasty. While an Abbasid caliph persisted, the Abbasid capital, Baghdad, was soon controlled by the Buyids.

While the Buyids were Twelver Shiites, they did not impose it as the state religion, where subjects were still predominantly Sunni. Even amongst the Shiites, there was a notable Ismaili population, given the rival Ismaili Fatimid empire that controlled Mecca at the time; one of its chief leaders, Hassan bin Sabbah, would soon set up in the fortress of Alamut (after the fall of the Buyids).

The Buyids ruled for a century as a Persian dynasty that came to power at the end of what is known as the Iranian Intermezzo. They were the first to blend Persian identity and Twelver Shiism, which would become a precursor for future rule in Iran. Yet they would also be the last non-Turkic rulers of Iran until Reza Shah came to power in the 20^th century, nearly 1000 years later.

The Iranian Intermezzo was a renaissance for Persian culture and local traditions. During Arab rule, Persian was rarely used in official settings. The language itself transitioned from Pahlavi (a derivative of Aramaic) script to Arabic script. Yet during this period, lasting about two centuries, Persian literary influence returned with ferocity.

There were many dynasties that, at times concurrently and sequentially, assumed influence – the Tahirids, Saffarids, Samanids, and Ziyarids – and, finally, the Buyids. The Samanids patronized significant poets, including Rudaki and Ferdowsi, the latter who wrote the Shahnameh, or Book of Kings.

The city of Bukhara under the Samanids would become a center of global knowledge, giving rise to Ibn Sina (Avicenna), the father of modern medicine. Meanwhile, the Ziyarids also hosted Al-Biruni, one of the greatest polymaths of modern civilization. The Buyids also brought the pageantry of Persian traditions back into the ruler’s court, an influence that would shape many subsequent Turkic rulers of Iran, as Persian became the language of rulers across Central and South Asia for centuries.

The Turkic Ghaznavid dynasty arose from the Samanid slave guards. When they came from the East, they carried the banner of Sunni Islam and mobilized against the Twelver Buyids and other Ismaili factions. The Seljuq empire arose from the Oghuz Turkic tribes. The combined rise of the Seljuqs and Ghaznavids ended Twelver Shiite and Iranian rule for half a millennium until the Safavids. Still, the language of subsequent Turkic dynasties remained Persian.

It was the Mongol invasion in subsequent centuries that left an indelible mark of a loss of local sovereignty. Genghis Khan took Iran from the Seljuq successor state, the Khwarazmian Empire, in just two years in the 1220s. The Mongols would not complete their domination of Iran until their defeat in 1256 of the Nizari Ismaili proto-state’s fortress in Alamut.

For half a century, Iran was in a state of wilderness. Islam was precariously surviving. Local languages were under threat. And the public administration and institutions were not functioning. Slowly, the Mongols consolidated their rule into an Ilkhanate that encompassed modern-day Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkey (and some neighboring states). Around this time, modern Turkey began to emerge as Turkic tribes settled en masse amid the chaos of the Mongol invasion of Anatolia, which eventually gave rise to the Ottomans.

The Ilkhanate was governed under Sunni Islam, although one ruler converted to Twelver Shiism for a decade. In the mid-14^th century, the Ilkhanate disintegrated and was subsumed by Tamerlane and the Timurid Empire. The Timurids began to give way to various Turkmen confederations and had a loose grip by the end of the 15^th century.

The overall Turkic period through the Mongols and Timurids did give rise to some of the greatest Persian philosophy and writings. This included Rumi, who made his way to Seljuk Anatolia; Omar Khayyam, in Seljuk Iran; and Hafez, who was in Shiraz during the Mongol Ilkhanate and subsequent periods. The Timurids turned Herat, in modern-day Afghanistan, into a global center for Persian culture.

During this period, religiously, there was a massive rise in Sufi orders. Sufism was neither Shiite nor Sunni in nature, although it held great veneration for Imam Ali. Throughout the Muslim world, starting in the 11^th century, there was a fall in central authority, with no clear caliphate after the Abbasids, and the Mongol invasion, which decimated indigenous Muslim rule. The perceived separation of political and religious authority created a vacuum, particularly in Sunni Islam.

Three significant Sufi orders emerged in that era: the Qadiriyya, the Naqshbandi, and the Suhrawardiyya. Sufism allowed for a syncretic acceptance of the original Shiite leadership within Sunni settings. There was also a unique tie to the land of Iran. The Qadiriyya was founded in Baghdad by a Persian from Gilan. The Naqshbandi by a Persian (or Persian speaker) from Bukhara. The Suhrawardiyya by a Persian from Zanjan.

One of the most dramatic Sufi figures in history before its institutionalization was Ibn Al Hallaj, who the Abbasids famously executed for saying he was “the truth,” or God. He was from Shiraz. It was only natural, given these intersections, that after the Ilkhanate and estrangement from the ruling order, local Sufi orders in Iran multiplied. Significant ones also later emerged in Iran, such as the Kubrawiya and Nimatullahi.

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The Shiite Empire (1501-1905)

In the late 15^th century, Iran was once again in chaos, and Sufi orders were becoming local organizing mechanisms. The Safavid order began in the 13^th century and later developed a positive relationship with the Timurids. It was under Shaykh Junaid in the 1450s that the movement took an overt Twelver Shiite character. The Safavids became increasingly politicized and militarized. A militant group of Shiite Turkmen tribesmen, the Qizilbash, mostly from the Caucasus, supported his initial military campaigns.

A Turkoman Sunni federation ruled Iran in the late 15^th century, known as the Aq Qoyunlu. After the Battle of Shahrur, Ismail I, a grandson of Shaykh Junaid, proclaimed himself Shah of Iran in 1501 at the age of 14 and, over the next decade, conquered much of the traditional territory of past Iranian empires. Unlike previous empires, he made Twelver Shiism the compulsory religion for all subjects.

Around the same time, the Ottoman Empire came into its own in 1453, when it conquered Constantinople and defeated the Byzantines. While Ismail I established the Safavid Empire, as the first Shiite empire of substance since the Fatimids, Sultan Selim I defeated the Mamluks in Egypt and took control of the holy city of Mecca. It created the basis for a Turko-Persian rivalry.

Following an initial confrontation in 1514, the Ottoman-Safavid wars continued for over one hundred years, until a broad peace was concluded in 1639; aside from border skirmishes and flare-ups, this peace holds, in some ways, to this day. This, however, was not just a rivalry of empires, but also of Sunni and Shiite leadership for the Muslim world.

The Safavids invested heavily in leveraging Twelver Shiism to build their legitimacy as rulers. They also established a form of religious supremacy that led to the mass discrimination and exclusion of the Sunni population, at least in the initial years. And despite the Safavids starting as a Sufi order, they largely circumscribed previously flourishing Sufi orders.

While both the Safavid order and the Qizilbash espoused Twelver Shiism, neither was well-versed in its underlying ideology, nor did either have a body of formal scholars (or Ulema) in place. There was also no clerical establishment, either to justify the divine nature of Safavid rule or to impose a standard religion on the population. Major centers of Twelver scholarship were in Iraq and Lebanon, and ulema relocated to Iran. They, in turn, trained religious representatives who were sent to centers throughout the country.

The most eminent Twelver scholar to date was the 13th-century Iraqi scholar Muhaqqiq al-Hilli. He addressed the issue of clerical authority in the absence of an Imam, a vital question for Twelver Shiite Islam. His interpretation delegated all matters of interpretation from the Hidden Imam to clerical representatives, but not political authority or leadership.

Muhaqqiq al-Karaki, a Lebanese cleric brought to Iran by the Safavids, innovated on this concept, elevating the role of the jurist (mujtahid or faqih) in proximity to the state. From the outset, the need was political: The Safavids’ first battle with the Ottomans was lost, and they needed stronger internal legitimacy amid potential factionalization.

While al-Karaki did not go far in creating the rule of the jurist, or vilayet-e-faqih as Ayatollah Khomeini would support many centuries later, he did expand on the delegation of divine authority to clerics as a sub-stratum of governance. He went so far as to say clerics needed to play this role. His book, Jami’al Maqasid, remains heavily influential for Iranian clerics today. But it was not without its critics, particularly in Twelver circles outside Iran, not subject to the Safavid political order.

Over the next century, Twelver Shiism consolidated in Iran, and the ascendency of clerics served as a bulwark against the Qizilbash functionaries, creating a new pillar of support for the Safavid Empire. In neighboring Iraq, successive waves of tribes also began converting to Twelver Shiism in greater numbers. The net effect of the Safavid Empire on one hand and the Ottoman Empire on the other was the gradual disappearance of heterodox Sunni and Shiite communities in the core of the Muslim world.

Ismailism disappeared as an organized force. Zaydism was largely confined to Yemen, where an Imamate ruled it until 1962. Most of all, looser Sufi orders, more localized traditions, and amorphous offshoots dissipated in successive centuries.

The Safavids’ main impact beyond the religious dimension was the reestablishment of a Persian ethos and the revival of Iran’s formal political identity from Sassanian times.

There was a concurrent literary and philosophical renaissance, known as the philosophical period, in the early 17^thcentury in the Safavid Empire, which brought to the fore epochal thinkers such as Mulla Sadr. However, its main impact was felt in art and architecture, a legacy that remains throughout Iran today.

As the Safavids collapsed in the 1700s, giving way to the middling dynasties of the Afsharids and Zands, the religious evolution of Twelver Shiism unfolded in nearby Iraq. Without Safavid backing, spiritual centers in Mashhad, Isfahan, and Qom declined, and clerical authority reverted to Najaf and Kerbala in Iraq, which was under Ottoman control.

The Safavids elevated jurists and formalized the khums (or “fifth”) system of religious taxation. In Iraq, scholarly debates fostered a hierarchy of authority among clerics that emphasized the role of finding a single jurist as a point of reference. This would formalize clerics’ standing in providing interpretation (ijtihad) for modern times. It would become the basis for a cleric being a reference or marja.

The Qajar dynasty emerged from the Turkic Qajar tribe, which had been part of the Safavids’ initial fighting force, the Qizilbash. They had maintained their cohesion in lands around Astrabad, which is today, Gorgan, in the north of the country. They defeated the Zand dynasty in a final battle in 1794 to reconsolidate Iran, and the first Qajar monarch, Agha Mohammed Khan, began calling himself the Shah of Shahs, or King of Kings.

The 1800s were marked by the declining relevance of the Persian polity amid global empires, with the British advancing along the border in Afghanistan and the Russians from the North; the Qajars were fighting two empires simultaneously. It was a century of curtailment. The result was the loss of Western Afghanistan to the British and the Caucasus to the Russians. They would never be recovered.

Domestically, the decentralized governance led the clerical establishment to accumulate even more power. Equipped with the empowered role that they had received under the Safavids, but without the need to be incorporated into the state, they became an independent power base.

Clerics and related institutions began amassing tremendous wealth in Iraq and Iran, in the face of a weakened state structure, but also due to increased global trade links that generated transnational religious networks. The khums system generated revenue, and more Shiite communities sought to follow noted clerics.

In the 19^th century, the idea of a single reference point for each follower, or marja, gave rise to the notion of marja taqlid, or one’s obligation to emulate a marja who would be above all others. The first of these ‘grand marjas’ was Murtadha Al Ansari, who was based in Najaf (although he had been born in Dezful, Iran). His universal recognition accrued when most other senior clerics of his rank had passed. But like many of the Iraqi-based clerics, his role was religious, not political, and he was away from his native country, based in the Sunni Ottoman Empire.

The successor to Ansari as the marja taqlid (later a title of grand ayatollah) was Mohammed Shirazi, still based in Ottoman Iraq. In Qajar Iran, the clerical establishment and merchant class began to develop closer links in the late 1800s, particularly due to the vast landholdings held by clerics as waqfs (religious endowments). When the Qajar Shah granted the British Empire (through a business representative) a tobacco concession, it inflamed the merchant class, prompting significant protests.

It was around this time that a nascent movement of Islamic revivalism and modernism was advocated by leading thinkers, notably Jamal al-Din al-Afghani. Al Afghani often portrayed himself as a Sunni Muslim from Afghanistan, but he was in fact born to a Shiite family in Asadabad, Iran. Afghani criticized the tobacco concession on an intellectual anti-imperialist ground.

Soon, protests emerged opposing foreign encroachment. Afghani wrote several letters to Shirazi, urging him to use his authority to intervene, which he did (whether incidentally or as a result is not known). After multiple entreaties from Shirazi to the Qajar Shah to withdraw the concession, which he did not, Shirazi issued a fatwa. The concession was subsequently dropped. It was the first real exercise of jurist influence over the matters of the Iranian state (at that time, the Qajar empire), in a spirit of Iranian nationalism.

But it would certainly not be the last.

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Modern Iran (1906-1952)

Entering the modern era, Iran, like many successor states to great empires, sought to become a republic after the American Revolution and the rise of European nationalism. In 1906, it had a revolution of its own that established a constitutional monarchy. The short-lived constitutional revolution followed the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah, the Qajar monarch who had issued the Tobacco concession. It was also around this time that certain clerics began to be called Ayatollah with regularity (simply meaning “sign from God”). The leading jurists at the time, notably Ayatollah Akhund Khorasani, spoke out in favor of democratic rule in the absence of the Mahdi or the hidden imam.

As Khorasani led the clerical establishment to support democratic change against the ruling Qajar Shahs, a later cleric, Sheikh Fazlullah Nouri, who came to oppose the constitutional change, was executed by a constitutional court. He is today recognized by the clerical establishment as a hero for opposing Western-style democracy. Yesterday’s clerical establishment was just as similarly divided as it is today. There is no one unified position.

Similar to the ongoing tug-of-war in the Ottoman Empire, the old political guard remained strong. While the Qajar Shah had approved the new constitution, he died shortly after signing it. In 1907, the British and the Russians signed a treaty that effectively divided Iran into their respective spheres of influence. The Russians ultimately helped defeat constitutionalists, and by 1911, the short-lived constitutional monarchy ended. By that time, multiple concessions, including an oil concession to the British, had been signed and would shape the country’s development for the next century.

Following World War I, the Qajar dynasty was weak, but the Soviet Revolution in Russia also fostered a new dynamic. With new Bolshevik threats, a British General, Edmond Ironside, supported Reza Khan, who commanded a small garrison and led a coup to seize power, which he did in 1921. By 1925, he had installed himself as the new Shah and had placed the Pahlavi dynasty under the 1906 constitution, which, while not fully active, remained the law of the land until the 1979 Islamic Revolution. It was not just the end of the Qajar Dynasty but also the end of the age of empires in Iran.

Reza Khan was not ethnically Persian; his mother was from the Caucasus, and his father was an ethnic Mazanderani. Initially, he was the war minister, and politician Zia ol Din Tabatabaee served as the prime minister, but that was short-lived. He desired to firmly establish an imperial autocracy. In the mold of Ataturk in nearby Turkey, he also undertook modernization efforts, building a railroad and founding the University of Tehran.

The Shah was a secular ruler and was seen as an anti-clerical figure. He supported many reforms at odds with them. He passed laws requiring Western clothing and the mixing of genders. While he passed laws removing clerical authority in family courts and other matters, he did not affect their landholdings.

As such, clerics within Iran adopted a quietest position, similar to their counterparts in Najaf. With the founding of a seminary in Qom by Abdolkarim Haeri Yazdi in 1922, Iran began to develop its own clerical base. This would become critical to its future leadership of the global Shiite community. Ayatollah Yazdi was followed to Qom by a young student, Ruhollah Khomeini.

During World War II, following some losses against the Germans, the Shah’s son, Mohammed Reza Shah, was being positioned to depose his father. There were accusations made against the Shah of sympathies with the Germans, as he had exchanged several letters with Hitler in the 1930s. The USSR and Britain leveraged the younger Shah’s reign to restore Iran’s role as an oil supplier for the allies, and the two countries, in effect, jointly ruled Iran during World War II. The famous Tehran Conference, held in 1943, brought together President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, and UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill for an iconic photo.

From that moment, it was clear that Iran played a central role in the emerging world order, due to its geographic position and oil reserves. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which managed the supplies, eventually became British Petroleum (BP). After World War II, the U.S. and the USSR clashed in what became known as the Iran Crisis in 1946. The struggle for control of Tehran culminated in the Western alliance’s capture of the city, and Soviet troops withdrew to the north.

The younger Shah sought to continue reforms, but also initially provided a political opening to opponents of the monarchy. He allowed for the return of diverse political parties and empowered the parliament’s role in governing. He also relaxed some of the religious restrictions around dress, madrassas, and celebrations that his father had imposed. The entreaty to the clerics coincided with the death of Ayatollah Yazdi. In 1945, his successor, Hossein Borujerdi, was invited to Qom from his hometown of Borujerd and began developing the city into a truly global Shiite center.

In parallel, the specter of religious violence appeared. In the 1940s, a shadowy group, Fadaiyan-e Islam, had led a spate of assassinations, including that of famed secular intellectual, Ahmad Kasravi. Yet, this seemed to be an outlier at the time.

The initial threat to the Shah’s rule did not come from the religious establishment. It came from leftist nationalist forces. The first parliamentary elections were contested by various parties, including Western-allied parties such as the National Will Party, led by Tabatabaee, who had returned from exile after falling out with the younger Shah’s father.

By the end of the decade, a nationalist fervor was in the air. The key figure was Mohammad Mosaddegh. Mosaddegh was a minister in the short-lived government in the early 1920s following the coup that removed the Qajar dynasty. He opposed the return of monarchy in 1925, and left politics at the time, returning to contest elections in the renewed opening led by the Shah’s son in the 1940s.

Mosaddegh’s father had served as a Vizier to a Qajar Shah, and his mother was a Qajar princess. But he had a unique East-West orientation; he had received a PhD in political science from the University of Switzerland in 1913, an unprecedented achievement for an Iranian at the time. He became both popular and politically adept, and in 1951, he was appointed Prime Minister and leader of the National Front movement.

He quickly sought to nationalize the previous British oil concession, which was due to expire in 1993. He also paired that with other social policies, including land reform. After the controversial 1952 parliamentary elections and a confrontation with the Shah around the appointment of ministers, Mosaddegh was not named Prime Minister. As the new government sought to reverse the nationalization of oil, massive street protests broke out.

At that time, many clerics served in parliament. While not a unified bloc, it spoke to the current of combining religious and political legitimacy. Ayatollah Abol Ghasem Kashani called for the Shah-imposed government to fall, and a frightened Shah, who had already faced assassination attempts, called on Mosaddegh to resume the prime ministership, which he did.

Kashani became the Speaker of the Parliament. It was always a tenuous alliance among nationalists, clerics, and leftists, all in one coalition; this also included the communist Tudeh Party, which had no seats but tremendous mobilizing power. As echoed in subsequent decades, the partnership also fell apart in 1953. By the time a coup emerged to remove Mosaddegh from power, he had already lost the support of Ayatollah Kashani.

The success of the famed coup, led by the CIA, was in part due to the American operatives, led by Kermit Roosevelt, as covered in All the Shah’s Men. But it was also a result of growing political opposition to the consolidation of Mosaddegh’s power, who was governing under emergency law, and of the rising economic despair caused by the suspension of British concessions, which affected core industries. Within 10 days of the protests starting in August 1953, the Shah fled to Rome and returned with the backing of CIA officers and General Fazlollah Zahedi, who would become his new Prime Minister.

The aftermath of the 1953 events was telling. The clerical establishment, led by Ayatollah Borujerdi in Qom, remained at their quietest. The political space was fully closed, with Iran soon to become a uniparty state under an authoritarian monarchy. But most of all, it ushered in an American era in Iran.

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The American Era (1954-1978)

Iran quickly became central to the new American security architecture in the Cold War. Upon Israel’s formation, it was shunned by much of the Muslim world and particularly Arab countries. As most of those countries, particularly Syria and Egypt, which were allied with the Soviet Union, the United States found common cause with three countries to effectively shape the region as junior partners: Turkey, Israel, and Iran.

This was the dynamic that held until 1979. Turkey recognized Israel first in 1949, and was followed by Iran in 1950 (although somewhat hidden from view). They formed part of a peripheral alliance and what was formalized as the ‘phantom pact’ between Israel, Turkey, and Iran. The intelligence services of all three countries collaborated closely, and they co-developed weapons, including missile technology. In 1986, it was revealed that Moshe Dayan led efforts to develop nuclear-capable missiles in the mid-1970s with Iran, and they had developed an advanced prototype.

From the 1950s to the 1970s, the Middle East, like most post-colonial settings, was increasingly dominated by leftist ideology, which had an anti-imperial bent, in contrast to authoritarian states. Initially, anti-imperialism was not so much opposed to the United States as to the European powers, and America had taken an anti-imperial stance since President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points were announced in 1918, which supported self-determination partly to weaken European powers.

For example, in 1956, when Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, the UK, France, and Israel attacked and seized the Canal back. Israel also seized the same lands it would later take in 1967, the Gaza Strip and Sinai. President Dwight Eisenhower forced the countries to retreat and return the territories they seized.

In Iran, the United States, following the 1953 coup, reduced the share of the British concession, with proceeds going back to the Iranians and to the United States. In that sense, it was dislodging an imperial vestige from the past. But it was also laying the groundwork for a new imperial footprint.

By the 1960s and 1970s, political anti-imperialism had shifted course, with the United States as the primary target and the Soviet Union, its chief rival, as the primary backer. Many of the militant and revolutionary forces at the time were leftist, Marxist, or communist. Palestinian groups such as the PFLP, DFLP, and even the PLO were decisively so.

This strengthened the hand of authoritarian governments, including the Shah, to crack down on any opposition linked to militancy, communism, or both. The communist-leaning Tudeh Party was banned, even though it was arguably the most popular. In the early 1960s, with the political space completely dominated by his leadership, the Shah sought to exercise his full authority and enacted the White Revolution in 1963. As with most developments throughout Iran’s history, the action precipitated a counterreaction.

The White Revolution was a series of top-down-driven reforms led by the Shah to modernize the country, accelerating what his father had initiated in the 1920s. It further cemented the country’s secular nature and sought to remove the vestiges of formal Islamic oversight over family and personal matters. A key component was women’s universal suffrage. The Shah also protected the rights of religious minorities, but also instrumentalized them when convenient, particularly Iranian Jews and Baha’is.

The clerical establishment’s response addressed the social issues, but not the political ones. In 1961, the leading marja Borujerdi had died. His successor was Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, another quietest cleric. A charismatic figure broke ranks and, in line with the tradition that had come to be expected, led a clerical revolt against reforms. His name was none other than Ruhollah Khomeini.

In a June 1963 sermon marking Ashura, the most prominent religious holiday, Khomeini berated the Shah and his government, accusing them not only of being anti-Islamic but serving Western and Israeli interests. It was a precursor to what would become familiar by the 1970s, but at the time, it was a dramatic, new tone. Khomeini was promptly arrested.

Major riots broke out, and hundreds were killed by the Shah’s forces in the streets in what became known as the 15 Khordad uprising. Khomeini was released but put under surveillance and essentially under house arrest. This did not stop his vocal opposition.

When the Iranian parliament passed a status-of-forces agreement in 1964 authorizing the presence of the U.S. military in the country, he condemned it. Khomeini was subsequently sent into exile, first to Turkey and then to Najaf, in the tradition of my clerics before him. In 1965, the Shah’s Prime Minister was assassinated by a young man linked to religious radicalism. It was another precursor to the political violence on the horizon.

According to recently released government documents, in 1964, the U.S. established contacts with Khomeini’s circle. It would become a recurring theme for the next 50 years. Hidden communication and sometimes coordination, even during times of outward confrontation between Iranian Islamists and the American government.

The evolution of the clerical establishment in Iran was also the culmination of 50 years in which their base of power was slowly eroded, first in the public sphere through their authority in religious matters, and then in the private sphere through their private holdings. The land reforms initiated by the Shah during the White Revolution would have significantly eroded their khums payments and reduced their independence. Khomeini sensed not only the threat but also the potential of the new base of clerical power in Iran itself, as the Qom seminary grew.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s star was rising at a time when the narrative was also shifting in the wider Middle East. Secular nationalists and monarchists ruled most of the Muslim world, and yet were mired in authoritarianism, poverty, and domination by foreign powers. In 1967, Israel seized the remaining Palestinian territories, including East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula, and this time held onto them after the war.

In 1969, the Organization of Islamic States was formed in response to an arson attack at one of the holiest sites in Islam, the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem. A year later, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was dead, giving rise to Anwar Sadat, who would subsequently make peace with Israel. Revolutionary leftism had created space for failed authoritarians, who were now giving way to Western-allied autocrats. There was a space opening for something new.

The idea of Islamist leadership was anomalous to the Muslim world at that time. Figures such as Jamal al-Din Afghani and his intellectual successors, Mahmoud Abdu and Rashid Rida, had probed it theoretically. By the 1950s and 1960s, political Islam was most aggressively being advocated by the (Sunni) Muslim Brotherhood, a movement founded in 1928 in Egypt by Hassan Al Banna. Other scholars, like Pakistan’s Abu Ala Mawdudi, had promoted a form of Islamic government. Yet, Islam had not taken root as a governing force.

One outlier, of course, was the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. While Muslim in character and allied with the Wahhabi movement, it was still predominantly monarchial. Even Saudi Arabia’s outward nature of Sunni Islamism became much more pronounced only following the Islamic Revolution in Iran. It had previously sponsored many Salafi-oriented groups that were quietest in nature.

Following the execution of the Muslim Brotherhood leader Sayyid Qutub in 1966 in Egypt, political Islamism as it existed was also without leadership. Many Muslim Brotherhood movements adopted a quietest approach as they retrenched. Thus, it was no surprise that Israel and even the United States supported some Islamists as a bulwark against communist-linked opponents in the 1970s. Islamism, including the precursor to Hamas, was supported in the Palestinian territories by Israel to oppose the influence of the PLO. At that time, the idea that Islamist militancy could emerge and take over a state and govern it was simply not plausible (or in the political consciousness).

In the 1970s, two armed groups became active in Iran: The Organization of Iranian People’s Fedai Guerrillas and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). The Fedai were a leftist-Marxist group, and they undertook an attack in Gilan province in 1971, killing several soldiers. The ensuing decade saw intermittent, often escalating attacks by various groups.

The MEK was founded initially in 1965 by students from Tehran University. They were a leftist organization, but they also blended an Islamic revolutionary ethos with some Jesuit-based liberation theology. In 1957, the Shah had created a new intelligence directorate, SAVAK. It became increasingly involved in state repression and anti-guerrilla activities.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Shah began to crack down even harder on political dissent. As the Freedom (or Liberation) Movement of Iran, which had taken the mantle of political representation of a more open Iran, was stifled by SAVAK, guerrilla movements took the lead. In the mid-1970s, the Fedai and MEK were successful in the assassination of various officials and several US advisors to the Iranian military.

SAVAK led a crackdown against these groups. The founders of the MEK were arrested, including Mohammad Hanifnejad, and were executed. The MEK then split in the 1970s into an Islamist and a Marxist faction, with the Marxists taking the lead. They bombed the headquarters of several Western companies, such as Pan-American Airlines and Shell Oil Company. Eventually, the Marxist wing became a separate organization, Peymar, and the original MEK fell under the leadership of Masoud Rajavi, who would participate actively in the revolution.

The Islamist-Leftist nexus played out most prominently in intellectual circles. The primary focal point and thinker of this phenomenon was Ali Shariati. In many ways, Shariati was a distinct but co-thought leader with Khomeini in the eventual revolution. Like many intellectuals of the time, he spent formative years in Paris in the 1960s, a hub of anti-colonial and revolutionary activity. He returned to Iran in 1964 and was arrested.

After his release the following year, he began speaking at Hosseiniyeh Ershad, an Islamic cultural center, which increased his popularity. The government shut down the center in 1972, arrested him again, and sent him into exile in 1977, where he died a month later. Shariati was buried in Damascus, close to the Sayyida Zainab mausoleum, a prominent Shiite shrine. Lebanese cleric Musa Sadr led the funeral prayers. The death of Shariati only further popularized his writings, which provided the intellectual underpinning for many leftist and student supporters of the revolution. But his death also left a void that was filled by the growing power of clerical Islamists.

By the mid-1970s, most leading intellectuals had been jailed, guerrilla movements curtailed, and all but one political party banned. The SAVAK was seemingly all-powerful. The Shah also had a largesse at his disposal due to burgeoning oil revenues following the OPEC oil crisis. In the Persian Gulf, the British had withdrawn in 1971 from the Trucial States, leaving Iran as the strongman, further strengthening the Shah’s hand and feeling of invincibility.

The Shah expanded his footprint in the region, seizing two islands claimed by the nascent United Arab Emirates. He grew his overall military presence, supporting Oman’s defeat of the Dhofar rebellion. He also exercised his power in Iraq by backing the Kurds; this relationship continued after the Shah as well. Overall, the Shah was ascendant, but he was also increasingly close to Western interests. Iran grew in the 1970s to become Israel’s primary oil supplier.

The focus within Iran was increasingly on state repression and excess. While the video of the Shah’s famous 1971 celebration of 2500 years of Iranian history has made the rounds, it was the more mundane corruption of government officials and the growing inequality that would serve as the flashpoint.

A new politics began to emerge in opposition. During the Safavid and Qajar dynasties, the clerical establishment had a formal but clear role. Even in the Safavid empire, while they were closely intertwined with the state and held significant oversight roles in society, politics, and governance remained the domain of kings. In modern Iran, the clerical establishment vacillated between quietism and political activism.

The revolutionary ethos of Shiism against injustice, however, made quietism a challenge to sustain. In Iraq, without a Shiite majority, this might make more sense. But in Iran, how could the religious establishment not intervene? The debate within Iran’s clerical establishment coalesced around three groups.

The first group was led by the quietest clerics, notably the leading marja in Iran, Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari. He aligned with Abu al-Qasim al-Khoei, the most senior Shiite religious leader globally in the 1970s and 1980s, who lived in Iraq. This group constituted the majority of clerics. They continued to advocate traditional roles in the social and cultural realms.

The second group supported direct political engagement. That in and of itself was not new, given the history of clerical engagement in the 1906 constitutional revolution, for example. This group included a range of figures within Iran but, notably, outside it.

In Lebanon, a mid-level cleric, Musa Sadr, took on a leading political role and, by the 1970s, emerged as the most well-known Shiite leader in the Middle East. The Shiites in Lebanon were politically disenfranchised compared to the Sunni and Christian communities. Sadr mobilized and founded the Amal Movement, a political group that eventually formed an armed wing. Amal’s initial antagonist was not Israel but the PLO, which was present in South Lebanon.

In 1978, Sadr disappeared, apparently at the hands of Gaddafi, in 1978 during a trip to Libya. It was shortly after he had sharply turned against the PLO after Israel’s Litani Operation in the South of Lebanon. Another Lebanese cleric was Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, who would become the most senior cleric in Lebanon in the 1980s and 1990s. He would become a key spiritual guide to members of Hezbollah, although not an operating leader himself. Both Fadlallah and Sadr drew inspiration from Iraq’s activist cleric, Mohammed Baqir Sadr.

Iraq’s Sadr could be said to be the true intellectual architect of Shiite religious politicization in the modern era. He wrote treatises on an Islamic alternative to both Marxism and capitalism. In the 1950s, the Islamic Dawa Party was formed, and Sadr became its intellectual guide. As Saddam Hussein took control of Iraq, the Party was suppressed, and Sadr was eventually arrested and executed in 1980.

In Bahrain, a Shiite-majority country ruled by a Sunni monarchy after independence in 1971, several clerics were elected to parliament. Notable among them was Isa Qassim. The Shah had claimed Bahrain as an Iranian territory, but in a plebiscite, the population supported independence. In 1975, the parliament was suspended, laying the groundwork for autocratic rule that set the country on a trajectory of constant turmoil, especially following the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

These two intellectual currents of Shiite religious thought were soon to be outflanked by a third, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. Around 1970, Khomeini delivered a set of lectures on an unorthodox concept: Vilayet-e-Faqih, or the rule of the jurist. The case was for an Islamic theocracy, in which a cleric would rule the country. Most of his predecessors who supported politicization either supported political liberalization or the separation of clerical authority from clerical rule.

Khomeini’s concept was also a broadside against the quietest clerics. In that way, while not publicly critical, the more senior clerics marginalized him. After the Islamic Revolution, many figures would go on to support the vilayet-e-faqih, such as Isa Qasim, but before 1979, this support was scarce. Thus, Khomeini was waging a two-pronged propaganda campaign in the 1970s: one that targeted first the religious seminary community and later one that targeted ordinary Iranians.

His network spread this message through a new technology at the time: cassette tapes. Akin to a manual form of social media, Khomeini went increasingly viral through these recordings as the 1970s progressed. Through his base in Najaf, he had a close group of aides and family members who helped establish an organizational structure. This allowed him to reach out to a pan-Shiite community, particularly in the Arab world, as well as to political figures and the media.

Back in Iran, a group of clerics began organizing on his behalf, particularly by spreading his cassette tapes. His status as a lower cleric, along with that of his acolytes, gave them an advantage with the student generation. His rise also empowered his followers within the clerical community, enabling them to skip the decades it would normally take to reach prominence and position.

Many figures orbited his circle, but it is worth noting several, both within and outside Iran, who would go on to play important roles in the revolution and the new structure. Within Iran, this included two who died quickly after the revolution. The first was Morteza Motahari, who helped mobilize clerics and spread ideological messages. He led the Council for the Revolution in 1979 but was killed by the mysterious Furqan Group, which was outwardly anti-clerical but Islamist. The second was Mohammed Behshti, who created a clerical political network, led the initial Islamic Republican Party, but was killed in 1981by the MEK. Many thought Beheshti might succeed Khomeini.

Three others were instrumental before and after the revolution. Hossein-Ali Montazeri was a senior cleric and former student of Khomeini’s; he was imprisoned for a long period in the 1970s. He would be named as his successor in the 1980s but was outmanoeuvred from that role by two individuals just before Khomeini’s death. Montazeri would go on to become a persistent critic of the Islamic regime in Iran in subsequent years.

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was a key bridge between the business community and the clerical establishment. He was also in and out of prison. After the revolution, he served as the Speaker of Parliament and eventually became president.

Ali Khamenei, a former student and preacher who spread Khomeini’s messages, was the other. He was the elected president of revolutionary Iran in 1981 after the impeachment of one president and the assassination of another. Khomeini himself was almost assassinated just before assuming the presidency by Furqan.

Khamenei and Rafsanjani were close and ran many of the internal networks mobilizing support ahead of the revolution. When Khomeini eventually returned to Iran, he had spent nearly 15 years on the outside, leaving him reliant on his confidantes. Khamenei was also an ideological bridge to Islamic militancy. He was known for earlier translating Sayyid Qutub’s works into Persian.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s group became increasingly engaged with the wider political revolutionary movements in the Middle East. His close circle in Najaf, who served as emissaries, included his sons and personal aides, but otherwise very few who would go on to have significant roles after the revolution.

Mohammad Montazeri, the son of Hossein Montazeri, was a key organizer linking Khomeini with Palestinian and regional militant movements. Ali Akbar Mohtashami-Pur was active in building links with militant Palestinian groups in the region. He would later become ambassador to Syria after the revolution, building on these ties to help form Hezbollah.

There is the sense that both Montazeri and Mohtashami viewed Musa Sadr negatively. Sadr himself had maintained close links with the Shah, even sending him a letter with advice on countering Khomeini. In some ways, Musa Sadr viewed himself as a future leader of the Shiites in the region, especially given his joint Arab and Persian lineage. He was also against the concept of vilayet-e-faqih.

At the time of Sadr’s disappearance in Libya, Montazeri was becoming closer to Gaddafi. In later years, another supporter of the revolution who trained with Palestinian guerrilla fighters was revealed to be in Libya during Sadr’s disappearance. His name was Jalal al-Din Farsi. After Sadr’s death, one of his close advisors, Mostafa Chamran, would join the revolutionary movement. Chamran was one of many Iranians living in America. He would go on to become the Islamic Revolutionary government’s first defense minister.

In that brief period, the nascent indigenous leadership and organization of Arab Shiites vanished and would soon come to be dominated by the weight of the Islamic revolution in Iran.

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Revolution and Aftermath (1979-1989)

Mostafa Khomeini, the Ayatollah’s eldest son, died in unclear circumstances in Najaf in late October 1977. The death was seized upon and attributed to agents of the Shah. The death and subsequent 40-day mourning period became a rallying cry, leading to many protests.

In January 1978, at the end of the month of Muharram, which is marked by religious commemoration of the death of Imam Hussein by the Shiite community, a controversial article appeared in the national newspaper entitled. The article directly attacked Ayatollah Khomeini. It immediately sparked protests and became a rallying cry across the country, underscoring the depth of his popularity.

The cycle of mourning became an instrument for further mobilization of protests. At each protest march, students and others would be killed at the hands of the Shah. Then, when memorial services would be held 40 days later, it would be another rallying cry for protests. The cycle engulfed the country in a state of permanent protest and even turned the quietest clerics, like Shariatmadari, against the Shah. In the summer, the Shah responded by offering the opposition a plan for political liberalization and adopting a more Islamic-leaning set of policies.

Then, on August 19, 1978, a fire in the Rex Cinema in the southwestern city of Abadan killed hundreds of moviegoers. An arsonist had barricaded the doors, and rumors abounded that it was done at the direction of security forces. The subsequent protests prompted a harder reaction from the government, which declared martial law.

This then led to Black Friday, when security forces killed dozens of civilians in the heart of Tehran. The protest movement was also supported by many Iranians living abroad, including in the United States. At that time, Iran sent the highest number of university students to America, accounting for up to 50,000 just before the revolution.

By November, in a State Department cable, the US Ambassador said that the Shah “was doomed” and that a deal should be done with Khomeini. The Carter administration ultimately encouraged the Shah to depart Iran after reviewing all other options, including military support. Khomeini had overstayed his welcome in an increasingly restive Iraq, and Saddam Hussein expelled him from Najaf. The Ayatollah found refuge in a suburb of Paris, Neauphle-le-Château. There, he held court with innumerable journalists and recorded cassette tapes featuring diatribes against the Shah, which were then smuggled back into Tehran.

It was in Paris that he assembled a close-knit team to help him assume power on his return. In later years, it would be apparent that the technocratic nationalists that he brought into his circle were never truly considered by him to be true members of the revolution. One of Iran’s perennial opposition statesmen, Mehdi Bazargan, visited Khomeini that November. While instrumental in the 1953 Mosaddegh government and the oil nationalization efforts, Bazargan had remained in Iran following the coup and the eventual political crackdown. A co-founder of the Liberation Movement of Iran, he maintained relations with the army.

Ebrahim Yazdi became Ayatollah’s closest political aide in Paris and handled strategy and foreign contacts. He had been active in the Liberation Movement of Iran. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh was another Iranian with an American education who became closer to Khomeini in Paris. He served as a translator when Khomeini returned to Tehran and would later become the foreign minister. Abolhassan Banisadr, another nationalist leader, joined Khomeini in France and would later become the first elected president of the revolutionary government.

On January 15, a US political envoy met with Ebrahim Yazdi in France to discuss the transition. America still had a significant commercial presence in Iran and several military representatives, and it wanted to safeguard these with the new leadership. The Shah left Iran the next day, never to return. He would first find his way to Egypt. On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran triumphantly and vividly, as he greeted supporters at the airport. He appointed Mehdi Bazargan as interim Prime Minister to lead a transition on February 4, 1979.

The United States began to reorient immediately. In June 1979, it issued the Persian Gulf Security Framework, which marked America’s modern engagement with the Gulf States and the establishment of military bases of significant reach in the region. It was bolstered by what became known as “The Carter Doctrine”, which read:

“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by the use of any means necessary, including military force.”

This statement was formalized in one of President Carter’s final directives on January 15, 1981, before leaving office.

The Carter administration’s policies led to the creation of a rapid deployment task force that ultimately became what is known today as Central Command, or CENTCOM, in 1983. CENTCOM has served as the primary coordinating body for almost every major U.S. military deployment over the past 40 years. CENTCOM, while responding to the threat of Iran, intentionally excluded Syria, Lebanon, and Israel at the outset. This changed in 2004. Israel was then moved from the European Command to CENTCOM in 2021. In that sense, the centrality of U.S. efforts in the region was first closely tied to energy security.

The attitude of revolutionaries towards American and Western diplomats was one of open hostility. There had already been a partial takeover of some embassies in the Spring. In November 1979, a new group of students took over the US Embassy after the Shah was let into the United States for medical treatment. When Ayatollah Khomeini blessed the takeover after the fact, it led to the resignation of Bazargan and the entire interim cabinet.

It marked the beginning of the end of the fragile coalition of nationalist, leftist, and Islamic revolutionaries. In that sense, the hostage crisis was as much an internal tool as an external display. Yet it was seared into the memory of all Americans. Already reeling from high gas prices, there was open antagonism towards Middle Eastern countries.

The hostage crisis became a 444-day saga that in many ways propelled Ronald Reagan to the presidency in 1981, especially after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw. This rescue plan instead resulted in the deaths of U.S. service members in a helicopter crash. The hostage crisis ended on January 20, 1981, at the onset of Reagan’s presidency.

In New York at the time, a young Donald Trump was the talk of the town as he was building what was purported to be the city’s most luxurious tower, Trump Tower. During his first-ever extended national interview with Rona Barrett, the real estate developer was asked if he would ever run for president. He spoke at length about the Iranian hostage crisis:

“In that conversation, he spoke to America’s “potential” and the idea that the country could go on to regain what it once was, so that it “gets the respect of other countries.” He also provided a probing reading of the Iranian hostage crisis and the Iran-Iraq war, shedding light on the peace-through-strength inclination that would echo later in his political career.” – Trump 2.5: A Primer

At the outset of his second term, many decades later, Donald Trump announced the release of Israeli hostages from Gaza. And at the beginning of 2026, after a perilous operation in Venezuela to arrest and extract the president, he remarked, “You know you didn’t have a Jimmy Carter crashing helicopters all over the place.”

After the resignation of the interim government, a massive crackdown began. It was around this time that figures like Sadegh Khalkhali, an early disciple of Khomeini’s who had dabbled in Islamist militancy prior to the revolution, were ascendant. Khalkhali had been appointed as the leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts. Initially, he was carrying out summary executions of former members of the Shah’s regime, such as the former head of SAVAK. But soon he turned his sights to newer opponents.

In particular, the Kurds in Iran faced his scrutiny. While the Islamic Revolution pacified much of the country, the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (KDPI) launched an independence rebellion in March 1979. Eventually, the new government in Tehran would suppress the rebellion, and many of the forces would escape to Iraqi Kurdistan.

Khalkhali presided over the execution of Jewish businessman Habib Elghanian, which sent shockwaves through the Iranian Jewish community. A meeting held by several rabbis with Khomeini in the days after afforded essentially protection moving forward, at least for non-Zionist Jews. For many other minorities, the regime established a period of suffocation that continues to this day. This was especially true for non-Twelver Muslim minorities, Sufi orders, and the Bahai community.

In 1980, Abolhassan Banisadr became the first elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, with Khomeini’s blessing. It was clear, however, that there were parallel institutions to the civilian government, driven by new Islamic bodies. This period, from 1981 to 1982, was marked by civil strife in Iran. It led to the arrest and execution of thousands, the purge of an even greater number, and the departure of many Iranians from the country who believe in a democratic but not Islamically authoritarian Iran. It was not a one-way battle.

On June 28, 1981, a bomb exploded at the headquarters of the Islamic Republican Party. Some of the most prominent members of the revolution were killed, including Mohammed Montazeri and Ayatollah Beheshti. The assassination attempt on Ali Khamenei came that same month, but he survived.

Banisadr was subsequently impeached by one of the many entities of the new structure and went into hiding. Later that summer, President Mohammad-Ali Rajai, who had succeeded Banisadr, was assassinated. Most of these attacks were believed to have been led by the MEK following the Guardian Council’s exclusion of Masoud Rajavi from politics. In October 1981, Ali Khamenei was elected president.

The Iranian hostage crisis spurred another creation for the U.S., which was called the Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) and is today known as Task Force Orange. In addition to human and signals intelligence, the group would also go on to participate in various covert operations, including within Kurdish areas in Iraq and Iran.

Iran also repurposed its military and intelligence services during the revolutionary time. The main branch established was the IRGC, led by its special operations division, the Al Quds Force, which focused on territory outside Iran. The IRGC, formulated in the Spring of 1979, was led in part by two Iranian Americans, Mostafa Chamran and Mohsen Sazegara. Mohsen Rezaei also joined early on and would go on to play a leading role. But the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS) was also active, repurposing intelligence links and capabilities established by the SAVAK. It became known as VEVAK.

The Iran-Iraq War, sometimes known as the first Gulf War, started in September 1980 when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. It continued and ended in a stalemate eight years later, leaving up to 1 million dead. The war allowed Khomeini to foster a new Shiite-infused nationalism, while also targeting domestic threats even further. In that vein, he led a crackdown on the longstanding Tudeh Party. The war opened the opportunity for regional expansionism through proxies. In Iraq, this included arming both the Kurds and a guerrilla unit of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, called the Badr Corps.

For the United States, the decision was made early on to support the Iraqis, including with weapons and other intelligence support. The U.S. remained silent when, later in the decade, the Iraqi army used chemical weapons in Halabja. In the 1980s, as the Soviet Union began to weaken, the American military devoted significant attention to combating Iran. The base Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean went through major upgrades to support the air effort, which would later become critical for the 1991 Gulf War and subsequent operations against Iran. President Reagan appointed one of his key advisors, Donald Rumsfeld, as a special envoy to Iraq. He famously visited Saddam Hussein in 1983.

In Lebanon, the situation became even deadlier as the indirect confrontations between the United States and Iran picked up pace. The U.S. deployed Marines in 1982 as part of a peacekeeping force. By the early 1980s, there were a dozen separate Iranian-backed Lebanese militias. The IRGC began training recruits at specialized camps in the Bekaa. Deeper links were developed with Libya and Syria in this effort.

Initially, the attacks undertaken by these new Islamist militants targeted Israeli forces who had remained in Lebanon despite the PLO’s withdrawal in 1982. It was during this period that a core group was recruited that would eventually lead Hezbollah, once formally formed, a decade later. That included Imad Mughniyeh, who was perhaps the most instrumental of them all. One of Mughniyeh’s cousins, Mustafa Badredinne, and then brother-in-law, also received training in Lebanon and would succeed Mughniyeh upon his assassination by Israel decades later. With the U.S. engaging on the Iraq side to target Iranian forces, Iran decided to play the same role in Lebanon to target American forces.

This began a long period that continued in multiple theaters, particularly in later years in Iraq, whereby the IRGC facilitated, supplied, and sometimes even ordered proxy groups to attack American forces. In October 1983, suicide car bombs hit the U.S. Marine Barracks and French military station, killing 241 American and 58 French personnel.

While the U.S. did not immediately respond militarily, two years later, the CIA would orchestrate a bomb blast in Beirut targeting Ayatollah Fadlallah, killing 80 people; Fadlallah was not present. Americans in Lebanon soon faced a spate of kidnappings, bombings, and counterattacks. Quixotically, during this time, Iran-US engagement, negotiations, and arms trading actually grew. Lebanon and Iraq became the theaters that brought Iran and the United States closer together and drove them further apart.

The Iran-Iraq war had become a stalemate by the mid-1980s, but with an escalating series of attacks in the 1980s. After Iraq began hitting Iran’s oil facilities on Kharg Island, the Iranians threatened to shut down the Strait of Hormuz. But they also began to target oil tankers directly. In what became known as the Arabi Island incident in 1984, the Saudis shot down an Iranian fighter jet that had violated their airspace. It set a precedent that would stave off direct attacks on Saudi territory in subsequent years. The Gulf countries and the US began a new phase of military collaboration.

Iran would specifically target tankers from countries seen as the main backers of the war, notably Kuwait. Lloyds of London either dramatically increased premiums or refused to issue insurance, and over the course of the decade, hundreds of ships were attacked. Kuwait entered into an agreement with the United States for the naval protection of its ships in Gulf waters against Iran. The deadliest incident was a case of friendly fire, when 37 US sailors died in a missile attack not from Iran, but an errant Iraqi fighter jet in 1987 on the USS Stark.

President Reagan authorized broader naval engagement to ensure safe passage in the Strait of Hormuz and associated waterways. The U.S. ships accompanying Gulf ships were increasingly targeted by Iranian sea mines. This led to Operation Praying Mantis, the largest naval surface battle for the U.S. since World War II, in 1988. It was the last true navy-to-navy battle the U.S. has had, and in some ways, the sinking of an Iranian ship off the coast of Sri Lanka in 2026 harkens back to that event.

When a US naval ship shot down a civilian airliner in Iranian airspace just months after Operation Praying Mantis, it had the effect of cementing de-escalation on all sides moving forward. Everyone had had enough. A month after that incident in which 290 civilians died, Iraq and Iran entered into a ceasefire of the nearly decade-long war that cost one million lives.

Iranian activities and subterfuge in Gulf countries also occurred covertly throughout the 1980s. These efforts notably targeted Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Largely, the UAE, Qatar, and Oman were not subject to this. Bahrain had a majority Shiite population that was increasingly susceptible to clerical advocacy. Saudi Arabia’s oilfields were in the Eastern Province, with a majority Shiite population. Kuwait was, of course, home to significant Western assets, and while its Shiite population was not in the majority, it was a substantial minority of 20-25%.

In Kuwait, a series of bombings over the course of the decade killed 25 people across U.S. installations, cafes, and other facilities. They were tied to a later Hezbollah operative, Mustafa Badreddine. He would escape in a jailbreak during the Gulf War and was killed in 2016 while operating in Syria. In Bahrain, there were smaller-scale attacks as well as an earlier coup attempt. There were recurring incidents at the hajj in Saudi Arabia, particularly in the late 80s, that authorities blamed on Iranian elements.

Despite all that was occurring, in the mid-1980s, the U.S. had started to initiate arms sales to Iran in exchange for hostages held in Lebanon and other concerns. It was, in fact, the Israelis who were initially sending arms to Iran. Their go-between, an Iranian named Manucher Ghorbanifar, also became a central figure in the Iran-Contra affair. In exchange for 500 Tow missiles that arrived via Israel through Ghorbanifar, but then backfilled by the United States, they received one hostage from Lebanon.

Over time, the relationship was revealed to be far more extensive than originally thought. It included direct intelligence sharing, for example, on Iraqi positions given to the Iranians. This led to an increase in meetings, first through intermediaries and outside the United States. In early 1986, former national security advisor Robert McFarlane and a presidential envoy took a delegation to Iran.

And then on September 19, 1986, a delegation of IRGC representatives flew to Washington, D.C. to meet with White House official Oliver North, including a nephew of Rafsanjani. Key actors who facilitated dealings with the Americans included Rafsanjani, Mir-Houssein Mousavi (who later became a leader of the Green Movement), and Hassan Karoubi.

The Iran-Contra affair led to a significant scandal in the United States when it came to light and was an eventual embarrassment for the Reagan administration. That was partly due to off-the-books payments resulting from the arms sales to Iran. Yet it also showed that Iran and the United States could both battle one another, while also dealing behind the scenes.

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The Islamic Iranian Intermezzo (1989-2000)

As the Iran-Iraq war was coming to a close in 1988, the regime in Tehran was moving from a revolutionary to a stable setting. It would need to focus on domestic affairs and on consolidating the state apparatus. Moreover, the factionalization that occurred under the Supreme Leader was not sustainable without clear leadership. Khomeini was aging and would soon hand over power.

This would be the first test for Islamic Iran, which was built around a theocracy. While there was contestation over Khomeini as the leading Shiite jurist – that title, for most global Shiites, remained with Ayatollah Al Khoei in Iraq – he was the most charismatic religious leader in the public sphere. The choice for succession would have to be someone of strong political leadership or impeccable religious credentials.

That was supposed to be Hossein Ali Montazeri. He was also the designated successor. But in 1988, he had a falling-out with Ayatollah Khomeini following the Iran-Contra affair, which ended Montazeri’s path. Otherwise, a moderate, he viewed the engagement with the Americans as tantamount to treason. Mehdi Hashemi, a confidante of his late son, learned about a meeting in Tehran during a U.S. delegation’s visit earlier in 1986.

Hashimi leaked the story to the Lebanese press, and it sparked the scandal in the United States, leading to embarrassment for the Reagan administration. Hashimi was tried and sentenced to death. When Montazeri tried to intercede through an exchange of letters with Khomeini, he was summarily dismissed as Deputy Supreme Leader in Khomeini’s public response.

It was hard to know what else was unfolding behind the scenes as the leadership transition approached, but Rafsanjani and Khamenei appeared to be orchestrating their rise to power. Montazeri had become a liability for the future of the revolutionary system. While he was popular, he was not as ardent an Islamic theocrat and was not as effusive aboutvilayet-e-faqih in its absolute form (mutlaq).

Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989. A constitutional revision process was underway that was passed shortly after Ali Khamenei’s ascension to Supreme Leader in June 1989. The lines between the Guardian Council and the Expediency Council were delineated to hold power above the political process, effectively disempowering the majlis (parliament) and the presidency, as the bodies could review legislation, veto candidates, and exercise other responsibilities. An Assembly of Experts was tasked with electing and supervising the Supreme Leader.

In 2018, a video leaked from the Assembly of Experts session that elected Khamenei highlighted concerns about his election as Supreme Leader, including that it was originally intended to be temporary. The revised constitution removed the requirement for the Supreme Leader to be a marja-e-taqlid. Khamenei’s legitimacy would derive from his political and military control rather than from his religious standing.

Ayatollah Khamenei’s long-time collaborator, Rafsanjani, was elected president in 1989. While ever the pragmatist and focused on finding common ground with the United States, he was also liberalizing the economy at home. A new Tehran was emerging: literate, urban, and business-minded. While many benefited from the war dividend, others remained part of the rural poor, or were now in the cities but on the outside, looking in at the new excesses of both regime operatives and traders enriching themselves, while inflation abounded.

The political cycle played out on both sides of the world. The U.S. held an election in January 1989 that brought George W. Bush to power. It was a time of a sea change in the world order. The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan, and by the end of 1989, it was clear the Cold War was ending with the fall of the Berlin Wall.

The United States shifted its posture as it ushered in an era of Pax Americana and a new role in the Middle East. National Security Directive 26, issued by President George HW Bush on October 2, 1989, outlined the emerging strategy towards Iran, Iraq, and Persian Gulf allies. It laid the groundwork for what would begin to unfold in the early 1990s. The focus was clearly on energy security and the protection of the Gulf Cooperation Council states.

In that environment, Rafsanjani saw an opportunity. When President Bush sought to resolve the case of the remaining American hostages, Rafsanjani agreed, and a young diplomat, Javad Zarif, was tasked with leading the negotiations with the UN intermediary, Giandomenico Picco. Also involved was Hossein Mousavian, who today is based at Princeton University.

As President Bush’s term progressed, they were open to Iranian engagement but had other priorities. The Mujahideen in Afghanistan began to move into new theaters of operation. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were dismembering, with conflicts erupting in Chechnya and Bosnia, and challenges emerging in a new Europe. Meanwhile, a new form of Salafi-jihadist terrorism was emerging. When Iraq attempted to seize Kuwait, the entire notion of Iran as a preeminent concern dissipated.

Rafsanjani’s enthusiastic backing for the engagement led to the eventual release of all the hostages, with journalist Terry Anderson being the final hostage released in 1991. Yet, in the end, no reciprocation came from the White House. The priority of the administration following the Gulf war and weapons deal with the GCC countries was now squarely on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process following the Madrid Conference. But there were also broader concerns now.

In February 1992, Israel assassinated the secretary-general of Hezbollah, Abbas Musawi. In retaliation, a group calling itself Islamic Jihad Organization, reportedly linked to Iran, bombed a Jewish center in Buenos Aires, killing 29 people on March 17. Iran wanted to compartmentalize progress. For the Bush administration, this was not possible. This moment indicated that progress between Iran and the United States in one area risked being undermined in another.

As the Clinton Administration took office in 1993, the region’s landscape was changing. Like his predecessor, President Clinton focused on the peace process and hosted the iconic signing of the Oslo Accords in his first year in office. For Israel, Iraq was fading as a preeminent enemy, and the PLO was largely contained. Negotiations with Syria under Hafez al-Assad were ongoing. Libya, which was a strong adversary in the 1980s, was heavily constrained by sanctions. It was increasingly clear that by 1993, Israel’s threat was from sub-state groups in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.

Iran itself had not backed away from supporting transnational proxy groups; it was doubling down on them. It began to support Hamas financially and operationally in the early 1990s, and through Syria, facilitated connections with another proxy force, Hezbollah. The first suicide bombing in the West Bank took place in 1993, and more continued throughout the decade.

Rafsanjani, ever the pragmatist, continued to make overtures to the United States. In 1995, apparently with the Supreme Leader’s blessing, he offered the American oil company Conoco a $1 billion contract to develop an oil field. The Clinton administration blocked it. Congress then passed legislation further restricting trade with Iran. For Rafsanjani, it was a failure, but for the Ayatollah Khamenei, it was as expected.

As with his predecessor, Khamenei would keep one hand outstretched to the Americans to speak, while continuing to support hostilities in the background. Nowhere was this truer than in Saudi Arabia. In 1996, a terror attack on the Khobar Towers by a group calling itself Hezbollah al Hejaz killed 19 people. The complex housed U.S. military personnel. It took place amid intense negotiations over a Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. U.S. authorities identified the perpetrators the following year, who provided evidence of Iranian involvement.

In 1997, a reformist candidate, Mohammed Khatami, decisively won the presidential election in Iran with the backing of women, students, and liberals. A generation with limited recollection of the Shah was now becoming a rising share of the electorate. That same year, Mohsen Rezai was replaced by Yahya Rahim Safavi as chief commander of the IRGC. The next year, Qassem Soleimani replaced Ahmed Vahidi as commander of the Al Quds Force.

On the one hand, Iran was about to embark on a massive project of international dialogue and civilian-facing reform led by Khatami. And on the other hand, it was about to build a military juggernaut that would come to dominate the Middle East over the next decade, led by Safavi and Soleimani.

Increasingly, Iran was portrayed in Washington DC, especially by interests close to Israel, as the preeminent global threat by groups. This was anchored in either Israel-adjacent narratives or the neoconservative project. But the military establishment and Gulf allies echoed this concern, often driven by Iran’s own actions.

Following the Khobar attack in 1997, CENTCOM began preparing a contingency war plan with Iran that would take two years to complete. The ultimate objective? Regime change. In 1999, protests broke out primarily in cities, starting at the University of Tehran. They were the biggest demonstrations since the revolution. But they were quickly curtailed. And even President Khatami distanced himself.

The protests occurred during an explosion of modern Iranian intellectualism, journalism, and cultural expression. The Iranian film industry had always been of a high standard, but now it was exploring more topics. Hundreds of newspapers were established, often reform-minded and liberal. It was in the mid-1990s when intellectuals like Abdolkarim Soroush began shaping a new discourse about Islam and politics. It was an opening of vibrant debate. But the Islamic government repressed it heavily in the coming years, and many individuals went to prison or into exile.

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Axis of Evil (2001-2008)

On January 20, 2001, President Bush assumed his duties in the Oval Office. His Iranian presidential counterpart would remain Khatami, who would be re-elected in June. Yet all would be different just a few months later. The September 11 attacks dramatically altered the stance in Washington towards the Middle East. Business as usual would not suffice. At the forefront of threats in the world was terrorism.

The perpetrators this time, however, were Sunni Islamists, not Shiite Islamists. It was an opening for Iran. The two biggest countries the U.S. was focused on were Afghanistan and Iraq. These were two neighbors whom Iran saw as part of its civilizational heritage. Iran wanted to expand its influence, and if that meant direct cooperation with the United States, it was ready.

The first ‘official’ meeting between U.S. and Iranian officials in two decades followed. Ryan Crocker led the relationship on the American side, and Javad Zarif on the Iranian side. This set forth a dialogue for months that operated across multiple forums, involving multiple touchpoints and spanning a range of issues, first focused on Afghanistan but, in those same meetings, also touching on other regional issues. There was no real overt change in U.S. policy nor in the IRGC’s regional activities.

In Afghanistan, the coordination, however, was significant, which included the Iranians providing the U.S. with Taliban troop positions ahead of the invasion. They began sharing intelligence on Al Qaeda prisoners being held by Iran. But suspicions remained, and then during the State of the Union address in early 2002, George W. Bush announced to the world who America’s enemies were: the axis of evil – Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

When the U.S. invaded and removed from power another Iranian adversary in March 2003, it was not in coordination with Tehran. Following the invasion of Iraq and the immediate aftermath, the sights were on Iran and other rogue threats. In Libya, negotiations in late 2003 led to a subtle detente, with the country agreeing to forgo weapons of mass destruction. The war in Iraq was becoming problematic at the least, and there was no appetite in Washington for any military intervention against Iran.

In 2005, a new project led by administration officials Elliot Abrams and Liz Cheney was formed, called the Iran-Syria Working Group, which created an action plan to foment a popular uprising in Iran. This was at the same time that the State Department set up an Iran office in the Dubai consulate. As in the past, both sides would have one hand reaching out for diplomacy while the other lagged, moving toward a more aggressive posture, and then they would seem to alternate.

Zarif was by now the Iranian ambassador to the UN. In his palatial residence originally bought by the Shah, he would host dinners [disclosure: the author attended one of these], inviting policymakers and others, often with his wife by his side, reciting snippets of Persian poetry along the way. It was part of the same duality, in many ways a sleight of hand, since the beginning of the revolution. Zarif was leading the charm offensive. He even brought former Mohammad Khatami to Harvard University for a lecture on September 10, 2006. It was an attempt to counter the public message of the Bush Administration.

That would be harder than before, however, as the year prior, Iranians had elected a firebrand populist to the presidency, named Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, in a political earthquake. After two terms of a reformist president, like in many countries, the population wanted change. Ahmadinejad was a populist and enjoyed favor among the working and rural poor. Many had also lost faith in the reform movement that had failed to deliver results.

But overall, it was a clear sign of the Supreme Leader’s disapproval of the direction of the country’s relationship with its chief rival, America. Since 1989, he had endorsed the pragmatic, outreach-oriented approach, collaborating in Afghanistan, even militarily, on American intervention. The view in Iran was also that the country’s hand was getting stronger, just as America’s was getting weaker.

Ahmedinejad was not a cleric. And his rival in the election was Rafsanjani. The result demonstrated that Khamenei was clearly in charge. It also put not just reformists but also moderates on the back foot. The rise of Ahmadinejad empowered a new guard who were not necessarily ideologues or part of the clerical establishment. Rather, they were leaders backed by the IRGC, which was increasingly business-minded.

In 2006, Iran and the United States moved closer towards confrontation. In the summer, Israel and Hezbollah went to war, and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice arrived in Beirut, famously declaring it “the birth pangs of a new Middle East.” But in the war, Hezbollah displayed unprecedented capabilities. The U.S. marched instead to the Security Council. It was able to have Resolution 1737 approved, which enacted sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program, and then, a few months later in 2007, it limited arms sales through another resolution. China and Russia refrained from exercising their vetoes.

Iran’s answer to this was to enrich even more uranium. They expanded the site at Natanz. But it was in Iraq that the confrontation increased. The one directing the rising attacks targeting U.S. soldiers through Shiite proxies was Qassem Soleimani.

In Iraq, the Arab centers of Najaf and Kerbala were always held in higher regard than Qom. Ayatollah Sistani was the undisputed marja of global Shiites. And with Saddam Hussein no longer in place, new powerbrokers could emerge in Iraq that could rival Iran. And, notably, one did: Moqtada al-Sadr. A cousin of Musa al-Sadr and hailing from the lineage of the highly respected Sadr family (his uncle was executed by Saddam Hussein in 1980), he immediately garnered support.

Qassem Soleimani partially co-opted the movement by enabling financing to flow to them. Just like Iran had done in Lebanon and elsewhere, it sought in Iraq to dominate the Shiite scene to forward its influence and displace all other actors. That often meant a more sectarian and aggressive approach.

Soleimani, however, was much more strategic than previous commanders. He was building an integrated type of regional deterrence. For years, Arab leaders had warned that Iran was building a ‘Shiite crescent’ to encircle American allies. It was part-conspiratorial and paranoid, but events precipitated by the U.S. brought it closer to reality. The Al Quds commander started to leverage the new base in Iraq to create a direct smuggling route from Iran, through Iraq, across Syria, and into Lebanon, now all connected through proxies and allies.

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Art of the Deal (2009-2016)

In 2009, Ahmadinejad was re-elected, but the result was widely contested due to alleged fraud. His reformist opponent was Mir Hossein Mousavi, who had served as prime minister in the 1980s. Meanwhile, across the proverbial pond, in the United States, Barack Obama was also ushering in a new era.

Millions of Iranians flooded the streets in the summer amid allegations of vote-rigging. This was a generation that had come to age after not just the revolution but also the Iran-Iraq War. All they knew was the government that ruled over them, and they were not happy. With Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State and two young apparatchiks by her side, Alec Ross and Jaren Cohen, the administration supported the protests that emerged.

It would become known as the Green Movement and served as a precursor to the Arab Spring. It also gave Twitter an outsized profile as a mobilizing force. But the opening was short-lived. The regime crushed the protests as well as the reformist movement. Later that December, Ayatollah Montazeri died. With him vanished an original leader of the revolution who presented an alternative vision.

For the Obama administration, the Green Movement was a complication. The president had entered with the mindset of having a reset with America’s adversaries, including Iran. It was here that the interests of Israel and America began to diverge sharply. Early in his presidency, coinciding with a public Nowruz address, Obama had sent a private letter to the Supreme Leader. It went unanswered.

Yet, in October 2009, despite the Green Movement, the U.S. pursued direct engagement with Iranian officials. At a high-level meeting between William Burns, then Deputy Secretary of State, and Saeed Jalili, initial alignment was reached. It had not, however, been blessed by the Supreme Leader, who quickly undermined the framework. This hardened the Obama administration’s stance towards Iran during the first term.

In 2010, a major WikiLeaks release revealed that many of the Gulf countries Iran was looking to restore relations with were working closely with the United States to contain Iran. It only strengthened the already intractable views of hardliners within the regime. Khamenei, after three decades, was under no illusions. He never trusted the Americans nor the Gulf states.

As such, the aggressive posture of Israel was not initially a challenge as it strengthened the Obama administration’s hand in nuclear negotiations. A campaign of assassination of nuclear scientists began at that time. Also, Israel launched Stuxnet, a computer virus to disable key facilities. Meanwhile, groups such as Jundullah, a Balochi Islamist group, ramped up attacks, perhaps supported by some Gulf actors and Israel.

The Obama administration, for its part, led a stifling sanctions campaign against Iran. Much of that sanctions regime centered on the UAE. By 2010, Abu Dhabi, under its crown prince, the de facto leader, was starting to assert its leadership within the Gulf. The crackdown in Dubai on Iranian-linked entities was total. The United States even removed the MEK from its list of terrorist organizations.

At the UN Security Council, Israel’s Benjamin Netanyahu famously hoisted a crude photo of Iran’s nuclear progress in 2012. That same year, the Obama administration renewed sanctions in UN Security Council Resolution 2049.

The pressure and posturing eventually led to a détente in 2013 as Obama entered his second term. The shuffling of the deck had become commonplace by this point for both Iran and the United States, who were always hedging between accommodation and compromise. In Iran, Hassan Rouhani, a perceived moderate, was elected president, defeating a slate of revolutionary hardliners, including Saeed Jalili, Mohammed Ghalibaf, and Mohsen Rezaee, by winning a majority in the first round.

While the Obama administration had made overtures, including direct ones, the Green Movement, followed by the Arab Spring, had made public engagement with Middle Eastern autocracy a challenge. Soon after the start of Obama’s second term, in March 2013, Oman began facilitating direct negotiations headed by National Security Advisor to the Vice President Jake Sullivan and several Iranian counterparts. After Rouhani’s June win, President Obama spoke by phone with him.

With Secretary of State John Kerry on one side and a familiar face, Javad Zarif, now the minister of foreign affairs, on the other, the negotiations moved quickly toward what was called a Joint Plan of Action by November 2013. Zarif was supported by his deputy, Abbas Araghchi, who would go on to become minister of foreign affairs almost a decade later. The overall participants included not just the US but also the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5+1).

This was a provisional agreement, but it took effect in January 2014 while negotiations continued on the broader Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). There was a lot of criticism of the agreement, publicly from Israel and privately from Gulf allies. In both the United States and Iran, there was skepticism from expected corners. Iran immediately received $4.2 billion in frozen funds by the summer of 2014.

As the Obama administration continued to pursue a new global order driven by diplomacy, peace, and accommodation with former adversaries, world events slowly came to the fore. Around the same time of the negotiations in 2013, the White House backed off a stated red line regarding the use of chemical weapons by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, an ally of Iran. Instead, it deferred to a Russia-led initiative to disarm Syria of chemical and biological weapons.

Two months after the initial deal with Iran, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea in March 2014 from Ukraine, beginning a long war in the eastern part of the country. A few months later, ISIS declared an Islamic State in part of Syria and Iraq. The Houthis took Yemen’s capital, Sanaa, in 2014. In January 2015, King Salman ascended to the throne in Saudi Arabia and anointed his son, Mohamed bin Salman (MBS), as de facto ruler. MBS soon launches an offensive in Yemen that the Obama administration chose to support.

A few months later, in the summer of 2015, Qassem Soleimani reportedly flew to Moscow to draft a new regional framework of cooperation with Russia, particularly in Syria. In September 2015, Russia began a sustained aerial bombardment campaign to support the Assad government. Apparently, an operations room was established that linked Hezbollah, Iran, Russia, and Syria. Iran, which had become increasingly isolated in the region by both governments and leaders of popular uprisings, especially due to its relationship with the Assad government, was focused on a longer-term strategic view.

In the midst of all this, just before the final JCPOA was signed on July 14, 2015, Donald Trump famously descended the escalator at Trump Tower on 5^th Avenue and declared his candidacy for president. One of his chief talking points: he would rip up the newly signed JCPOA.

On ‘implementation day’ of the nuclear deal, January 16, 2016, it is estimated that Iran received upwards of tens of billions of dollars in frozen funds from previous years of sanctions. With all the other regional flashpoints, it was a boon to both its domestic standing, especially amidst flagging oil prices. It also created a new pipeline of funding for proxy groups when it was most needed.

Meanwhile, Qassem Soleimani has organized in Iraq a force of popular mobilization units (PMU), essentially Shiite militias, to combat ISIS. They operated under American air cover as they were technically integrated into the Iraqi army. On the ground, Hezbollah operatives were moving from Lebanon to Syria to Iraq, and then into other countries, notably Yemen. The transregional network of Iran was reaching its height, targeting the interests of American allies just as America was seeking engagement with Iran. There was even a large battalion of Afghan Shiites called the Liwa Fatemeyoun.

Meanwhile, the split that had occurred over Syria between Iran and Hamas ended after the 2014 Gaza War. The next few years saw the restoration of ties. By 2017, a full rapprochement would be underway, including the supply of new weapons and funding.

In 2015, the events in Washington and the region led Israel and Gulf countries to deepen intelligence and security ties. Israel opened an office in Abu Dhabi. In a famous interview on the Obama Doctrine, the president said, “Saudi Arabia and Iran need to find an effective way to share the neighborhood and institute some sort of cold peace.” It would prove prescient, but the conditions were not ripe then.

In Iran, the Al Quds Force and the IRGC were ascendant, and the JCPOA ushered in a new era and resurgence of the growing business conglomerates under the Revolutionary Guard. This included Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters, Bonyad Taavon Sepah, the Sepah Cooperative Foundation, the Etemad Mobin Consortium, and others, which together operated across infrastructure, energy, telecoms, finance, and large state development projects. It also solidified Iran’s growing non-clerical leadership. This included figures like Ebrahim Raisi, Mohammed Bagher Qalibaf, Saeed Jalili, and Ali Larijani. And for a while, Qassem Soleimani.

With an ever stronger Iran, allied with Russia, and oil prices at a nadir, the Gulf and Israel engaged both the Democratic and Republican sides ahead of the 2016 elections. They needed a change. The region, in their view, was being lost to the Russians, Iranians, Sunni Islamists, and vacuums of power.

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Art of the Assassination (2017-2020)

After President Trump was inaugurated, his first trip was to Saudi Arabia, followed by Israel. It was a clear sign of things to come. There was no mistaking the policy towards Iran: it would be facing a 180. There was no interest in renewing the rapprochement. In Iran, the hardline element felt vindicated. For Ayatollah Khamenei, it renewed his long-held view that the Americans could not be trusted. Still, as usual, he leveraged Iran’s political structure to deploy the hand that was needed.

The Gulf’s initial preoccupation was not with Iran but rather a squabble between neighbors. In May 2017, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates initiated a blockade against Qatar. It was also a time when Turkey was rising, which quickly came to Qatar’s aid. Yet the Trump administration had different plans for the region: one integrated security zone.

In that sense, they wanted to recreate the pre-1979 architecture, but this time swapping out one side of the Persian Gulf for the other. By 2018, the U.S. withdrew from the JCPOA, and by April 2019, it had declared the IRGC itself as a terrorist organization. As Iran’s leading military branch, it would have far-reaching consequences. But to encircle Iran, a more transformative approach would be needed.

After the killing of ISIS leader Baghdadi in October 2019, the attention fully turned to Iran. Tensions had already begun flaring due to maritime skirmishes, rising sanctions called ‘maximum pressure’, and targeted attacks by Iran, first on oil tankers such as in Fujairah and then on Saudi oilfields in late 2019. The target, the Saudi Abqaiq oil facility, was the largest of its kind in the world. While the Houthis initiated the attack, it was clear that Iran was strengthening the group’s hand.

Iraqi militias, notably Kataeb Hizbollah, also escalated their attacks using drones on U.S. targets in Iraq. In late December, when a U.S. contractor was killed, the U.S. bombed key militia sites, which led to militia members swarming the U.S. embassy, although no one was injured. Just 3 days later, Qassem Soleimani was killed along with a senior Iraqi militia commander.

The assassination of Iran’s top military commander was an earthquake in the U.S.-Iran dynamic. As commander of the Quds Force, Soleimani reported directly to the Supreme Leader. But he was much more than just a high-level figure. For over two decades, he had cultivated the entirety of Iran’s proxy coordination, its main deterrence against its rivals. He was the most senior figure killed in the fighting between the two countries over the 40 years of the revolution.

When Israel carried out a range of assassinations of key Hamas figures in the early 2000s, such as Abdelaziz al Rantisi and Hamas founder, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, it was condemned by the Bush administration as an extrajudicial killing. The U.S. government, however, soon followed suit, especially as drone technology improved. Under President Obama, the policy of assassinations was formalized in a White House memorandum.

The pace of attacks picked up after the killing of Osama bin Laden. But it focused mainly on Al Qaeda and Taliban-linked targets, such as Anwar Awlaki and Mullah Mohammed Mansour. President Trump had set a precedent for Iran’s own leadership to be a target, especially after the IRGC was declared a terrorist group.

By the summer of 2020, the U.S. had facilitated the Abraham Accords, bringing Israel together with Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Morocco, with the promise of more to come. In January 2021, the Gulf dispute was formally over, and later that year, the countries of the Abraham Accords, along with the U.S., would hold joint military exercises.

Although the policy of assassination was now on the table vis-à-vis Iran, the killing of Soleimani led to Iranian retrenchment into its zones of familiarity, and the two countries avoided direct conflict. The focus for Iran became nuclear enrichment, and strengthening its positions in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

The Iranian orientation towards the Gulf countries also began to shift from confrontation to conciliation. Israel understood the geopolitical landscape. It began to weaken Iran on two fronts. Aided by penetration through signal and human intelligence, it became increasingly successful in killing IRGC figures operating in Syria, who were facilitating the movement of arms to Hezbollah.

The confrontation shifted more directly between Iran and Israel, and away from America, for the time being.

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Pride in Persia (2021-2023)

When the Biden administration took office in January 2021, there was a visible sigh of relief in Iran. The maximum pressure of sanctions had been punishing, and with low oil prices and the broader COVID malaise, the two combined to create perilous economic conditions in the country. The Vienna Talks began immediately in April.

Within one week, Israel carried out a remote (perhaps cyber) attack that led to a blackout of the Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz. Less than a week later, Iran announced that it would be proceeding with higher enrichment levels. During the April talks, it was clear that the political winds had changed. The room to maneuver for a nuclear deal this time around was much more limited. And Israel would more aggressively try to prevent it this time around.

Iran, however, felt that it was in a stronger position. While the sanctions had been punishing, they had only strengthened the IRGC’s position in the country as its businesses became increasingly more important. The election of Ebrahim Raisi and the disqualification of candidates ranging from reformist to conservative, including Ali Larijani, reflected the Supreme Leader’s mindset at the time.

The Biden administration pushed for an end to the Yemen conflict, leaving the Iranian-backed Houthis effectively in charge in 2022. Gulf countries, weary of the policy vacillation between American administrations, began significant outreach to Iran. They did not want to be in the crosshairs of any Israeli-Iranian confrontation. Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed, the UAE’s National Security Advisor, made a trip to Tehran in December 2021, the first since 2016.

Saudi Arabia followed suit in March 2023, with China’s support, restoring ties that had been formally cut off in 2016 following the execution of a Saudi Shiite cleric, Nimr al-Nimr. With the Yemen conflict subsiding, and MBS seeking to focus on the economy and Vision 2030, he wanted to reduce tensions with Iran. Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait had not fully broken ties with Iran, but they used the moment to deepen the relationship. President Raisi made official visits to Doha and Oman in 2022, while the foreign minister at the time, Hossein Amir‑Abdollahian, visited Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Iran was also reconsolidating its military-industrial base and improving its capabilities, following the Soleimani strike. Israel’s control of the skies in Syria proved challenging. It repeatedly struck key IRGC facilities throughout the country, leading to the deaths of IRGC leadership in the country. Iran’s response was to invest in new technology.

In June 2023, it unveiled its first hypersonic missile, and overall, the accuracy of its ballistic missiles capable of reaching Israel was improving. But it was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that was the game-changer. The conflict provided the platform for full-scale deployment of its Shahed drones, which would cost less than $50,000 each to produce.

While Iran focused on its adversaries abroad, its own population was under increasing economic stress, resulting once again in mass protests in 2022. Inflation was often running at 40-50%, there was significant inequality, and the commercial elite were only more entrenched. The protests were ignited by the death of Mahsa Aman while in custody in the Kurdistan province.

The Farsi slogan of zan, zendegi, azadi evolved from the Kurdish Jin, Jiyan, Azadi, which was initially popularized in the region’s Kurdish areas in the 1990s. While the protests accelerated and captured global attention, by early 2023, they had largely subsided and were contained. Meanwhile, while the nuclear negotiations had faltered, there was movement on prisoner exchanges. This resulted in the release of $6.2 billion to Iran in September 2023.

Iran had also invested in its overall financial architecture through its Gulf relationships, which were paying dividends. Through its operations in the UAE, it was able to reignite global financial transactions via entities linked to Bank Melli. It had also begun rerouting the majority of its oil exports to China. Iran also completed the Gorgan-Jask pipeline and terminal, which was operational in its first phase by 2021. This provided a potential alternative to the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the relationship with Iraq had only strengthened after an initial setback following the 2021 elections. The political bloc in charge was linked with Iran.

Iran appeared to have reached a strategic equilibrium with the United States. Still, it did not take this for granted and sought to solidify its position through two ongoing avenues: advancing nuclear development and ensuring alternative oil routes. On the nuclear front, it had advanced facilities: in Natanz to potentially enrich uranium up to 60%; in Fordow, to enrich uranium up to 60% in an underground setting; and in Isfahan, the key research facility enabling uranium conversion for enrichment. Fordow was particularly difficult to target because of its underground location. It would require the most advanced bunker-busting bombs if it were a target.

The Gulf states had not forgotten about the intervening period in the 2010s nor the 1980s. They still saw Iran as a threat, even if contained for now. Saudi Arabia continued to pursue normalization with Israel. Behind the scenes, it had also begun a defense procurement arrangement with Israeli companies. The UAE was far more advanced in this area. Israel’s links with the Gulf states, especially in terms of security coordination, had markedly risen by 2023.

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The Great Confrontation (2023-2026)

On October 7, 2023, Iran watched as Israel was engulfed in flames from an attack by Hamas. The deadly attacks constituted the most significant assault on Israel since the Yom Kippur War, 50 years to the day. That evening, the unrelenting siege on Gaza began. On October 8, Hezbollah fired rockets into Israel, and the Lebanon front became increasingly active. It led to the mass evacuation of northern Israel. On October 19, the Houthis also fired missiles at Israel.

Iran was ascendant, and it began to probe the U.S. presence in and around Iraq. It wagered that America did not want to enter into a direct confrontation. Iraqi militias launched numerous drone operations against American positions and in January 2024 hit Tower 22, an American installation on the Jordan-Syrian border. The Americans responded in a limited fashion.

By Spring 2024, however, a different picture started to emerge. In subsequent actions, it was clear that Iran was on the back foot. After a wave of killings of IRGC officials in Syria in April, its embassy was hit by Israel, and a senior commander died. Iran responded for the first time in its history by attacking Israel directly with ballistic missiles. Israel responded with a strategic attack on Isfahan.

In the summer, everything escalated. Israel hit the Houthis hard in Yemen in July and then again in September, including Hudaydah port. On a similar timeline, it first killed prominent Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in July, and then, in September, launched what is known as the ‘pager’ attack, and then assassinated the charismatic leader of Hassan Nasrallah. It was a tremendous blow to Iran’s prestige.

Iran’s own president, Ebrahim Raisi, was killed in a suspicious helicopter crash in May 2024. In the subsequent presidential election, Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist, was elected. Just hours after the presidential inauguration on July 31, the leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh, was killed in a huge explosion at the government guest house in Tehran.

Iran responded in earnest to Israel on October 1 with a barrage of ballistic missiles targeting Israel, hitting the strategic Nevatim Airbase. Israel undertook severe attacks on Iran later at the end of October, devastating its ballistic missile capabilities and air defenses. But it stopped short of assassinating Iranian officials.

A week later, Donald Trump won re-election to the presidency. He was returning to the White House. Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu would visit Donald Trump at Mar-a-Lago a month before his inauguration in mid-December. Ending the Gaza War was at the forefront of the incoming Trump administration’s mind.

For Iran, it always viewed America as its direct enemy and threat, but in recent years, it viewed the relationship in a period of strategic balance, while the real battle unfolded with Israel. Broadly speaking, the crux of American hostility towards Iran was over the Persian Gulf. Now for the first time, America’s Gulf allies were in a full détente with Iran, in a way markedly different than perhaps ever.

A ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel was reached in late November 2024. But the strategic calculations continued to change in the region. On December 8, Bashar al-Assad’s regime fell in Syria, as forces led by Jabhat Al-Nusra seized the capital Damascus. The oft-discussed ‘Shiite Crescent’ that extended from Iran through Iraq, then Syria, and into Lebanon, and encircled Israel, was irrevocably broken. Iran entered 2025 in a weakened geopolitical position.

The Trump Administration made resolving the Gaza War its priority. Although it reached an initial deal on January 19, just before taking office, the interim ceasefire collapsed twice in the Spring. Just before his inaugural trip abroad to the Gulf states, the U.S. entered into negotiations with Iran in Oman, led on the American side by Steve Witkoff and on the Iranian side by Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, on April 12, with a letter from Trump to Khamenei in hand.

Amidst the negotiations, while President Trump’s envoy to the Levant, Tom Barrack, was busy containing the situation in Lebanon and Syria, the United States launched severe strikes on the Houthis, which ended by May. As June approached, the two-month deadline Trump had set for the negotiations to conclude successfully loomed. Since 1979, Iran has always seen negotiations as an open-ended exercise. For President Trump, he was imposing his own timeline. It was a divergence that could not be resolved.

On June 13, Israel launched what would become known as the 12-day war. It was an unprecedented assault on Iran that the U.S. would then join. The United States was soon in open and direct conflict with Iran for the first time in its history. While Israel and Iran traded long-range missiles, the U.S. involvement was limited to one day and targeted Israel’s nuclear sites.

The primary objective for the U.S. military was the Fordow nuclear installation and its underground enrichment facility, which President Trump claimed was totally destroyed. U.S. airstrikes also hit facilities in Isfahan and Natanz. Israel operated in Iran’s skies undeterred for the overall conflict, showing total air supremacy. While Iran’s defense capabilities were degraded, it did manage to strike back at Israel with various long-range missiles. These were not the Scud missiles from Saddam Hussein in 1991. They caused significant damage, although the full extent has not been revealed by authorities.

In what appeared to be a telegraphed response to the Americans, Iran hit the Udeid Airbase in Qatar, when it seemed to be evacuated, on June 23, 2025. And just like that, the short-lived direct confrontation had concluded.

For the Make America Great Again (MAGA) base for President Trump, this could not have come sooner. There was tremendous domestic criticism around the march to war. On the campaign trail, prominent voices like Vice President Vance had cautioned against a regime change war in Iran. Meanwhile, platforms like Turning Point USA were holding debates around Israel, led by Charlie Kirk, who served as an effective political bridge between Trump and MAGA factions.

Kirk was assassinated on September 10, which brought the president’s political coalition back together in a show of unity. Around the same time, Israel had led an attack on Hamas operatives in Doha. Qatar, which was a strong US ally, objected vociferously, especially as one of its own security officers had been killed.

President Trump forced an apology from the Israeli Prime Minister during a phone call at the White House to the Qatari Emir on September 29. That same day, they announced the 20-point Gaza peace plan, which the United Nations Security Council soon formalized following a Gaza Peace Summit in Cairo on October 13.

Notably, Iran did not attend the Summit, despite being invited. The Supreme Leader had a long memory, and it was not episodic. In his view, as always, America could not be trusted. The urgency, however, changed by early 2026. In Iran, there were fresh protests and armed elements in parts of the country. The demonstrations had significant support and were widespread throughout the country, driven by a range of factors, including a growing water crisis. It went to the heart of the regime’s legitimacy. Ultimately, companies linked to the IRGC were also responsible for much of the country’s water management infrastructure.

The government’s tactics in response seemed to be having success. The death toll, however, from the brutal crackdown was reported to reach in the tens of thousands. Increasing calls could be heard for President Trump to intervene in Washington. Then on January 3, in a shock move, the U.S. military led a daring raid into Venezuela and arrested the sitting president, Nicolas Maduro. His successor, Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, pledged to cooperate with the United States.

Amidst its show of strength in the Americas, the U.S. was also moving significant military assets from around the world to the Middle East throughout January. Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, and America’s lead negotiator, Steve Witkoff, stayed in contact and, in February, arranged to meet first in Oman earlier in the month, then in Geneva on February 17 and February 26. In between, Ali Larijani made trips to Doha and Moscow. He was increasingly playing a lead role behind the scenes and had a direct line to the Supreme Leader.

The U.S. side was joined by President Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. While the Omani foreign minister appeared sanguine, and Araghchi optimistic, U.S. officials were less so. There were simple demands from the White House, but they started with zero enrichment. Other issues were also brought up regarding ballistic missiles and proxy forces. Yet Witkoff made it clear that what the president really wanted to see was Iranian “capitulation.”

The next day, as the Omani foreign minister made a last-minute appeal in a preview clip for the popular news show, Face the Nation, the U.S. and Israel prepared to strike Iran that evening. On Saturday, February 28, 2026, airstrikes on the residence of Khamenei killed him and several close family members. After 37 years as Supreme Leader and nearly five decades in the leadership of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was dead.

In the immediate aftermath, there was an online euphoria, driven by clips of the Iranian diaspora celebrating in the streets and by the reemergence of figures like Reza Pahlavi, the son of the deposed shah, who claimed victory. But this was not Venezuela. Iran and its regime had been preparing for this day ever since the revolutionary government took power in 1979. This was always the inevitable war. And now it had arrived. They were ready to fight.

If this war had happened a couple of years earlier, it might have caught the Iranians off guard. Neither Israel nor the United States had attacked Iran directly to that point. And for Iran, after nearly five decades, it had found a way to avoid a true confrontation with the United States, understanding when to escalate and when to de-escalate. Iran had perfected the strategic posture of concurrent divergence to an art.

Yet the events of 2024 and 2025 jolted the Iranian security establishment into action. They had a clear game plan for how and when to escalate. They had built in contingencies for both civilian and military operations. Their stockpiles were now deeply buried, with a clear understanding of Israeli and American capabilities. More importantly, even the demonstrations in January assisted the Iranians by ensuring they had restored internal control before any war.

Following the killing of Khamenei, it was clear this was not a limited strike. This played into Iran’s advantage again. It did not need to be constrained in its reaction. It was in the existential endgame, and that meant everything was on the table. Progressively, Iran expanded the theater of the war to a dozen countries through the use of ballistic missiles and drones that could reach 1500 miles (2500 kilometers).

Meanwhile, Hezbollah, despite the prior war with Israel and the assassination of its leadership, was active again. It entered the conflict in early March. In Iraq, militias started drone and rocket attacks on U.S. targets, breaking a fragile peace. The embassy in Baghdad was targeted.

Yet this time, Iran was not just leading with the proxies. In the first ten days of the war, the Houthis had not even entered the frame. Iran was more than capable of extending its capabilities on its own. It hit U.S. targets, including diplomatic facilities, CIA stations, and military bases, in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, and Bahrain.

Across those Gulf countries, Iran also targeted critical infrastructure, including desalination plants, oil facilities, airports, and power stations. Hostilities were extended to targets in Cyprus, Azerbaijan, and Jordan. Iran’s message was clear: anywhere and everywhere with a U.S. military relationship was a target.

With an arsenal of tens of thousands of long-range drones, this was no idle threat. The ultimate weapon for Iran was also displayed early on in the conflict: paralyzing the global economy. It threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz effectively. Would that be possible? The threat of passing oil tankers was reminiscent of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war. The US offered to insure the insurers through the Development Finance Corporation.

Oil spiked to its highest levels in years, over $100 a barrel, before subsiding. The Gulf countries winced at the escalation. But the biggest effect was on President Trump’s base. Over the first ten days, social media was wall-to-wall with accusations that this war was one for Israel. This came from central figures like Tucker Carlson, an ally of Vice President Vance. Several days before the war, Carlson had made a trip to the Oval Office to try to talk President Trump back from the brink of war.

The prevailing media narrative was that this was a war Prime Minister Netanyahu had foisted on the White House by threatening to act first. In the fog of war, it is difficult to determine what is fact from fiction. And certainly, the timing of the conflict raised questions. But ten days into the conflict, it was clear that the U.S. may not have been ‘winning,’ but it was not losing either.

The U.S. quickly set about destroying Iranian naval assets. It also degraded the overall missile capabilities in Iran, and progressively, Iran’s ability to fire missiles and drones was declining. And Gulf countries, while fierce in their responses and vocal in their calls for de-escalation, began achieving higher interception rates against incoming Iranian fire.

Quickly, it was also unclear where U.S. and Israeli interests converged and diverged. For Israel, the objective appeared to be weakening Iran at all costs, even if it meant chaos. Its strikes on Iranian oil depots caused the skies to turn black during the day, in scenes that appeared apocalyptic. Meanwhile, the civilian costs were mounting, with images of dead school children engendering sympathy for Iran across the Middle East.

Amidst all of the strikes, Iran managed to convene its Assembly of Experts to select a new Supreme Leader. The Islamic Revolution was not about to end, at least not yet. On Sunday, March 8, it was announced that a new Supreme Leader had been selected: Mojtaba Ali Khamenei, the 56-year-old son of Ali Khamenei.

In the grand history of Iran, it marked the beginning of a new chapter. While the pages may turn, assuredly, there is much more to be written. Whether it will be by Mojtaba Khamenei, his co-revolutionaries, or something new, only time will tell.

In the modern era of shifting global power, Iran and the United States will remain locked in each other’s fates.

Epilogue: The Way Forward

This section was last updated on March 11, 2026

Whether the status quo of the Islamic government in Iran remains or falls is an open question.

In the interim, the conflict remains unpredictable. There will continue to be shocks, in particular to oil supplies, logistics routes, and regional economies. This would lead to sustained oil prices above $100 per barrel and continued force majeure for oil, natural gas, and chemical supplies. The cascading effect of this, in particular, would be felt most acutely in South and East Asia. This is already happening to petrochemical companies that rely on the Middle East for feedstock.

The CEO of Aramco, Amin Nasser, put it clearly: “The disruption has caused a severe chain reaction in not only shipping and insurance, but there’s also a drastic domino effect on aviation, agriculture, automotive, and other industries.”

The longer the conflict continues, the more it could lead to the participation of neighboring countries in airstrikes on Iran. Their engagement could provoke more direct hits on Gulf capitals. The long-term consequences of that would be felt, but it would lead to immediate capital flight in the short term. This is a scenario that all sides are trying to prevent, but that may not be possible.

Defining Victory

It is not easy to define victory for the United States. Does Iran capitulate and surrender to the Americans? For Iran, simply put, the regime needs to survive and avoid the fate that befell the Ba’athist government in Iraq. Yet, the United States wants to permanently degrade the ballistic missile, nuclear, and proxy force capabilities of Iran. The war will become increasingly violent if these objectives cannot be achieved at the negotiating table.

While previous rounds of negotiations on the nuclear issue involved complex measurements and methods, it is unlikely to satisfy the American administration this time. Given that Iran had reportedly reached the ability to achieve 60% enrichment, a technical step away from weapons-grade enrichment, the demand from the Americans would be zero or near-zero in-country enrichment.

The timeline for this becomes open-ended, and with any war, unintended consequences can lead to a quagmire. For Iran, surviving the military confrontation past the 40-day mourning period after the Supreme Leader’s death would be symbolic. President Trump is due to travel to China at the end of the month. It is hard to see that visit occurring amid the war, but that decision could be a cliffhanger. Politically heading into the mid-term elections, and especially with early and mail-in voting, early September would appear to be a definitive date to conclude the war.

The question of divergent interests remains. Israel could maintain the conflict with Iran at a low level even without the United States, especially if it determines its interests are not met. Moreover, the conflict has extended to Lebanon, where there is no end date; that theater could continue until Israel feels Hezbollah has collapsed, thereby risking civil war in Lebanon.

Warfighting Readiness

The conflict with Iran, as of this writing, is already on its way to being the most significant interstate conflict involving the United States since the Gulf War, which itself lasted 43 days. Since 1991, the United States has mostly conducted wars with aerial campaigns, including when it toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein. The ‘shock and awe’ campaign succeeded in 20 days. Of course, what came next was far more prolonged and, on the ground, something the U.S. is not prepared for in Iran.

In the quarter-century of the War on Terror, the United States had become accustomed to contesting sub-state actors as a primary threat. The changing geopolitical climate, which brings the specter of great-power conflict to the fore, also suggests confrontations with rising middle powers. Conventional warfare between states is once again on the table.

Regardless of the war’s outcome, the military-industrial complex, the Pentagon, and defense planners will take many lessons from the conflict. Specifically, the weapons supply chain and manufacturing process will be scrutinized. For example, the explosive RDX, which is used in over 4,000 ordinances, is produced in only one plant in Tennessee in the United States.

Anti-drone systems – Merops – developed in the Ukraine conflict are being re-purposed for Gulf allies facing Iranian drones. Missile makers, in a meeting shortly after it began, agreed to ‘quadruple’ production. If there were ever a confrontation with Russia and China, the U.S. would never have been aware of the vulnerabilities it is now discovering.

When the United States sank the Iranian naval ship off the coast of Sri Lanka early in the conflict, it was the first time since World War II that the US Navy sank a warship with a torpedo. Similarly, the U.S. is facing Chinese and Russian empowered tracking, radar, and anti-aircraft technology that the Iranians are using to combat American fighter jets. While the U.S. is learning, the Chinese and Russians are studying as well.

The U.S. had already asked for $500 billion in supplemental Pentagon funding. The next decade, already driven by the rise of sovereignty, will likely see increased defense spending worldwide. In the United States, the war with Iran brings home further the need to accelerate defense technology in the areas of hypersonic weaponry, robotics, artificial intelligence, and drones, as well as new types of aircraft. But it will also invest heavily in upstream production, including chemical precursors. Like all wars, the consequence reshapes economies.

The implications extend far beyond the United States. In the face of Iran’s attacks, it brings home the fragility of not just Persian Gulf countries, but many other states, especially those neighboring larger, if not great, powers. The new arms race that results will likely be mind-boggling. Many countries, such as Turkey, are well on their way to developing indigenous capabilities. Others, notably in the Gulf, will try to double down on this approach.

The Iranian Regime

In Iran, there has been an orderly transition at the outset of the war with Mojtaba Khamenei ascending to the position of the Supreme Leader. Yet behind the scenes, it is more likely that a collective of interests is positioning for power. In retrospect, it may become clear that the younger Khamenei was being positioned for his role for quite some time. But it goes to the heart of the Islamic regime. There is an improbability of Mojtaba Khamenei playing the role of a so-called modernizer, like MBS. He is not, however, from the right generation and is cut from the same cloth as the clerical establishment, literally and figuratively.

The Pahlavi dynasty ruled Iran for 54 years. The Khamenei dynasty could last even longer, although there are concurrent rumors already questioning Mojtaba’s health. Aside from the hereditary dynamic, the question arises about the very nature of theocracy. The legitimacy of the clerical founding of the regime is now only nominal. While the constitutional requirement that the Supreme Leader be a marja was removed at the time of Khamenei’s ascension, it is now quite clear that his son is being selected through nepotistic absolutism.

While domestically, this may be resolved simply through brute force and control, new forms of patronage, and a gradual adoption of syncretic Iranian nationalism, it raises questions about its projection of power abroad. Likely, the hydra of Shiite leadership is on the decline for the Islamic regime, which will have to turn more inward in any case.

This assumes that the Islamic regime survives. The Americans, and President Trump specifically, have spoken about avoiding the ‘Iraq’ scenario, something reiterated in press remarks on March 9. Yet the idea that there could be a Venezuela scenario, for example, with someone like Ali Larijani playing the role of Delcy Rodriguez, seems out of the question. It is anathema to the nature and founding of the regime itself. Israel and others may still seek to push regime collapse, specifically through the arming of various insurgent groups such as Kurdish, Balochi, and Ahvazi separatists. The longer the conflict continues, the more potential chaos enters the picture.

Iran has succumbed to both internal and external regime change over the past 150 years. During the time of the Qajar dynasty, there were assassinations, such as when Naser al-Din Shah was killed in 1896. In 1906, the constitutional revolution reshaped the fabric of government. In 1921, Reza Shah seized power in an effective coup. In 1941, the USSR and the British collaborated to install his son on the throne. In 1953, an internal uprising nearly dislodged the Shah, and he was then effectively reinstated by the CIA. Then, in 1979, the Islamic Revolution effectively toppled the Pahlavi dynasty on the back of an Islamic-Leftist-Nationalist coalition.

If anything is normalized in Iranian history, it is a change of regime and orders. However, the prerequisite is the ability to maintain a monopoly of force on the ground. Thus far, there is no clear military commander, akin to the late Qassem Soleimani, who could play that role. Original powerbrokers like Rafsanjani are also no longer there. And short of an American occupation (which itself is not militarily feasible), there is no external force that can impose its will on a country so vast.

The only far-flung scenario is that in the event of a power vacuum, a set of massacres by the regime that causes outrage, or internal realignment, the regular Iranian Army or Artesh takes control. While smaller than the IRGC, it provides a parallel monopoly of force in the country. The overall chief of staff of the armed forces, Abdolrahim Mousavi, was killed in the initial airstrikes, and may have been a person U.S. intelligence services had projected could be a future leader. One interesting figure is Amir Hatami, the current head of the army, who did not serve in the IRGC. This, however, is all speculation.

The more plausible scenario is that the shadow leaders of the IRGC and related business entities take command of the country, with a nominal if not symbolic Supreme Leader at the fore.

Regional Futures

The instability driven by Israel would only continue, regardless of what the United States decides. For America itself, it is committed to energy security and its Persian Gulf allies. How could an investment find a safe harbor there, knowing conflict could erupt at any point? This is why the countries in the Gulf, while promoting diplomacy, have not called for an immediate halt to American strikes. Nor did they condemn the intervention.

Oman is an irregular case as it has been an Iranian ally since the 1970s. Qatar is similarly not a bellwether because it shares a gas field with Iran and is particularly susceptible. It is Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two leading countries of the GCC, that will indicate to Washington their displeasure or support, and often behind the scenes.

In particular, only at the leadership levels of MBS and MBZ could this be properly communicated. While those two countries have in the past couple of years pursued détente with Iran, since the 1970s, even before the revolution, there have been constant tensions between Iran and its Persian Gulf neighbors. With war now already unfolding, the sacred halo of stability has already been pierced. There is no going back. The Gulf leadership will want to see the conflict end only with a severely weakened and changed Iran.

Regardless of how the regime evolves, it is likely to lead to new alliance formation in the region. The countries with the most powerful military and industrial bases, such as Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey, will likely seek to position themselves at the forefront and perhaps start to create a new security architecture for the Middle East, juxtaposed to Israel, even if not oppositional at first.

Countries with large Shiite populations, such as Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon, will see a longer tail of evolution beyond the yoke of the neo-imperialist vision of vilayet-e-faqih. That may lead to a contestation of power within Iraq, most specifically, but could also pose intergenerational challenges to existing structures of Amal and Hezbollah in Lebanon and in the urban neighborhoods of Bahrain. How this plays out in broader Shiite-Sunni dynamics remains to be seen.

Yet, since the Iranian revolution in 1979, the region has been beset by sectarian dynamics. A more pan-Islamic discourse could emerge, giving a renewed boost to Islamic revivalism in some corners of the Middle East, especially if modernization projects fail to deliver amid economic realities. In that counter-factual way, the fall of the Iranian revolutionary ideology could engender a more rooted Islamic set of movements in the coming decade.

Imperium Americanum

The Iran War is a defining event for the nature of American hegemony moving forward. Does American dominance extend only in the Western hemisphere or also to geostrategic regions like the Middle East? What is the nature of enforcement for this dominance in the absence of a rules-based order?

The United States is a preeminent power, looking at its adversaries and removing them from the geopolitical table, one by one. The actions in Venezuela and Iran, and perhaps soon in Cuba, should be viewed in that light. This is a continuation of policy from previous presidencies, but of course has a much more flamboyant and flippant nature under President Trump.

Russia and China will closely study the aftermath. They will want to intervene further in their own neighborhoods and in Eastern Europe and the South China Sea, respectively. Yet an ascendant America may not be tame in response. The longer the Iran War continues, the more incentive there is for China and Russia to find a way to bog down America, similar to what Iran did in the 2000s in Iraq.

The war is clearly demonstrating the importance of technology and military capabilities. While countries will pursue both asymmetric means and the ability to defend against asymmetric weapons, will they also jockey to be the junior partner to America, as Israel has been? Who is that in Latin America? What country can play that role in South Asia? Who can that be in Africa?

Overall, many countries will seek to obtain nuclear weapons to safeguard their sovereignty. This will no longer be the provenance of rogue states or American adversaries. The American repositioning and transactional nature could leave allies such as South Korea and Japan exposed. Without nuclear weapons at their disposal, what ultimate defense do they have?

The Iran War is unlikely to be the Iraq War of 2003, no matter how similar it seems. The humanitarian consequences are, however, already grave, as seen by the devastating attack on a school in Tehran. The United States will achieve both tactical and strategic outcomes once this concludes. The question will be at what cost?

The Iran War is the culmination of decades of enmity in the most important geostrategic zone for the United States, and it may have been inevitable. Still, it was certainly avoidable, for now. Many tactical and strategic gains could have been obtained through negotiations and other means. The results may not have come as quickly, but they may have been more sustainable.

The timing of the American strike at the outset of this war successfully removed Ayatollah Khamenei, but it also led to his son succeeding him, at least initially. This was at a time when Iran was already under tremendous pressure. The Supreme Leader was also quite old. Perhaps if he had died of natural causes, street protests would have forced a different outcome in the regime leadership. Now, if the regime does stay fully intact – still an if – in Iran, it will be much more hardened.

The quick demonstration of force in the summer of 2025 could have been repeated in 2026, rather than through assassination and a massive bombardment campaign. And this raises the Israel question and divergence of interests. As Israel grows in power, it has distinct motivations and interests from the United States, even as a junior partner. For example, in the Middle East, Turkey is a junior partner, exercising influence in Syria. Yet Turkey and Israel remain at odds. For the United States, it could diverge with one or the other to maintain its interests. The Israeli political spectrum has already indicated that Turkey is next after Iran.

A definitive outcome of the war will be a clear demarcation within American domestic politics between the interests of foreign allies, in this case Israel, and those of the United States. Within the Republican Party, this is likely to be an increasingly contentious debate. Regardless of how quickly the war concludes and oil prices are restored, the risks created by the current conflict are too high. There will be much more organized political opposition to any push for American engagement in the Middle East if it is perceived to be in the interests of Israel.

Overall, Iran has exposed through its survivability over the decades the very limits of American power. The nationalist pushback against American control in Iran has taken many forms, but it has not always been Islamist in nature, as 1953 amply showed. Today, as the United States is on a technological hyper-march, Iranian technology, developed asymmetrically in isolation, is forcing a change in war strategy.

Survivability, however, is not sovereignty. In Iran’s case, the total control it has maintained over its population and its constant confrontation with the world’s leading power have frozen what was once a vibrant civilizational dynamic. What religious forces would emerge if Iranians could practice freely? What would a modern Iranian identity look like? At the turn of the 20^th century, some of the world’s most vibrant ideological debates were taking place in Tehran. No longer.

In defining its next chapter, Iran, like most countries, not just from a philosophical positioning but from a matter of core practical concern in the age of sovereignty, needs to question existing dogmas that trap it between reactionary ideology and complete submission at the expense of the development of a vibrant internal core (across culture, economy, industry, and politics).

The world today lives in the shadow of America, as does Iran. Its population, leaders, and thinking seem to have vacillated between what the famed Jalal e Ahmed coined as Gharbzadegi (West-toxication) and ‘Islamzadegi’. Perhaps it is time for a third path.

And what has befallen the light of the sun?...

No man knoweth, in youth or prime

Or in wisest age;

of whom would’st thou ask:

What has befallen the wheels of Time?

- Hafez (True Love)

Appendix: Resources

There are many great resources on Iran, and it is as complex a country as any. Here are several that helped inform this writing and are good starting points.

· Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran by Roy Mottahedeh

· The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon by Fouad Ajami

· The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran by David Crist

· Postrevolutionary Iran: A Political Handbook by Mehrzad Boroujerdi and Kourosh Rahimkhani

· 60 Minutes Interview with Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and 60 Minutes Interview with the Shah of Iran

For reference, two posts from last summer provide historical context and record that may be useful: “Israel versus Iran: A strategic snapshot of the past, present, and future of a regional rivalry” & “America in Persia: Tidings of Midnight Hour in the Middle East.”

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This essay was written in the first 10 days of the 2026 Iran War. While the epilogue will be updated, the main body will be adjusted only for factual corrections, grammatical issues, and formatting. Please excuse any missteps, given the haste to publication.

The weekend’s events had the hallmarks of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Yet the operation more closely echoes the arrest of then-Panamanian president Manuel Noriega on January 3, 1990.

The anti-U.S. posture of some governments that has persisted in the Americas following the Cold War may no longer be viable. As the United States under President Donald Trump seeks to cement American dominance, it will do so first, closer to home, in the Western Hemisphere. Deferring to American power is the only surefire way to allay military action.

There is one alternative. True sovereignty – but that is not given. It must be established.

The Trump Doctrine

It is too early to confirm a coherent, all-encompassing Trump Doctrine in foreign policy. In Trump 2.5: A Primer, there are three ‘imperatives’ put forward at the center of an emerging one:

1. Advancing American prosperity

2. Peace through strength

3. Balance of power

At the core of the three, and the guiding north star of what is developing as the Trump Doctrine, is not just peace through strength, but peace through the demonstration of strength. Without that last element, American adversaries are unlikely to defer to or even recognize American strength. Following the Iranian strikes last summer and now the operation against Venezuela, those who oppose American interests are taking notice.

In geopolitical physics, every action has an equal and opposite reaction, and that is the risk of the Trump Doctrine, in particular when it is recklessly applied. The modern Middle East clearly showcases the challenges of interventionism. The other worrying implication on the horizon is renewed nuclear proliferation in response.

The Monroe Doctrine, from the early 1800s, has guided American policy in the Americas and was built upon by successive American presidents, including Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt. It emphasizes non-interference of foreign powers in the Western hemisphere. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union tested this, notably during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Over the past quarter-century, America has focused its attention on global pursuits. The Trump Doctrine has emphasized global dominance over empire. The objective appears to be to project global power without restraint or constraint. The expansion of the Monroe Doctrine within the Trump Doctrine, however, goes beyond hegemony in the Western hemisphere.

“It seeks to ensure American military supremacy at all times, in all theatres, and for any eventuality. In addition, it is exercised…on an ongoing basis. Thus, it must be understood that Trump is not an anti-war president necessarily. If there is a threat against America and an enemy does not back down, Trump will exercise military force. However, the theory is that the threat of force, over time, will be enough to compel American adversaries to sue for peace and make deals.” – p. 59 | Trump 2.5: A Primer

Western hegemony, in this view, remains the prerequisite for global power projection. Thus, while Russia and China are outside the orbit of American power, everything beyond their immediate neighborhoods is subject to the Trump doctrine. This doctrine, however, is itself part of a New American Era. Successive presidents are likely to be bound by the era that the actions of this administration have already unleashed.

First Stage – Venezuela

The overnight raids in Venezuela appear to have been a tactical and strategic success. The principal target has been captured. Yet, as any geopolitical advisor or military planner would know, this is only the beginning. The most immediate concern is remnants of the old regime, and full efforts are being undertaken to ensure compliance. This involves potentially future operations, which could both take time and lead to rounds of violence.

To forgo a full occupation, the United States is seeking to ensure a friendly government, and ideally a leader, that can establish a renewed monopoly of force in the territory to prevent anarchy. This is easier said than done. While the incumbent Nobel Peace Prize winner, Maria Corina Machado, has been touted in some corners, others have favored the opposition candidate from the 2024 elections, Edmundo González or a transition, at least initially, from within Maduro’s circle.

The immediate future for Venezuela could be as an American protectorate, with the trappings of independence. It is a test case for forced, induced, or negotiated regime changes in the rest of the hemisphere that could become a normalized expectation when American interests are threatened. Nevertheless, any elongated stretch of uncertainty in Venezuela brings new risks.

Second Stage – Cuba

There is already significant pressure being levied on Cuba. Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized this in a recent press conference. The country remains a threat to American interests in the eyes of the U.S. government. It is also a longtime lynchpin of global power intrigue in the Western hemisphere.

A military operation in Cuba would come as little surprise in the coming year. The only way it could be staved off is through comprehensive capitulation by the current government in the country, including a complete transition of power.

Is it possible for the country’s communist apparatus to outlive the current White House? It seems improbable.

Third Stage – Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, and Beyond

Cuba and Venezuela have been the outliers in the Americas for some time. Other countries, such as Bolivia and Nicaragua, often took stances allied with Havana. Anti-Americanism was more broadly prevalent in left- and socialist-leaning governments, such as Argentina’s in the 2000s.

There will be more robust U.S. opposition to this moving forward. Complete deference to American interests in the Western hemisphere is quickly becoming a requirement, as is keeping Chinese and Russian engagement to a minimum. The Trump Doctrine will inform relations with Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia in the coming months.

It is reasonable to ask, what are American interests? Democracy is not voiced as a primary concern. The recently released National Security Strategy reflects underlying forces best understood through broad frames rather than specific policies. All countries in the hemisphere would need to ensure:

• Access to natural resources and transportation routes;

• Alignment on policies related to the trafficking of goods and migrants; and

• Support for American foreign policy objectives.

While this is the White House’s expectation, achieving it will prove more challenging outside Venezuela. Many Latin American countries have entrenched militaries and legitimate governments. Instead, the approach will likely be intermittent pressure and negotiation. Elections are inflection points to be exploited, the most recent example being Honduras.

As a potential staging ground for global power interests against America in the Western Hemisphere, Greenland does not stand apart from this and will increasingly be in the spotlight.

The Global Stage

Venezuela was already weakened and had limited allies. Within the Western orbit, the regime was ostracized and sanctioned. While there may be mutterings of international law, there is already broad acquiescence to Maduro’s capture.

Yet, the precedent it sets will jolt states into recognizing that they are still within America’s dominion, and, if they desire to be outside it, sovereignty will need to be taken seriously as an active process. In 2026, investment in domestic military industries will catapult even further.

More formal adversaries like Iran and North Korea understand that the stakes have risen. Escalatory postures are likely before any détente. Yet, unlike Trump’s first term, when engagement was preferred, both the Biden administration and the current White House raised the stakes of any potential deal.

While China and Russia will object to the American actions in Venezuela, the White House’s emerging global balance-of-power approach could also extend to Taiwan and Ukraine. These powers could benefit from greater leeway in their immediate neighborhoods.

What is less clear is what happens to the framework of the global order that America has long engendered, but that the Trump administration has eschewed. Can global dominance and dominion be achieved without an empire? It is an unresolved question.

The New Era in the Americas

The pronouncement of a new doctrine and era is not an endorsement.

It is a recognition of a time when American power is being fully exercised. The doctrine is set to live beyond the current president – the Venezuela precedent could define the next decade and beyond. While exhortations through op-eds will proliferate, they cannot allay the implications at hand.

The sovereignty principle rules the world, and if countries do not assume sovereignty, they will be subsumed by it.

The 21^st century was meant to be a Project for a New American Century. The architects of the masterplan were ushered into office fatefully in January 2001. A cabal of neoconservatives led by Vice President Dick Cheney buttressed President George W. Bush.

They needed a moment.

Then came the attacks on the morning of September 11, 2001. Nothing could have shaken the modern calm more than the twin towers of American capitalism disintegrating, with the world watching.

What followed, nearly every year since, has been a mania of moments.

The invasion of Iraq was vociferously opposed in the streets of global capitals. Then it happened. And the world kept turning.

A tsunami hit the shores of Asia, taking a quarter of a million lives in one event. Then it faded into history.

The Global Financial Crisis arrived with shock and awe in 2008. And then went away as fast as it came, with markets climbing to all-time highs.

The first Black president changed America. But didn’t.

A green revolution in Iran erupted. Then subsided.

The Arab Spring ushered in a wave of revolutions and uprisings across the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe. Soon, new potentates arrived to take the place of departed ones.

The capture of Crimea crossed a red line never to be crossed again. And then it was. Again, and again.

A billionaire showman seized the presidency with bombast. Then he went away, was tried, and was almost assassinated. And then he came back to the presidency, and…

At that same time, conspiratorial rumors around pizza, pedophiles, and a global elite became the crazy of the day. Soon, a version of the crazy of the day came true, in a sense, with the man pulling the strings arrested. But he died in his jail cell, alone. Next.

A once-in-a-century pandemic happened. The world stopped, as did everyone’s day-to-day lives. And then things resumed.

Along the way, new technologies and companies have changed our lives forever. Google. Amazon. YouTube. Facebook. iPhone. Uber. Bitcoin. OpenAI. Ozempic. Download the next update!

Modernity is best typified as an addiction to mania and moments. Our world functions like a scroll, with each moment a reel that must wholly capture our senses, heighten our reactions, and elicit our interest before we move on to the next. With each swipe, we need more from each moment. Everything is intertwined, and thus everything becomes the same. The sameness evolves into a sense of nothingness. We cannot feel. We cannot relate. We are detached from ourselves and from each other. An injection of residual moments brings temporary dopamine on the surface - bits of memory – but it dissipates fast.

We have reoriented reality through this lens. The dulling of our senses enables us to absorb more change, but the more change we absorb, the duller our senses become. This is why we are accelerating without brakes towards all-consuming transformation. While we may be numb to the idea of change, the consequences will be real.

The tidal waves on the horizon this quarter-century will consume many unwittingly, unless they learn to surf above, understanding what flows beneath.

The Moment is the Message

Famed Canadian philosopher Marshall McLuhan coined the phrase “The Medium is the Message” in 1964, in response to the television age. We are at the century mark of mass communication, which began as the radio age, moved to television, then the internet, and now has splintered into social channels imbued with artificial intelligence. The notion of the medium has evolved beyond its original meaning and the frame of mass media.

Today, we have an ever-constant flow of interactive moments. What is viral is ubiquitous, and what is ubiquitous is viral. In that loop of constant consumption, the urgency of now is tagged to each post, highlight, and story. Disruption is no longer phenomenal but mundane.

This extends beyond the superficial to permeate all aspects of society. When Apple became the first trillion-dollar company in 2018, it was an unprecedented event. NVIDIA went from a $1 trillion market capitalization in 2023 to $5 trillion in just two years. Now, individuals are on the cusp of becoming trillionaires.

What appears suddenly can disappear just as fast. The velocity of the moment is blinding. While at first, the pace of change was blinding – and perhaps unsettling – it is now normalized, and we are desensitized. We expect the extreme. The audacious. The unprecedented. If it is not extreme enough and doesn’t push the frontiers of what we have already seen, it is that much less impressive. It becomes easy to cast aside.

This pushes all things to become about everything. The geopolitical is spiritual. The spiritual is financial. The financial is philosophical. The philosophical is technological. The technological is geopolitical. The lines do not matter as much. Is it a stock market or gambling? Is it a media outlet or a nuclear company? Is this person a podcast host or a political adviser? Is he a billionaire or an influencer? Everything, and everyone, has become everything, and that, of course, makes everything a little bit of nothing that flows into a vast tundra of sameness.

This winter, the world’s wealthiest group gathered around St. Barth’s and its environs. With hundreds of yachts in tow, and inhabitants ranging from Sergey Brin to Miriam Adelson, it was punctuated by a scene of Amazon founder Jeff Bezos and his wife having a frolicking time. What becomes important is not the wealth, nor the cast of characters, nor even the event itself, but the photo, the image, the virality, the short-lived moment that lives briefly in the scroll.

As moments do indeed fade, there must be successive moments. The nature of the collective attention span, however, means that what is new quickly displaces what is slightly less new. What is new must also be new in its level of ‘shock’. It is why in 2025, the ‘Epstein Files,’ which initially landed with ferocity, did not have much resonance.

If tomorrow it were announced that a nefarious intelligence agency had indeed killed Jeffrey Epstein, would it matter? If it mattered, would it go viral? If it went viral, how long would it be viral before the next moment? And once it faded from view, would it be recalled? Would there be any resonance? And if there was any resonance, would it lead to any lasting change?

Acrobatics of Axioms and Acronyms

As a global community, we are increasingly interconnected through these moments that, in effect, are primarily filtered through the lens of the greatest power of the age, the American empire. Moments are tagged in terms of the language of empire or resistance to empire, and the political tribal winds surrounding them.

While moments are fleeting, the tags can live on and soon become axiomatic. Yet, as soon as they become axiomatic, the underlying reasons for the axiom remain unexamined. The moments disappear, but the nature of the tags remains and underpins the tribal reality. The tribe is more closely related to moments than to the depth of being. In many ways, the tribe aligns with an online fantasy rather than the offline reality.

An individual living in Malaysia, completely disconnected from Minnesota, can become heavily invested in the cause of racial animus in the heart of America. The last decade, in particular, gave rise to new acronyms and axioms that shaped identity. Black Lives Matter. Build Back Better. Make America Great Again. Online, you are likely to be confronted by duelling icons of yellow ribbons and watermelons in response to the events of October 7 and the assault on Gaza. The iconography itself is the rendering of the moment into identity.

A watermelon on a dating profile becomes existential, as the icon is itself an axiom. Successive moments are then filtered through the perceived identity represented by this icon. Life is experienced through this filter of where a moment or an individual should fit, first consciously and then subconsciously.

Searching for the Next High

What is happening within each individual is still understudied. Many people not only need moments, but they also need moments to be more momentous than any moment ever before. We become manic about the current moment and the search for the next one. A moment cannot just be a moment; it must be everything. It must be the beginning and end of all things. Everything is not just a moment. It is also the onset of utopia. And of the apocalypse. And those that usher in these moments are gods – and devils.

There is a heightened sense of what will satisfy us. But it is not just a ‘trend’. It has become physiological. The ‘hit’ of a new moment provides the fix to restore our level of balance. Once the dopamine wears off and the cortisol takes its turn, all that is left is an exhausted individual and, collectively, a society fatigued, undernourished, and unable to heal.

This is happening in the day-to-day social lives of all, and especially in digital interactions. While global demographics decline, sexuality is on the rise between humans and artificial intelligence. The addiction cycle of moments is playing out with young men and women in a way that will have catastrophic repercussions if unaddressed.

The dulling of sexuality is also part of a dulling of the senses overall, albeit from a distance. The idea of the extreme is desensitized, but not the actual exposure to it. Violence, war, and true upheaval are not experienced by the vast majority of those online and in the West. While people become numb to digital manifestations, they are, conversely, less prepared to face the physical world in all aspects.

This leads to heightened antipathy and empathy. At a societal level, it also means pushing for an over-indulgent response, because, without such responses, identity begins to fade. This is why conspiracy theorists often start with a kernel of truth, but then seek out something more audacious, more outlandish, more skeptical at each turn. When Charlie Kirk was assassinated, it drew in the top conspiracy theorists. If there is not a greater conspiracy afoot, no new moment, can a political group still cling to an identity of persecution? If they are not persecuted, who are they?

If a moment does not occur naturally, it will be manifested and served through the next set of reels into the feeds of today’s identitarians.

Roaring 20s – Part Deux

In this mania of moments, the lowliest of men and women reach the loftiest of heights, and those on the highest perches fall to the lowest ledges. Once you rise, you are exponentialized. As you ride the zeitgeist, with all the connectivity, the resources, the cultural synchronicity, it is an integrated super-ride to the top. You are at once powerful, rich, beautiful, famous, and saintly.

If the launch of ChatGPT was a moment, it was soon ubiquitous. Within two years, the entire world of capital re-oriented, new industries rose overnight in the trillions of dollars to build moment-supporting infrastructure. Capital flows in capital moments, from Series A to Series L. Technology companies all update in an iteration of moments. V1, V2, V3, V4, V5.3. Deal flow aggregates in moments. Milken. FII. Davos. Allen & Co.

The next quarter-century is about the convergence of the hyper-moment and hyper-technology. The speed of change is only matched by the speed at which we perceive it, while disregarding the underlying depth of its consequences. The roaring 1920s did lead to economic growth and stock market booms. New technologies emerged around that time in communications, entertainment, transportation, and atomic energy.

What is different between the 1920s and the 2020s is that the moments are now embedded in the capital and industrial cycles through hyperfinancialization and ‘hyper-technology’, and real-world changes are also occurring. Yet the changes may not be driven by the needs of the time but by the whims of moments. Even politicians are decision-makers in election cycles of moments.

One century ago, the rip-roaring years also laid the foundation for the Great Depression, fascism, communism, and World War II – the great evils that humanity faced and dealt with for the rest of the 20^th century. What is the foundation being laid today? What ills and evils could rise at an even more accelerated pace?

Of course, as moments become the frame, some take advantage of the underlying inertia and propulsion to advance in plain sight. They amass the true power, wealth, and influence. And like all potentates, they push a vision that they believe in.

The Eternal Superpower of the Soundless Mind

The mania of moments will not let up. Everything tells us that more will surround us, even as people may become fewer and prosperity concentrates at the top. This may only embolden the moments. Without the ability to take care of themselves, the drip-feed of moments will be the succor that keeps the rebellion of the many at bay.

A disconnect, meanwhile, grows between what moors us and what unmoors us. Values. Connection. Community. Spirituality. Mission. It all just starts to disappear. They all become the moment. Our minds become manic in the moment. We become manic for the moment. And we become manic without the moment.

Each of us today has near-infinite power in our hands. To speak. To build. To trade. To travel. To learn. To connect. To push frontiers. To ride the tidal wave of what is already underway and what is yet to come will require steadiness to allow us to see what is truly happening, and most of all, what is exceptional, versus what has the look and feel of exception.

This will force us not just to see the waves on the surface, but also what has true depth. Technologically. Geopolitically. Economically. And most of all, morally and spiritually. This is the great challenge, here and now. This is the antidote to the mania.

With this disposition, however, you may be the one diagnosed with mania in our moment.

Next.

In early December 2025, Abu Dhabi hosted the world’s leading investors for Abu Dhabi Finance Week. The host was its own financial center, Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM), where family offices from Europe and North America have been setting up satellite holding companies in recent years, including prominent investors like Ray Dalio.

During the week, other marquee events also took place, including a collaboration with global philanthropists comprising Africa’s leading investors, the Bridge Summit, which brought together media and capital, and the Further Network Summit focused on blockchain innovation.

This came after another epic Formula 1 weekend that featured billionaires, heads of state, and yachts. On the sidelines, Mubadala held its annual business forum, and the Milken Institute hosted its annual regional summit.

If there ever was a week establishing Abu Dhabi as the capital of capital, this was it.

What made Abu Dhabi the capital of capital beyond the fanfare on the surface? Underneath is a tectonic awareness of global shifts underway and a deft instrumentalization of sovereign power combined with sovereign capital. The scaffolding includes investment institutions built over three decades, which has accelerated over the last five years.

While there has been intentionality, there has also been risk-taking and overreach. The adaptability of the leadership, including oscillating attention between East and West, has catapulted Abu Dhabi to a unique position on the global cap table.

Will it last? Who are the relevant institutions? How can Abu Dhabi and its global partners be stewards of success rather than cannibalize each other’s capital?

The landscape is best understood in its narrative form.

Transiting in Dubai

In the summer of 2007, the hottest place to be was Starbucks in Emirates Towers. The second hottest location? The nearby hotel lobby café. To say that billion-dollar deals were being made over Mocha Frappuccinos was no understatement. It was the summer of Dubai. All investment roads led to the desert and its building bonanza.

At the time, a flamboyant figure, David Jackson, stood at the helm of Dubai’s sovereign wealth fund, Istithmar (part of Dubai World), which he led on an international buying spree. Barney’s. The Mandarin Oriental in Manhattan. Queen Elizabeth 2. All gobbled up. Like many things in the Dubai boom at the time, purchases were fueled by debt.

Following the 2008 global financial crisis, Dubai entered a period of recovery. Expat mainstays that had indulged in the excess, like David Jackson, faded away. Many firms went insolvent. Debts were restructured. And the cranes went quiet.

Soon after, the Middle East erupted in revolution. Then the revolutions gave way to ISIS, which is when oil prices slumped. In the Gulf, a cold war erupted, pitting Qatar against the UAE and Saudi Arabia. The latter two countries soon faced their own scrutiny in the spotlight. The rise of new leadership in Saudi Arabia was marked by trials and tribulations, to say the least. The Mueller investigation focused in part on the UAE.

The COVID pandemic provided the Gulf with respite. Buoyed by rising oil prices and then wider détentes – within the Gulf and regionally – by late-2022, it was clear that a ‘New Gulf Moment’ was underway. Amid rising interest rates, the Gulf’s $1 trillion capital surplus became a favored source of global investment.

The constant stream of announcements and events masks the true undercurrent: Gulf institutions, from the global financial crisis onwards, have been on a straight growth curve through all the ups and downs. Leadership had never stopped investing in infrastructure and institution-building.

Even Dubai, which seemed in despair in 2009, opened the Dubai Metro on time on 9/9/9. On January 4, 2010, the vaunted Burj Dubai was completed, with a new name upon unveiling: Burj Khalifa. Dubai’s destiny deserves its own telling in a separate article.

In Abu Dhabi, while the Burj Khalifa was named after Khalifa bin Zayed, the then-president of the UAE, his younger half-brother, Mohamed bin Zayed, was beginning to chart the country on an aggressive path forward.

Roots of Abu Dhabi

Much of the coverage of the rise of Abu Dhabi as a city, emirate and sovereignty is either overly hagiographic or polemical. As it is one of the world’s leading political and economic centers, this is a disservice to all. While this article focuses on investment flows in the modern period, it is worth situating Abu Dhabi in a broader, deeper perspective.

Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the founder of the nation, was a monumental figure in the Muslim world. His story is charted by his long-time photographer, Noor Ali Rashid. Sheikh Zayed’s pact with Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, the then-ruler of Dubai, to forge a new sovereign nation was itself a dramatic departure in a region full of internecine strife.

Political events in the 1970s and 1980s shaped the country’s outlook, including the disposition of the current president of the UAE and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Mohamed bin Zayed, better known as MBZ. The assassinations of Saif Al Ghobash in 1977, who was then minister of foreign affairs, and Khalifa Ahmed Al Mubarak, then the ambassador to France in 1984, by Abu Nidal, a radical splinter group of Palestinian militants, have never been forgotten. It is worth noting that Mubarak was the father of Khaldoun Mubarak (CEO of Mubadala) and Mohammed Mubarak (who leads Abu Dhabi Tourism).

MBZ is also acutely aware that the country sits on the borders of two larger powers, which informs his decision-making. Since the UAE’s founding, Iran has occupied part of its territory, the Tunb Islands. Saudi Arabia has never fully demarcated its borders with Abu Dhabi, and before independence, still claimed the emirate as its own.

While Abu Dhabi is the capital of the UAE and holds the federation’s sovereign leadership, there are six other emirates, each with its own ruling system and leader. Sharjah has its own Game of Thrones history and, in recent years, has demonstrated entrepreneurial and cultural dynamism. Dubai, of course, is on its own destiny. Other emirates, often less in the headlines, are worth paying attention to. Ras Al Khaimah, where the casino industry is on the march, was itself the center of Islamist intrigue for many years, a focus for Abu Dhabi for decades. Everything in the country connects over time.

Some of this history and political context may seem taboo for the investor to probe, but it is essential to understand it delicately, layer by layer. A good starting point is Robert Worth’s in-depth interview with MBZ. To date, he stands alone as the journalist who spent the most concentrated time with the leader for a long-form piece.

Rise of the Capital

Read more

Meanwhile, Tucker Carlson released a documentary on his network on the ‘real story’ of the assassination attempt on Donald Trump. In response, the FBI created a special crisis account on X, putting the administration at loggerheads with its high-profile ally.

As that was unfolding, long-time Trump booster, Stephen Bannon, while fighting for populism in public, was revealed as being all over the Epstein Files in private.

With the economic and political headwinds facing the White House, the infighting and contradictions within the MAGA movement have reached fever-pitch levels.

Is this the beginning of the end? Is Trump 2.5 giving way to Trump 0.5?

Zero Hour

President Trump stands at the ultimate inflection point in his presidency. With a string of stinging political losses, he faces a multifaceted rebellion from within the GOP. MAGA faithful are rising up while the perpetual Republican establishment bucks his broader calls for alignment. This is partly due to early positioning for the 2026 and 2028 electoral cycles. It is, however, more about the fracturing of an always improbable coalition rife with paradoxes.

In response to the dissent, the mercurial president has deployed his most familiar defense: a scorched-earth offense. Yet, in that course of action, he may induce a retreat of his own frame to his former self, restoring the markings of the mid-point of his first term: Trump 0.5.

Then, he was very much alone, had discarded his populist cloak for mundane Republicanism, and was still attacked by all sides. Gary Cohn walked the West Wing, and soon after, John Bolton flew on the wings of Air Force One. There was no MTG yet. Tucker Carlson was still on Fox News. Elon Musk was a Democrat. Epstein had not yet been arrested. Generation Z was just entering adulthood. COVID and inflation were unknowns. The Israel Lobby was too taboo to discuss.

President Trump faces a choice at this pivotal moment: continue down the current path reducing his presidency to a coterie of supporters or renew a big-tent push to be the pragmatic bridge between the elite and a base motivated by populism.

Trump 2.5 or Trump 0.5.

The Rise of Trump 2.5

On July 13, 2024, the day Donald Trump was nearly assassinated. It was an earthquake in the political zeitgeist. Elon Musk endorsed him. Mark Zuckerberg called him “badass.” The ‘coolest’ figures online from Sneako to Theo Von to Adin Ross backed him; when he won, they all showed up to the inauguration. Yes, it was ‘cool’ for a very brief moment to be all the way with the Donald for a subset of the electorate.

“If President Trump had won re-election in 2020, it would have been a continuation of the first term, with slightly more accomplishments, the same fecklessness, and infighting to jockey for the future of the Republican Party. It would have been Trump 2.0. Instead, in an almost Lazarus-like moment, Trump’s return and decisive victory give him an unprecedented mandate. His organization has clear capabilities that were missing in the first term. The current president is no ordinary second-term president. He has had four years to regroup, understand who his opponents are, and ensure that there is an effective team. The trials and tribulations he faced also led to newfound allies beyond the inner group from 2016 and 2020.” p.44-45, Trump 2.5: A Primer

In the early days of 2025, despite all the vitriol, the DOGE destruction, the cold raids by ICE, and the shock-and-awe of tariffs, the President barely lost a step in the court of public opinion with his supporters, maintaining his approval ratings. When he spoke of peace in the halls of Riyadh’s palatial settings, amidst the billions of dollars flowing including to his allies, it was a stark juxtaposition . And he followed his words by meeting with Syria’s president, a former leader of Al Qaeda.

Trump 2.5 was not about either/or. It was about both/and. He hadn’t abandoned Israel; the antisemitism task force targeting its critics was in full force. He hadn’t given up on America’s vast military-industrial complex; everyone from Larry Fink to Elon Musk was on that trip and ready to partake in the riches. As the president returned to Washington, his second 100 days were being primed to go as well as the first for his base.

The End of the Honeymoon

In retrospect, the month that followed was the end of the beginning. Elon Musk emerged in the Oval Office upon his ‘retirement’ from government service with a black eye that remains unexplained to this day. He went on X, announced that Trump was in the Epstein files, and claimed to be setting up a new party. Then the administration backed Israel in a widening war in the Middle East and initiated an American-led attack on Iran. And the Epstein files, in the middle of all of this, were cast aside with a perfunctory 2-page memo released on the July 4 weekend.

Nevertheless, despite the pushback, the Rorschach of Trump held the movement together. Like all followers and their centripetal leaders, blame fell to the people around Trump, not on the president himself: He was being ‘led astray’ by advisors, by his chief of staff, by outsiders texting him at late hours.

This all changed at the beginning of September when Charlie Kirk was assassinated. What may have been a unifying moment became a breaking point, as key figures sought to elevate their narrow agendas in his image.

In the weeks prior, to avoid potential fallout from a vote on the release of the Epstein files, Speaker Johnson shut down the House. By the end of September, the government itself shut down due to a lack of a continuing resolution. President Trump shifted his focus abroad and announcement after announcement with billionaires by his side. With Congress out of session and the president seemingly detached from domestic affairs, the November 4 electoral results were a rude awakening.

Mamdani takes Manhattan. Virginia goes blue. Democrats had wind in their sails. Republicans were in disarray.

In response to the results, the president doubled down. As the affordability issue cast a long shadow across the political spectrum, he held a private dinner for bankers and billionaires at the White House. With greater calls for transparency from his base, the president instead attempted to browbeat congresswomen in the situation room to vote against the release of the Epstein files.

This prompted a severe backlash online, with prominent figures directly attacking President Trump from within the MAGA movement, a previous red line. Marjorie Taylor Greene stood prominently among them.

Was this the end of MAGA? The end of Trump 2.5?

Populism, Purity and Pragmatism

What made Trump 2.5 politically poignant was an unyieldingly America First position. While polarizing, brutal, and assuredly slightly authoritarian, it was populist and popular with his supporters. Jobs for citizens before immigrants. American interests before foreign ones. Peace, not war, as the first resort. Main Street over Wall Street. The heartland was the new center, not Washington, D.C. The end of waste, fraud, and abuse and the return of domestic investment would give way to a new golden age.

Ultimately, the rhetoric of pragmatic populism pushed Trump 2.0 to Trump 2.5 and engendered an inconceivably diverse governing coalition that built momentum in early 2025. Tulsi Gabbard was shoulder-to-shoulder with Marco Rubio. There was a green light for an outside hammer from DOGE, but also the insider track from Susie Wiles. Yes, to Israel, but no to Israel’s wars. Deals for billionaires, but to create jobs, not greed, grift, and graft. At least that was the message on paper.

Trump, his presidency, and the movement were accessible to the everyday American, online and offline. Candidate Trump was on every podcast and in every public setting. He styled himself as the man to lead a lost generation Z of men. With the initial euphoria across the first 100 days, and before any foreign trips, it was a honeymoon, and Trump 2.5 maintained the aura of pragmatic populism within the MAGA movement.

Crossing the Crucible

It could be asked today, where is the rhetoric of the forgotten men and women, and the end of forever wars? Where are the Generation Z podcasters? Where have all the Trump 2.5 cowboys gone? This fall lull may yet give way to the big-tent version of Trump who campaigned in 2024.

The crucible moment that the president now finds himself in was always inevitable. It was exacerbated by foreign trips and too many meetings in the Oval Office rather than gatherings with his base in Ohio, Oklahoma, Idaho, and across the country. Ultimately, the president was only hearing part of the message from his own movement.

“As always, it will come down to outcomes. If, by the midterms, there is demonstrable progress on government efficiency, economic growth, global conflicts, and immigration, that will overshadow much of the overreach undertaken to achieve it.” – p. 173, Trump 2.5: A Primer

With just under a year to go, the president needs to have a hard reset to regain momentum, prevent a lame-duck presidency, and avoid a relapse to Trump 0.5 and the Grand Old Party. While some in the MAGA movement may look to 2028 and a post-Trump future, there is no MAGA without the man and myth that is the Donald, for better or worse. Without the bombast of Trump, there will be no railroading of an establishment that his base desires. Donald Trump is both the problem and solution for the movement’s biggest internal detractors.

There is a playbook for the White House to return to Trump 2.5. It starts with a re-embrace of pragmatic populism with real results. It also includes a renewed big-tent approach and an open door to messaging to all parts of the movement, online and offline. The president himself is in constant motion, and his own adaptability, which some would call opportunism, enabled him to return to the presidency in 2025.

Late into Sunday evening (Nov 16), ahead of another weekly political cycle, President Trump gave his full backing to Tucker Carlson, did not condemn Nick Fuentes, and called on his party to vote for the release of the Epstein files. It was the beginning of his answer for the moment to bring back momentum.

Thanksgiving Dinner

As zero hour approaches, there is a narrow window to shift course. This Thanksgiving, if President Trump is smart, he will host dinner at the largest table possible. Susie Wiles would have to use all her shrewdness to bring everyone into the fold. Elon Musk. Tucker Carlson. Mark Levin. Stephen Bannon. Marjorie Taylor Greene. Bill Ackman. Bishara Bahbah. Larry Fink. Sean O’Brien.

The message at that dinner is that they should be thankful they have access to power, because in a few years, they may not. And in fact, they could become the targets of those in power. Their only chance to win is to emerge with an ‘America First,’ populist pact that permits private gains only if there are public gains.

Will this happen? Is it too late? Was Trump 2.5 just a mirage? And could it even hold? For the GOP, it is simply the only way forward to maintain power. For MAGA to have relevance. For President Trump to be effective. Whether or not that would be good for America and the world is another question.

It was exactly three years ago that a Special Counsel was appointed to investigate Donald Trump. That was meant to be the end for Trump 1.0. And instead it was the beginning of the rise of Trump 2.5.

The next political cycle is already being written before the ink is dry on this one.

Stay tuned.

Zohran Kwame Mamdani. Mayor Mamdani. Let that sink in.

Meanwhile, on X, right-wing influencer reactions ranged from rage to racism, or a combination of both. It was the second coming of the Third Reich. The onset of an Islamic State. The Sovietization of Wall Street. Or all of the above.

But it was clear that this sponsored messaging, which had reached a fever pitch before the election, had failed. And the loss was not just a defeat. It was an obliteration. In New York. In New Jersey. In Virginia. And across ballot measures nationwide. Mamdani’s victory represents the beginning of a bulwark against Trump 2.5.

It is the start of a Manhattan Project to save the Left in America.

From Woke Evangelism for Empire to Populism

The projection onto Zohran Mamdani of labels of terrorism was flimsy to begin with. It was a ham-fisted attempt to galvanize Jewish New Yorkers and perhaps others into voting against a perceived threat. Yet, it had the converse effect. It only reinforced the message that Mamdani was a populist. And Generation Z, most of whom grew up in the shadow of the War on Terror rather than the 9/11 attacks, saw in the messengers everything they hated about the establishment.

‘Free Palestine’ itself has become an anti-system battle cry over the last two years. While the October 7 attacks provoked outrage initially, by the time of this mayoral election, more Americans had become more outraged about the response to those attacks. Even young Jewish Americans decidedly backed Mamdani.

The more the well-funded online campaign and crudely put-together coalition attacked Mamdani for not being in lockstep with a neoconservative foreign policy, the more he came across as bucking the system. The same system that keeps rents high. The same system that is broken. The same system presided over by boomers.

While the Biden Administration and its aspiring successor in the Kamala campaign represented woke evangelism for empire, Mamdani and his acolytes represent woke populists against empire. And that is a message that resonates. In that sense, they echo aspects of the MAGA movement.

A Vibe Shift Within the Vibe Shift

In an earlier article last year, I wrote “There’s a Vibe Shift in the Empire” following the election of Donald Trump:

“The anti-government feeling of the shift also leads to rejecting all establishment directives, whether from academia, experts, or the media. Why should there be censorship of misinformation? For Generation Z, which freely streams content, why would the government or an ‘expert’ limit what they can say? The vibe shift of the current moment ironically very much echoes the 1970s. It dovetails, however, with the vibe shift of the 1950s, marrying ‘fighting the man’ with the promise of a ‘new American dream.”

The MAGA spin on this was to restore a sense of traditionalism while also taking on a capitalist bent. Due to the prevailing environment of ‘wokeism,’ MAGA appeared to represent the anti-orthodoxy. Yet, in the first 10 months of the Trump administration, it has focused endlessly on antisemitism, replacing one form of speech monitoring with another, including on the right. The administration has also sued countless media outlets for defamation, leading to repercussions, including for flailing late-night talk show hosts like Jimmy Kimmel and Stephen Colbert. Perhaps it was good political fodder for the base, but it played against the vibe shift for free speech.

Meanwhile, as the cost of living has risen, health costs have skyrocketed, and unemployment has ticked up, the White House has simply rolled out announcement after announcement of ‘billion-dollar’ deals with billionaire magnates and trillion-dollar global funds. This left the vibe shift up for grabs.

During the campaign, Trump convened a big-tent coalition that brought together all the leading podcasters popular with Gen Z, from Theo Von to Joe Rogan to Adin Ross to Andrew Shultz. The outright racism online unleashed over the last several months has slowly hollowed out support to just core advocates. One by one, prior supporters have expressed unease with the current administration.

Then, out of nowhere, riding the N train, came Zohran Mamdani, smiling, showing up at the club at 1 am. Quite obviously, he was cool, and his opponent, Cuomo, decidedly uncool. And he was ‘for you’. For the ‘forgotten man’. The taxi driver. The halal cart worker. The street micro-entrepreneur. Shultz even gushed over Mamdani.

MAGA Gets Conned Inc

What happened to the MAGA Movement? Ultimately, the GOP without Trump is a failed party. Trumpism is not Republicanism. In the Virginia and New Jersey gubernatorial races, the Republican candidates were Never Trumpers. In 2022, the Republican Party was trounced in the midterms.

Yet there is no real MAGA movement. It is a coalition that only Trump could preside over, bringing technologists like Elon Musk, populists like Stephen Bannon, Gen Z podcasters, evangelicals, Dearborn’s Arab Americans, and hardline pro-Israel Jews in New York into one big, big tent. President Trump, however, has not governed like candidate Trump.

Accordingly, the technologists are fighting with the populists. Generation Z got bored and then perturbed. The pro-Israel camp has cast aspersions on the Arab Americans. And Trump himself has spent too time focused abroad. An America First administration, seen as an America Abroad presidency, was destined to suffer in popularity.

The Trump White House has also engendered a perception that it is a get-rich-quick platform for the billionaire class. Trump did not take union leaders to Riyadh for his landmark investment forum. He took magnates Mark Zuckerberg, Sam Altman, and other technologists who had opposed him politically. His political advisors did not set up meeting grounds for the forgotten men and women of America in Washington. Instead, his donors set up the ‘Executive Branch’ for confabs of capital.

Entrenched interests have wrested the administration’s agenda, ensuring that the focus is on stock market highs, bellicose rhetoric about empire, and culture wars. It is the playbook of a Republican Party that was already in deep decline for years.

Results over Resistance

Before his victory, Mamdani stood relatively alone, with tepid endorsements even from his own party. On November 5, he has the wind in his sails. Nothing attracts losers like winning. Even Bill Ackman pledged to work with Mayor Mamdani.

Mamdani’s victory is not just about a Muslim immigrant success story. It will constitute a Manhattan Project to build the resistance to Trumpism in earnest. And as such, many people will flock to sit under this new political umbrella, much as happened with President Trump on January 20, 2025. The aim will be to co-opt the moment to create campaigns and coherence for a national effort, with New York as the testing and meeting ground.

Nevertheless, Zohran Mamdani is not the flip side of Donald Trump. And his movement is not ‘bizarro’ MAGA. Nor is his victory just another act in the long-running theater of right-left politics. His triumph is an opening for something new. In that way, the oldest rule in politics becomes the most important to note: there are no rules.

As Zohran Mamdani awakens to a city that is now his to lead, he can move in whatever direction he chooses. Of course, his opponents will still project labels onto him. But it will be those who claim credit for his victory that will attempt to pigeonhole him and his policies the hardest, sometimes to his detriment. And others onside, who seek to leverage his victory for political gain, will be even harder to keep at bay.

For Mayor Mamdani and those who support him, what will speak volumes will be the results. Results will lead to success and more winning. Can Mamdani balance capital with conscience to bring about more affordability? Can he marry an abundance mindset with a disposition towards empathy for the downtrodden to foster social balance? Can he re-empower police in communities to become symbols of safety that reinforce law and order?

Can he rise to the occasion to become a leader for all tribes and classes in the new American era?

Tomorrow is Another Day

Today is a day that belongs to the winner. To the new mayor of New York City. Zohran Kwame Mamdani.

But tomorrow is another day.

Politics, especially now, rewards dynamism and adaptability, with constituencies and coalitions reshuffling overnight. As momentous as Mamdani’s win is, it will also come and go. The world is changing at breakneck speed, and that will not let up, regardless of political events. In six months, new crises will emerge, as will new opportunities.

As the vibe shift in the vibe shift begins, Mamdani’s Manhattan Project will follow one of two paths: one that creates and becomes a source of energy for a new America. Or another that destroys and erodes the potential for renewed promise and a united country.

It is a monumental challenge that now sits on the shoulders of the youngest leader of the world’s leading city in 133 years.

It was President Donald Trump himself who talked about the current negotiations forging a new dynamic to break the trajectory of thousands of years of history. There is debate on how far back to trace the historical enmity that prevails today. Nevertheless, it has indeed been millennia since all peoples, and the three Abrahamic faiths specifically, converged on a united position on Jerusalem.

Many prior agreements have fallen short in finalizing peace. The Abraham Accords. The Roadmap to Peace. The Oslo Accords. Camp David. And beyond. Ultimately, they involved political persuasion, legal frameworks, and pageantry.

Of course, these aspects are important. But more is needed. We must accept that our world has moved beyond the nation-state framework and tribalism. Today, what holds things in place more than anything is power and the ultimate materialistic motivator: money.

Ignoring this dimension will mean that failure is inevitable. The financial construct to shift incentives, however, cannot be superficial or peripheral. It must be central and overwhelming. Furthermore, it must be established before, not after, a negotiated settlement, at least as a formal mechanism. It is the promised incentive to forge a settlement today.

The last chapter of Middle East in Crisis & Conflict: A Primer released last year presaged the contours of the current discussions on the Gaza crisis. In fact, the deal brought by President Trump is similar to what many policymakers, leaders, and analysts have roughly outlined for quite some time. Then, as now, it is not enough for the long peace. As the primer echoes, “These steps, already perhaps unrealistic, would still be insufficient. This is obvious to even the casual observer. Pipe dreams for peace are part of the realpolitik scenario.”

A central idea in the book and raised elsewhere, such as at the Milken Conference in Los Angeles in 2024, was the Arab Peace Investment Dividend, “a $1 trillion investment fund that will flow directly into the Israeli and Palestinian private sector the day after a peace deal is signed. With a 10-year time horizon, $100 billion will be funded and disbursed year-on-year. It would be the greatest investment dividend per capita in modern history. It shows actual skin in the game by global and regional actors in peace. And it demonstrates to Israelis and Palestinians alike the financial upside in a financial world.”

A trillion-dollar fund for peace seems like a pipe dream, but with nearly $5 trillion of sovereign capital situated in the region, it is much closer at hand. With interconnected capital flows, it is hardly a stretch to see other sovereign wealth funds from Europe and East Asia join in, alongside pension funds from North America. Development finance institutions, more broadly, could also be added to the table. There is no doubt that the investment could be mobilized and committed with the right political push.

Unlike prior proposals, this would not be a conceptual talking point but a fully formed legal entity, with strict guidelines on the types of recipients who would have to originate from, be based in, and serve the region and interests of peace. While the Arab Peace Initiative in 2002 provided the political capital for a common future, the Arab Peace Investment Dividend would provide the investment capital for shared prosperity.

Of course, President Trump must also be brought onside, who would be one of its biggest advocates. It may need to be renamed to the Abraham Peace Investment Dividend, to match the style with the substance.

Now is the time for this investment initiative to take hold. Yet, without a transformative figure taking the mantle, it will still fall short. It is only natural that it should have a convener of stature, perhaps a leader of one of the Gulf countries themselves. That leader would also give it an inspiring vision and sense of purpose, which is what would sustain the long peace and provide it with the depth to survive.

Today is the moment for boldness. Who will take the mantle of leadership not just for profit but also for peace?

The world is waiting.

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In a tumultuous region, Qatar had been an oasis of stability. It had managed to navigate controversies related to its conflicting relationships for years. While it was caught in the crossfire of the conflict this summer between Iran and the United States when Iranian missiles struck the Al Udeid base, it seemed, after the fact, more like an orchestrated series of events.

After the October 7 attacks by Hamas two years ago, it was likely that Israeli retaliation could find its way to Doha. Conversely, the opposite occurred. Qatar’s leaders became key nodes for both Israeli and American officials, with the director of Mossad making routine visits. Perhaps it was not that surprising. After all, Qatar was one of the first Gulf nations to publicly establish a link with Israel all the way back in 1996.

At 3:46 p.m. local time, Tuesday, September 9, the feeling of impermeability evaporated as more than 10 missiles crashed into a building where Hamas officials were meeting, killing five of the group’s members as well as one Qatari security officer. Unlike the 2017 Gulf blockade, this was an unobstructed military strike within the country’s territory, not simply an outside pressure campaign. The alliance with America, the hosting of Central Command, and the hundreds of billions of dollars committed to invest in the United States did nothing to stop it.

The Israeli strike in Doha, with the world watching, represents a watershed moment not just for Qatar but also for the wider Middle East. It is the beginning of sovereignty.

While the immediate rhetoric will be sharp, the follow-on actions will be muted. More telling will be the subtle shifts to help prepare for a sovereign future.

Sovereignty in Stasis

On August 2, 1990, as the Cold War was ending and Pax Americana was searching for a footing, Saddam Hussein ordered Iraq’s forces to invade neighboring Kuwait. A petrostate effectively under American protection, this was a red line. It was also the first test of America as the now sole superpower. The Gulf War established a clear red line in the so-called rules-based order, or what we know simply as the American order.

America directly enforced that standard in defense of its allies in the region. Progressively, as this reality became more entrenched, American military capabilities were integrated heavily into the security architecture of the Gulf, even while the optics of American military bases faded. As Saudi Arabia discussed normalization with Israel, on the table was a fully-fledged American defense pact.

Countries in the Middle East have witnessed direct violations of their borders before, as seen in 2003 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example. Yet this precedent often involved countries outside of the American order. When Israel would act, it would mostly be deferential to the American framework.

The consequence of this architecture was an abdication of regional sovereignty. In the Middle East, it meant that countries were empowered so long as they fully integrated into the American security architecture, at the expense of any independent military or industrial apparatus.

For countries that chose this approach, everything seemed to be working out.

Searching for Threats

After the October 7 attacks, and since the Trump administration came to power in particular, the fig leaf of notional sovereignty has fallen by the wayside in the Middle East and around the world. Even in areas within the American orbit and core geographies of interest, there is no longer any umbrella protection. While America may not intervene today, it still mediates when two allies confront each other.

For Gulf countries, that offers no solace. Although the last decade witnessed a dramatic increase in defense investment and a close relationship with America, Qatar’s air defenses were absent in the face of Israeli strikes; even if they were not activated for political reasons, there is little doubt that they would not be able to match Israel’s firepower. Localized power that is not deployable or effective remains a line item on a balance sheet.

Qatar and other countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, are not naïve. They recognize this. But there is still a large gap between recognition and capability. Even Qatar, which had heightened awareness of its fragility resulting from the 2017 crisis, has been unable to truly harness its sovereignty.

The United States will still arm and support its allies – for a price – but it is up to each country to defend its interests. Additionally, in the Middle East, Israel has a ‘hall pass’, meaning its imperatives sit above all others. The assault in the heart of Doha made it clear that Israeli power remains uncontested as the country assumes a broader imperial footprint in the region. It means that every border is subject to negotiation.

In the past, countries outside the American orbit in the Middle East were the ones that might come under fire. Today, any country with perceived strength and autonomy is seen as a threat by Israel. Non-adherence to Israeli demands may also lead to an overt or covert attack.

This is most acute for countries like Turkey today, but tomorrow it could mean Saudi Arabia is in the crosshairs.

Beginning of Real Sovereignty

Real sovereignty means real power, not silky displays of hardware. Further integration into the American imperium could temporarily stave off encroachment. But this would not be the case vis-à-vis Israeli interests. For the smaller Gulf states, it may translate to seeking protection from new alliances.

There are few allies to turn to that possess indigenous power not subject to American whims—Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, and now perhaps Turkey. Most likely, an intersection of alliances represents the greatest protection moving forward. This will include states acting like mercenary protectors, who will take on the risk for a sizable reward.

This will contribute to a re-ordering in the Middle East of regimes and borders, which could be redrawn. More likely, the re-ordering will be subtle, reflected in two levels of sovereignty: real and phantom. Phantom sovereigns will either be subsumed by the growing Israeli imperial footprint or develop external protectors that can mobilize – a big if.

Tone Deft

For the time being, Israeli dominance will prevail. It will eliminate or diminish all the threats it can and attempt to subjugate any emerging force. Turkey, however, appears to be already capable of asserting its sovereignty.

For Gulf states, the choices are not clear. Can they go deeper into the American orbit? Is true indigenous capability possible? The stronger they get, the more likely it is that they will face opposition from Israel. Is there an external power outside of America that can provide sustained protection?

For the rest of the Middle East, there will be deft approaches to try and thread the political needles, as attempted by Syria’s nascent rulers. That path is fraught, and for most, it will not be successful.

A new sense of malaise across the Middle East appears inevitable. In the long horizon, however, it may yet prompt a new dynamic that could surprise.

If the moment is seized, the beginning of sovereignty is a blessing in disguise. It represents, for the first time, an opening to reimagine the region beyond the recurring reality of today.

“Elmo the Mook, formerly known as Elon Musk…He’s…a non-American starting an America Party.” – Stephen Bannon on his WarRoom Podcast

“The fat, drunken slob called Bannon will go back to prison, and this time for a long time. He has a lifetime of crime to pay for.” – Elon Musk on X

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“‘Mark Levin is a repulsive ghoul whose entire sex life consists of watching other people getting blown up.” – Tucker Carlson on the After Party podcast

“The isolationists, such as “Chatsworth Qatarlson” [Tucker Carlson], are turning on our president…They prefer the likes of Russian President Vladimir Putin.” - Mark Levin in the New York Post

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“[We are working] to make it [legal immigrant workers] cheaper, more efficient, and more effective for those farmers.” Brooke Rollins in Iowa on July 3

“Pam Blondi and Brooke Rollins are 2 of the worst cabinet picks in the Trump admin. I hope they are replaced.” – Laura Loomer on X

As the Trump administration approaches the six-month mark, there are increasing signs of a MAGA civil war. Key figures have expressed growing frustration. On the outer edges, a full-blown revolt is already underway, driven by a range of influencers.

The MAGA movement, a decade on, however, remains the Trump movement. The lockstep loyalty is evident in poll after poll. This was demonstrated when the president managed to garner support from all two GOP House members for his ‘Big Beautiful Bill’. On the number one issue for his supporters— the border —he has more than delivered. When the rank-and-file look around, where else is there to go?

The White House has also showcased the breadth of power at the president’s disposal and what may await future leaders of the MAGA movement. The flag to be captured for the base and key figures is executive power. The MAGA civil war, rather than being a move away from Trump, is an attempt to influence and control the apparatus that sits underneath him. Whether or not this moves from an online firestorm to momentum among grassroots supporters offline will be critical to what unfolds next.

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On Monday, June 23, midday, Iran responded with Operation Glad Tidings, striking Al Udeid Air Base in Doha, a critical fulcrum for U.S. Central Command. It gave advance warnings, although there was still slight panic in neighboring Gulf countries, where air sirens were blaring.

Later in the afternoon, President Donald Trump posted on his Truth Social account:

“I want to thank Iran for giving us early notice, which made it possible for no lives to be lost and nobody to be injured. Perhaps Iran can now proceed to Peace and Harmony in the Region, and I will enthusiastically encourage Israel to do the same. Thank you for your attention to this matter!”

He added:

“CONGRATULATIONS WORLD, IT’S TIME FOR PEACE!”

What comes next? Here are five dimensions to guide the thinking moving forward.

1. It appears the U.S. has achieved its objectives

When President Trump entered into negotiations with Iran early on in his administration, it came with significant risks. Iran’s incentives to make a deal were low. It had stabilized following the Israeli onslaught in the summer of 2024 that targeted its proxy forces, particularly in Lebanon.

By mid-April, negotiations formally began, with U.S. envoy Witkoff and Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi leading the way (who remain in direct contact, although they have not met since the beginning of hostilities). After 60 days, there was little movement from Iran on agreeing to near-zero enrichment.

At that point, the U.S. administration gave a green light to Israel to escalate. Its subsequent operation was based on years of preparation and months of planning. The tit-for-tat attacks between Israel and Iran have been devastating for the Islamic Republic, which has limited air defences left. They have been somewhat reeling for Israel as well, which has faced direct hits on strategic installations.

In joining the assault, President Trump needed to re-establish credibility and the ‘stick’ not just in the Iranian context but also concerning China and Russia. If he could not demonstrate that he was willing to pursue an escalatory tactic, then how could he bring Putin or Xi to the table? Arguably, this is a very volatile way to conduct foreign policy, but the personalization of geopolitics is today’s game. The attacks were as much about enrichment as they were about projecting power.

2. Round one has passed, and the dust is settling

With the back-and-forth between the United States and Iran now over, at least in terms of round one, there is a collective sigh of relief. The damage for both Iran and the United States was limited and telegraphed. The US spent days evacuating its facilities and bases of both personnel and key assets. Iran, meanwhile, likely moved nuclear material and other sensitive aspects out of the three sites ahead of the attacks over the weekend. The limited nature of the fighting means that both sides can claim victory, having caused some damage, and return to the negotiating table.

Geopolitically, there has been limited contagion outside of Israel and Iran. Gulf countries have taken the escalation in stride, although they may still respond to the strikes in Doha. Similarly, the spread to proxy battlegrounds such as Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq has been negligible. Each day that passes, this could change.

Economically, oil prices are back below where they were at the beginning of the flare-up between Israel and Iran. Equities, such as those listed in the S&P 500, have remained essentially unchanged. While some transportation routes have been intermittently disrupted, there is no systemic halt to global supply routes.

There are two wildcards. The first is that as the Israel-Iran conflict continues, there could be a renewed divergence of Israeli and American objectives. Second, and partly related, is the splintering of the MAGA base, around pro- and anti-war camps. If this attack is contained and President Trump immediately returns to the negotiating table, it could lead to partial reconciliation within his base.

3. An offramp to de-escalation and an onramp to regime change sit side-by-side

The two options are diametrically opposed and equally possible. There are now entrenched interests pursuing both, particularly domestically in the United States. On the one hand, there is an on-ramp to regime change, and on the other, an off-ramp to de-escalation and a nuclear deal.

The neoconservative faction in Washington, D.C., was reignited by the Iranian strikes, which were thought to be out of the question for decades. President Trump crossed a line and the Rubicon, opening the door to regime change. Some media figures and politicians are rallying around exiled monarch-in-waiting Reza Pahlavi, for example. Even Trump himself hinted at regime change, with the slogan Make Iran Great Again (or MIGA).

The later posts on Monday from the president’s Truth Social account indicate an open offramp. With the Iranian Foreign Minister doing the diplomatic rounds in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere before returning to Iran, it appears that groundwork is underway. Ultimately, however, the Supreme Leader could still veto a deal. There will also be an effort to bifurcate negotiations with the United States and Israel, keeping a hot conflict going with the latter.

The following 72 hours will be critical in determining the direction things take. An errant missile or a deliberate escalation by any of the three parties could once again put the conflict on a path of no return.

4. There is no World War III in the offing

What is apparent is that there is no World War III – or 2.5 – underway as a result of the American action. Both China and Russia have had muted responses. There is no vociferous BRICS position. Europe itself has not objected but cheered the effort. Even Turkey has been somewhat neutral in its statements.

During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the outrage was far greater. Iran has limited popular support, and its geopolitical allies do not see its decapitation as existential, even if it would be problematic. The priority for China and Russia is de-escalation, and they would prefer to focus on their own neighborhoods while reaching a détente with the United States.

That being said, if the American attacks were sustained and began to re-escalate, many political currents would seek to incentivize a quagmire to deplete the United States of military and financial resources.

5. We have entered the great unknown – act accordingly

In 2025, what would once take seven years can now occur within seven days. The timeline of possibility is radically shifting geopolitically. While this crisis may subside (although that is still uncertain by any means), countries with a keen eye will make significant adjustments to their approaches. In particular, defense deterrence and defense sovereignty cannot be put off even one day longer.

China and Russia believe a new red line was crossed and will never deal with the United States in the same way again. The attack on Iran indicates that their regimes could be next on the list. The nature of such an effort would be less overt, but it could occur regardless. They will, in the short term, avoid direct confrontation with the United States, but also double down on building political and economic autonomy.

System resilience applies to individuals and institutions, not just countries. That is also in the near term, especially in the Middle East. The current conflict is ongoing and has multiple facets and potential for escalation. It raises questions for companies considering investment in Syria or setting up operations in Saudi Arabia, for example.

The off-ramp for America and Iran is clear, and all parties should redouble their efforts to focus on what comes next—the great unknown lies on the other side.

On the early morning of Friday, June 13 local time, Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran, killing senior political and military leadership, as well as striking sensitive targets. The operation involved months of planning, as well as intelligence assets that had infiltrated Iran. Iran responded the same evening with ballistic missiles, striking the heart of Tel Aviv. Bringing the war to an end becomes ever more challenging the longer it continues. For example, the India-Pakistan flare-up in May 2025 lasted only four days, a period already surpassed in the Iran-Israel war of 2025.

There is no single analysis that can explain what is happening or may happen. In addition, the fast-moving situation is caught in a web of politicization and misinformation. This post provides a guide for the days ahead, covering the state of play, what led to this moment, domestic political considerations (in the US), the scenarios in play, and possible pathways to peace. There are several takeaways to frame the situation:

• Israel has clear military supremacy, and its initial attack created shockwaves. However, the Iranian counterresponse has also surprised and been unprecedented for Israel.

• Without the full backing of America and even direct engagement, Israel will be limited in what it can achieve, and the longer it proceeds, the more likely the U.S. will intervene.

• There is no obvious path away from war. The economic repercussions are likely to be absorbed by markets in the short term, reducing immediate pressure to conclude the hostilities.

While there is an attrition of forces, there are also weapons and capabilities on both sides that have yet to be deployed. At the ten-day mark, if the conflict is still ongoing, there could be a marked escalation and a series of events that may surprise both sides. One wildcard is that at any given moment, President Trump could insist on a negotiated outcome and force a ceasefire.

*The clinical nature of this post is not intended to disregard the costs of war, the human suffering on all sides, and nationalist perspectives held by various parties to the conflict. Those should be discussed, but are best left to other forums.

[Most in-depth posts are free for all subscribers for the first 24-48 hours]

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Less than two weeks after his victory in the presidential election, Donald Trump attended a UFC fight at Madison Square Garden in New York. He was hosted by UFC CEO Dana White, a close personal friend. In the crowd were his core base of supporters – young men. Seated to his left was the billionaire Elon Musk. Yet, the individual seated to his right also caught the eyes of many; chatting away with the president-elect was Yassir Al-Rumayyan, the governor of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF). It was a demonstration of the intimate integration of the Kingdom in Trump’s orbit, and a sign of things to come.

Trump’s Gulf moment comes at the outset of his administration’s next 100 days. When the president made a memorable trip to Saudi Arabia in 2017, the focus was regional. This week’s trip has broader global dynamics at the forefront, from geopolitical deal-making to generating investment deals for the America First agenda. With expectations sky high, there will also be skepticism. Yet the potential is there for Trump’s Gulf trip to catalyze significant gains for the region and beyond.

The details | What Trump wants

Trump’s trip to Riyadh, Doha, and Abu Dhabi has three principal focus areas.

• “Peace through strength” — After a period of sabre-rattling on various fronts, the administration sees the Gulf trip as an opportunity to cement peace agreements with the Houthis, on Gaza, and beyond. Although Saudi-Israel normalization appears off the table, other dramatic forays, such as informal engagement with Iranian officials, interactions with the Syrian and Palestinian leadership could occur. It remains to be seen if there will be progress concerning Ukraine to announce, where KSA and the UAE have been active mediators.

• Investment — Wildly ranging investment figures have been bandied about ahead of the trip. Over $2 trillion of (re-packaged) announcements could be tallied across the three countries, but the details and timeline will likely remain in the air. While the highlight is the ‘MAGA in the desert’ conference today (May 13) in Riyadh, robust deals have also been put together under the supervision of Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed (TBZ) in Abu Dhabi.

• Energy — The most significant gap between Gulf and U.S. officials relates to energy prices. President Trump considers lowering oil prices a signature initiative. Current price levels are insufficient to balance regional budgets, but this may be the cost of doing business with the Trump administration.

The details | What the Gulf wants

In many ways, Gulf leaders are getting what they want by being the prize of Trump’s eye and his first formal destination as president. Three overall priorities stand out.

• Defense and protection — All three countries seek longer-term defense arrangements with the United States as the overall nature of American power and the rules-based order shift. In addition to security agreements, they are also seeking to obtain new weapons systems, from fighter jets to missile defense shields.

• Economic partnerships — Although the Trump administration is focused on outward investment flows to America, the Gulf countries will seek to encourage inward investment and economic partnerships, particularly from large capital holders. There will be a desire to demonstrate the trip as a win-win arrangement for the region, rather than simply extracting gains for the president.

• Access to technology — With Saudi Vision 2030 underway and a robust institutionalized focus in Abu Dhabi, the Gulf is playing a key role in relevant new technologies, notably crypto and artificial intelligence. Most of Elon Musk’s companies, and others like OpenAI, have existing deals with the region’s sovereign wealth funds. During the visit, Gulf leaders will seek increased access to proprietary AI and computing technology.

How it may unfold

The three days of Trump’s visit consists of a bonanza of events and spectacles. Footage from the trip is already dominating the media cycle, which will also be driven by headline investment announcements. There will be a concerted effort to announce longer-term peace agreements. In this spirit, even if the Trump administration can’t manage a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, it will settle for a short-term one.

On the ground | What happened?

The President’s trip to the Gulf region unfolded like clockwork. Pageantry and protocol were front and center. In addition, a range of deals were announced, potentially totaling $2 trillion. Yet it was underwhelming on the geopolitical front, with limited movement on intractable challenges. The groundwork, however, could generate more tangible results in the months ahead.

Overall, the trip set a precedent for future foreign missions. Other countries will also note the level of investment and the optics involved.

On the delegation itself, the president was accompanied by a range of administration officials, notably:

• Chief of Staff Susie Wiles

• Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller

• Secretary of State Marco Rubio

• Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick

• Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent

• Secretary of Energy Chris Wright

• Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth

• Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff

In addition, prominent business leaders joined most aspects of the trip, including:

• Alex Karp (Palantir)

• Alexander Wang (Scale AI)

• Andy Jassy (Amazon)

• Arvin Krishna (IBM)

• Ben Horowitz (a16z)

• Dara Khosrowshahi (Uber)

• Elon Musk (SpaceX, Tesla)

• James Quincey (Coca-Cola)

• Jane Fraser (Citigroup)

• Jeff Miller (Halliburton)

• Jenny Johnson (Franklin Templeton)

• Jensen Huang (NVIDIA)

• Jon Ballis (Kirkland & Ellis)

• Kathy Warden (Northrop Grumman)

• Kelly Ortberg (Boeing)

• Larry Fink (BlackRock)

• Lisa Su (AMD)

• Lorenzo Simonelli (Baker Hughes)

• Patrick Soon-Shiong (Los Angeles Times, ImmunityBio)

• Ray Dalio (Dalio Family Office)

• Ruth Porat (Google)

• Sam Altman (OpenAI)

• Stephen Schwartzman (Blackstone)

• Tim Sweeney (Epic Games)

• Travis Kalanick (CloudKitchens)

• William Meaney (Iron Mountain)

• William Oplinger (Alcoa)

Finally, in addition to the regular press pool, the president was joined by Fox News hosts Sean Hannity and Brett Baier, who conducted interviews during the trip.

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

As the first stop and with the most high-profile event – the Saudi-US Investment Forum – Saudi Arabia was the highlight and showcased the largest potential business deals, even if all have yet to materialize. The president’s speech at the forum was his clearest articulation of the administration’s foreign policy since coming to office.

Itinerary (May 13-14)

• On Tuesday morning, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman met President Trump at the airport. They later had a formal bilateral meeting, joined by officials on both sides. During this meeting, a number of agreements were signed, including on defense cooperation, economic partnership, and energy/critical minerals.

• He later traveled to the Saudi-US Investment Forum and then joined a state dinner in the evening.

• On Wednesday, President Trump participated in the Gulf Cooperation Council leaders' meeting before departing for Qatar.

Business Outcomes

The official readout of the trip provided a figure of a $600 billion investment commitment from the Kingdom. Others have estimated that the figure is just shy of $300 billion. Yet, the most tangible numbers are the $142 billion in defense agreements, $20 billion by Datavolt for data centers, and likely $30 billion for NVIDIA and AMD from the new HUMAIN entity.

Geopolitical highlight

The most notable development of the trip was President Trump’s face-to-face meeting with the Syrian president, Ahmed Sharaa. In public remarks, he also announced that the U.S. would be lifting sanctions on the country.

Notable quote

“It’s crucial for the wider world to note this great transformation has not come from Western interventionists or flying people in beautiful planes giving you lectures on how to live and how to govern your own affairs.”

- President Trump at the Saudi-US Investment Forum (May 13, 2025)

Qatar

The visit to Qatar provided tangible investment returns, particularly in aerospace, but also prompted momentum on the hostage negotiations amidst the ongoing Gaza crisis.

Itinerary (May 14-15)

• On Wednesday evening, Emir Tamim bin Hamad met President Trump at the airport and then at the Amiri Diwan, where a bilateral defense agreement was signed. This was followed by a state dinner.

• The next day, the president participated in a business roundtable, during which several business deals between the two countries were discussed.

• He later visited Al Udeid Air Base, which is located in the country, to meet with the troops before flying to Abu Dhabi.

Business Outcomes

In Doha, Qatar Airways signed the largest deal of the trip, ordering $96 billion worth of Boeing aircraft. The country also committed to purchasing $42 billion worth of weapons, including a $1 billion purchase of drones from Raytheon. An interesting announcement related to a $1 billion investment for quantum computing in Quantinuum.

Geopolitical highlight

While no significant peace deals were made on Gaza during the visit, just prior, Hamas released Edan Alexander in negotiations largely facilitated by Qatar.

Notable quote

“We're in very serious negotiations with Iran for long-term peace. And if we do that, it will be fantastic.”

- President Donald Trump at the Business Roundtable in Doha, Qatar (May 15, 2025)

United Arab Emirates

The trip’s final stop lasted two days and focused in part on the integrated nature of the AI and energy sectorsin both countries.

Itinerary (May 15-16)

• On Thursday afternoon, President Mohamed bin Zayed received President Trump. The first stop in the country was a visit to Sheikh Zayed Mosque, followed by a bilateral meeting similar to those in the other Gulf capitals.

• The following day, President Trump participated in a business forum that included presentations on notable investments by sovereign wealth funds in the United States. This was followed by a visit to the Abrahamic House.

Business Outcomes

Prior to the Gulf trip, Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed, the brother of the President, visited Washington, D.C., and made a $1.4 trillion investment commitment over ten years. This trip promoted tangible announcements as part of that, with a stated total of $200 billion. Publicly, the most prominent of these was Etihad's purchase of aircraft worth $14.5 billion and the investment of $4.5 billion by Emirates Global Aluminum into Oklahoma. There was also an announcement that an oil and gas consortium would generate $60 billion in investment.

Geopolitical highlight

The Abraham Accords from the first term have seemingly been overtaken by other geopolitical developments half a decade later. Look for the UAE to play a more significant role in the Syria, Gaza, and Iran files in the coming months as they reassert relevance to US foreign policy priorities.

Notable quote

“We're looking at Gaza. And we're going to get that taken care of. A lot of people are starving.”

- President Donald Trump at the Business Forum (May 16, 2025)

The way forward

The trip is just the beginning of a deepening set of relationships across Trump’s four years in office between the U.S. and the Gulf. Compared to the first term, there is much more scaffolding for the overall partnership, and the robust movement on geopolitical files in the lead-up means that progress could be announced. That being said, it will only be in the coming months when it will become clear if the commitments made on the trip materialize into tangible outcomes or fade as headlines without substance.

Canada has long been integrated into the American orbit, but even more so in recent times. Justin Trudeau’s father, Pierre Elliot Trudeau, was fiercely independent as Prime Minister. His task was to affirmatively establish what it meant to be Canada in the 1970s as the country sought true autonomy from Great Britain and in the face of rising separatism in Quebec. In many ways, he was a Canadian nationalist—and unapologetically Canada First, albeit at the expense of provincial rights.

After the end of the Cold War, the development of a Canadian nationalist ethos fell by the wayside. NAFTA eroded independent Canadian industry. The country’s identity slid towards the superficial, centering on hockey and beer. Most of all, being Canadian became reflexively about not being American. This meant pride in socialized services and milquetoast multiculturalism while ignoring the reality that these constructs were indulged via a free ride of (80-90 percent) integration with the world’s economic superpower.

The election of Barack Obama was a further disaster for Canadian politics. He was the image of America-lite that emotionally resonated with Canadians. His policies and movement could be aspirationally Canadian. Increased immigration. Multiculturalism. Socialized programs. The era led to a comingling of politics and the elite, including the policy apparatus across both sides of the aisle.

The notion of an independent Canada that could forge a proud nationalist identity left the station. With the rise of Trump in the mid-to-late 2010s, the elite coalesced on both sides of the border to sing the songs of opposition. Slogans became one and the same across the political spectrum. Black Lives Matter. Believe all women. Somehow, the case of Harvey Weinstein and the death of George Floyd were also Canadian issues of national import.

The unmooring of Canadian cultural independence dovetailed with inescapable economic dependency. When Biden returned the Democrats to power amidst the COVID pandemic, it further decimated Canadiana. The addiction to fiscal irresponsibility was put into hyperdrive north of the border just as it was in Washington, eschewing the budgetary balance championed by the previous incarnation of Mark Carney as a central banker (which had enabled Canada to sustain itself with strength during the global financial crisis).

As happened with the American left, the sloganeering of attacking the country’s foundations became mainstream. Even the foundational notions of an origin story laid down in the prominent Heritage Minutesseries to try to put forward a shared history and identity became taboo. The peer-pressured silencing of any dissent relegated Canada’s politics to an alphabetized soap opera of acronyms.

The harsh reality is that America is still the global power and monetary driver, while Canada is not. The United States can print its own money with abandon and still have a stronger currency than most of the world. It could question its core because, whatever it was showing culturally, its global power would always be its foundational frame, Democratic or Republican.

By the beginning of 2024, the problems in Canada were out in the open. This even caused then-Prime Minister Trudeau to reverse the government’s pro-immigration stance. Yet, what is affirmatively Canadian is still defined as not being American: multiculturalism and socialized services. This is why every political platform descends to a combination of new spending and rallies with diaspora communities. Canada is its parts, and there is no sum.

Canada First

Enter 2025, and Canada's very existence was put on the table. If Canadian power does not derive from the U.S., where does it come from? What does it mean to be Canadian? What is Canada? Politicians have no choice but to awaken from their slumber in such an environment. But their instincts are stuck in a deepening frame of underestimating American power and echoing the politics of discontent.

Nationalism and national identity, however, require an appeal to intrinsic national power and even chauvinism, not intangible global values or an apparitional rules-based order. After a decade of chipping away at the depth of Canadian identity, the political establishment still showcases “I am Canadian” by holding a beer and playing hockey.

Yet this is not Maple Leaf nationalism, but rather the artificial syrup of a hollow identity. To truly move forward, there needs to be a national reckoning of what it means to say, “I am Canadian.” An authentic, not performative, coherence must be built from this. The result should acknowledge shortcomings as a nation—yes—but also pride in Canada's greatness, including how it got there, in its history, in its heroes, and all its hues—brown, black, and white.

In a complex world where every country is flawed, racist, and has done evil, original sins are everywhere. They must be acknowledged, addressed, and redressed. But they cannot be wielded to disintegrate national identity.

Surviving in an America First World

Ultimately, identity can only take a nation so far. A country needs the tools of power, namely military and monetary might, especially for one as large as Canada. The last 80 years are not instructive, as they were defined by an American monetary and military umbrella. Achieving true sovereignty will require asking real questions and arriving at solutions.

What is needed for Canada to defend its Arctic border without America? How can Canada build high-speed rail at the rate of China? When can Canada have its own car companies emerge? What is the strong economic and cultural frame that can sustainably support multiculturalism and socialized services?

The truth is that Canada and Canadians have not had to be masters of their destiny, perhaps ever. That time has arrived. And the conversation is just beginning.

Is Prime Minister Mark Carney up to the task to lead the way?

Most media coverage is centered on a retrospective of what has already happened, as seen in ABC’s exclusive interview with President Trump. Trump himself is trying to manage optics on social media. The next 100 days, however, will bring new dynamics and issues to the fore.

The focus will move from government restructuring, illegal immigration, and opening salvos on global economic policy to intense global deal-making, expansive domestic initiatives, and legislative action. The scale of these developments may overshadow current debates, as intense as they are. Those stuck in the weeds of polling, the vicissitudes of the markets, and the overall political back-and-forth will miss far greater shifts.

Here are five trend lines to pay attention to through August 29, 2025.

1. Geopolitical dealmaking in the spotlight

The coming period will see a higher pace of travel and foreign meetings. Whether that will include a face-to-face meeting with Chinese President Xi or Russian President Putin remains to be seen. President Trump will embark soon to the Gulf as his first major trip, prioritizing inward investment to the U.S. Until now, the President’s only travel was for the funeral of Pope Francis.

Major geopolitical files, from the Ukraine War to the Gaza Crisis, will receive even more attention. The ongoing negotiations with Iran will go into overdrive, and outreach could begin again on the Korean Peninsula. The drama of these developments and Trump’s travel abroad will drive the news cycle and overshadow other issues.

2. A cascade of trade deals in the pipeline

There was an apoplectic reaction when President Trump scrapped NAFTA during his first term. Yet, serious negotiations began within months, with a new deal reached in just over a year. There will be a furious drive to close trade deals fast. The first agreements to be announced could be with South Korea, Japan, India,Vietnam, Australia and the United Kingdom.

The ‘big fish’ is China, although the final alignment may take a while. Similarly, negotiations with the European Union and its member states will be fraught. Nevertheless, once an initial set of deals gets made, it will generate momentum for others. This will not mitigate the effects of already-enacted tariffs, nor will deals be reached universally. In addition, Trump remains committed to some tariffs across the board and the External Revenue Service.

3. Capitol Hill as the center of attention

In the initial months of the administration, there has not been much ‘action’ on Capitol Hill. Congress approved a continuing resolution to fund the government through the end of September. The first test will be an attempt at recission to claw back government spending, partly in response to the efforts of DOGE.

This will give way to the challenge of comprehensive legislation for the overall Trump agenda. It will move in phases, encompassing tax, trade, deregulation, and spending, with an initial component potentially coming up for vote in July. The horse-trading that will take place may put the president at odds at times with members of the GOP and will also test the ground for bipartisanship.

4. Brinksmanship between the judiciary and the executive

The number of cases before federal courts is already dizzying and set to increase. Most of these involve immigration, but they also relate to attempts at government restructuring. As cases go to the Supreme Court, some rulings will probably go against the White House, leading to a standoff. As in the Abrego Garcia case, the Supreme Court may leave more contentious aspects ambiguous. Whether the brinkmanship between the White House and the Supreme Court rises to a true constitutional crisis will become clear soon.

5. Activation of the 250^th anniversary

Starting July 4^th, the countdown will begin towards America’s 250^th anniversary, ahead of the 2026 mid-terms. In attempting to ‘Make America Great Again,’ the Trump White House envisions grand projects revitalizing America. Aside from some initiatives in AI, building ‘new’ things has been far from view. However, this will likely change and could include announcements for so-called Freedom Cities, the Golden Dome, and space exploration.

In Trump 2.5: A Primer, several key principles—sovereignty, strength, modernization, efficiency, and traditionalism—are outlined that guide the administration. The focus now shifts to translating them into outcomes. It will become apparent by the end of the summer whether the Trump 2.5 agenda has momentum or is faltering.

With the pace of change picking up, the time for reflection and reaction is over. Attention from both partisans and observers should quickly turn to what comes next to navigate the way forward or be left behind.

On December 8, 2024, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) announced that they had taken control of Syria. Aleppo. Hama. Homs. All of the country’s major cities fell, one by one. As Abu Mohammed Jolani entered the hallowed doors of the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, it was a triumph for Islam. It came just three years after the Taliban were victorious in Afghanistan, chasing foreign forces out of Kabul after a two-decade-long battle. These two moments ran counter to trends around the world where the notion of Islam was seemingly out of style.

A duo of diametric political projects is now on center stage in the modern arena. While the particular flavor may change, they are the last two political ideas left on Earth:

Islam and America.

Power, People, and Politics

The world is organized across 193 states in the global system, as recognized by the United Nations. These states, which act as governing structures for territory, have different ruling apparatuses but similar characteristics. While today we see states, in the future, we may see principalities, empires, and beyond.

A governing idea is not required for a territorial unit. The ultimate prerequisite for governance is a monopoly of force: power. Notions of substance, style, and even core principles can accompany power over time. For example, a monarchy may start with the veneration of the ruling family, its symbols, and its personage, but across generations of rule, it might also begin to encompass specific values.

The modern era has knitted a fabric that transcends the ruling power structure – the concept of the nation. This tie that binds mythicizes community-level links across a vast territory. The increased synchronicity of language and customs in the information age has enabled territorial ethno-homogeneity, which would have been improbable in past centuries. The national myth still requires ignoring or running roughshod over diverse identities in practice.

Before migration patterns of the last several decades, most European states were modeled as ethno-states. Much of East Asia still is, such as South Korea and Japan. This is nearly impossible on the African continent due to colonial constructs that hodgepodged states together with many tribes, cultures, and peoples.

The territorial tapestry of the American order, which has existed since World War II, has forced many countries to search for organizing ideas to complement power and ethno-homogeneity. Like individuals and institutions, modern countries often – although not always – require ideology as overall frames to guide actions and foster regenerative activity. North Korea, which venerates a family that rules through brute force, still pays homage to an ideological north star.

National myths, if strong enough, can serve this purpose at a state level, fostering ideological underpinnings for the state. However, they do not possess global ideological mobility. Religion, if universalist in application and followers, can travel as an organizing idea across countries. This is true for Islam, for example. Organized political Islam has also proven it can withstand a global order. It is hard to extinguish. Hindutva, on the other hand, as an example, is not an ideological force on the international stage due to its limiting ethnocentric and regional character.

During most of the 20^th century, a rivalry played out between Islam and America, and a third construct, collectivism, for states looking for a governing idea beyond power projection and ethno-homogeneity. Overtly, many countries would eschew this framing and point to more organic and differentiated ideologies in their governing core. Yet, it is hard to ignore this underlying reality, and it is useful to explore each governing ideology.

America, Americanism and its Antecedents

Socrates. Plato. Aristotle. Many patriotic political pundits seek to anchor Americanism in the lore of the ancients. The idea of America, however, is much more modern and varied. Even the principles of Ancient Greece and Rome came through many filters, first through the Islamic Age and thinkers like Ibn Rushd and then through European philosophers of the Renaissance and Enlightenment.

By then—and just before America’s founding—Western Christian empires ruled the world: the British, Dutch, Belgians, French, and Spanish. The notion of Christendom faded in the (post-)Enlightenment era as European exploration of the nation and nationalism relegated Christianity and its institutions to the background. Christian principles survived but were subsumed into emerging governing philosophies centered on liberalism, democracy, universal rights, and human agency.

The emergence of America on the world scene in 1776 was a central event in its era. It presented for the first time a clear case for an idea driving territorial integrity rather than the rule of a family or other oligopoly. It was no surprise that France, through its close ties to American revolutionaries, including Benjamin Franklin, witnessed its own ‘idea’ eruption in 1789. That moment raised a critical question that survives today: can Americanism thrive outside of America and in territories without the tutelage of the American order?

America eventually became the frame through which all modern states formed. It also grew as a polity, subsuming much of the world in its order. Through its integration into ruling systems, America became the de facto monopoly of force in large swaths of the world. Most countries, particularly after 1991, adopted the American idea, or at least tried to, many without realizing it.

Americanism has many elements, but America as an idea is rooted in its founding ethos, both the founders and the founding documents they created: the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and its Amendments. As imperfectly as it has played out, America has sustained itself, and as an idea intertwined with the people and land, it has had staying power. When distilling the American idea (in very simplified form), three elements appear at the core: individual freedom, balance of power (between aspects of the state and with the people), and movement of capital.

There is also the glitter and glam of America at any given moment. This is where America's culture enters the scene, whether through music and movies, brands and businesses, or celebrities and superstars. It leads to mimicry, but that misses the essence of Americanism. Much like any ideology, how and what America leads to in terms of culture, economy, and politics depends very much on its implementation in a time and place.

Ideas need to be actualized, and therein lies the challenge of American universalism and its proponents: you have to reconcile with the people being governed. This is true for America and countries abroad. Over time, for a modern state to thrive—and perhaps survive beyond simply being a territory under a ruler’s monopoly of force—it must engender a nation with a cohesive society.

Americanism today encompasses nearly every state that roots itself in the American order, even those on the periphery or that may be inimical to the order. Until recently, it did have a rival within the core of the West, one that had its first inklings in 1848 and the publication of The Communist Manifesto by German philosopher Karl Marx.

Das Discontents

The notion of empires was still a dominant global concept in the 19^th century, and the modern state system did not yet define the territorial nature of governance. In 1815, the Congress of Vienna was held in Europe after the Napoleonic Wars that followed the aborted French Revolution. As this gathering marked territorial boundaries, it was apparent that empires still ruled the world.

A century later, in the nearing aftermath of World War I, these empires gave way to new, orderly territorial units or nations. The advent of the League of Nations, Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, and the Bolshevik Revolution, all within a three-year period, made it clear that the time was ripe for a debate of ideologies to govern the modern state.

By this time, America had moved past its most significant growth period, following the Gilded Age, reaching a more progressive era with the rise of labor unions. New countries were being formed around the world, and Wilson’s points had also set the groundwork for decolonization. That time lent itself to revolutionary feelings of a global proletariat.

In the 1920s, as Americanism coalesced and enveloped the post-European empire order, and other ideas like Islam floundered after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, what other governing currents would fill the void? This is where the melange of communism, socialism, Bolshevism, and Maoism came into play.

Of course, these are not all the same, yet the notions of collectivism and statism are at their core. Thus, in the mid-20th century, the modern state had two governing ideologies. The collectivist frame also included prophets, sacred texts, and saints, providing the depth required to propel an ideology.

Communism was a Western-derived ideology that fit congruently with the modern state. Thus, it provided a neat counterpart to Americanism, which had inherited the philosophical underpinnings of liberalism and the economic concepts propelled by Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations (which coincidentally was also published in 1776). At its height, one-third of the world’s population lived in the shadow of communism.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and Deng Xiaoping's ascension to China’s leadership in 1978 significantly weakened socialism, communism, and their variations. It is hard to see any ruler or ruling apparatus proactively choosing them. Of course, they reverberate, and hybrid forms (mixed with Americanism and Islamism) are present; however, they appear to be a spent force.

Ruling systems in Cuba and North Korea still use the ideology to disguise the actual basis for their governance: brute force and ethnocentrism, the classic mainstays throughout history. In Europe, successors to collectivism have largely integrated into a lighter form of Americanism, social democracy, with the same elements of rights, balance of power, and movement of capital.

Other ideas and political projects have existed beyond collectivism and Americanism, but none have had escape velocity. Think of them as cults versus religions. They appear similar, but without size and resonance, the difference is night and day.

What does all this mean for the rest of the world, especially those without uniform ethno-homogeneity? With communism eliminated as a global ideological force and everything else, as mentioned, insignificant, when the 1.4 billion Muslims look up, there are only two ideas to choose from:

Islam and America.

Islam, Islamism and its Insurgents

Islam arrived as an earthquake 1,400 years ago, quickly spawning diverse empires around the world. Before the 20^th century, the governance of Islamic territory almost always fell under a caliphate, sultanate, or imamate. When the Ottoman Empire was in its last days, it was unclear what would become of Muslim countries in the modern state system.

At the turn of the 20^th century, prominent figures like Muhammad Abdu and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani initially advocated hybridity. However, what Abdu, Afghani, and others also advocated—pan-Islamic consciousness—was incongruous with the modern state. Many Muslim theorists eventually gravitated fully towards pan-Islamism, anti-Westernism, and even Wahhabism.

Political debate flourished throughout the Muslim world in the 1940s and 1950s. Soon after, however, the global powers at the time, the United States and the Soviet Union, backed ruling systems they could align with, halting the evolution or growth of new governing ideologies. The ruling systems of states adopted symbolic mantras of either Americanism or communism, and others had even more limited ideological depth. Some other countries petered along, like Pakistan, but after 1971, they also became an extension of America’s global monopoly of force. By the end of the 1970s, the vast majority of Muslim states around the world were governed by brute force, augmented by the pageantry and pomp of power and the faintness of Islamic culturalism.

The march of neo-Islamism ushered in by the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 challenged the equation. The takeover of Islam’s holiest site the same year, which led to the Franco-Saudi siege on Mecca, further pushed a more Islamic orientation in Saudi Arabia. The 1980s witnessed the rise of global modern jihad in Afghanistan. That cadre of transborder-jihadists found succor in later battles in Chechnya and Bosnia. The spread of global militancy spawned a new outfit, Al Qaeda.

Even secular leaders, like Saddam Hussein, adjusted to the post-Arabist times, adding Allah Akbar to the Iraqi flag. Islamic politics and militancy were on the rise everywhere. The Taliban embodied the most austere form, emerging in 1995 to take power for the first time in Afghanistan. Hamas outgrew its origins to become the most potent force in the most central theater for Muslims: Palestine. Islam was the force in waiting across the Arab world. In Jordan. In Algeria. In Morocco. Permitted or otherwise, its specter loomed large.

When the Arab Spring pushed rulers aside in Egypt, Yemen, and Tunisia, Islamic forces took their place. In Syria’s civil war, the most organized opposition was Al Qaeda-lite. Then, in the abyss of Iraq, a new entity emerged: the Islamic State. The extreme caliphate and its brutality shocked the Muslim world. It also extinguished temporarily the flames of organized Islam as a result. Very few people wanted that type of Islamic rule in their countries. With the elimination of ISIS leadership in 2018, global Islamic consciousness appeared on the back foot.

The poster child of Islamic democracy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice & Development Party, was overseeing a moribund economy in Turkey. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt became unpopular quickly and was overthrown. A few years later, the same thing happened to the Islamic Renaissance Party in Tunisia. By the late 2010s, TikTok, online streaming, and the Dubai effect had brought new, less Islamic trends to Muslim youth.

When the Taliban re-took Afghanistan in 2021, it was as an anachronism; the arc of Islamism that had begun in 1979 was in decline. The triumphant takeover by Islamists of Syria marks the beginning of a consolidated counter-narrative. And it is a powerful one. Despite the ebbs and flows of political Islam, Islam and Muslims have always been robustly present. Even in Dubai, on Friday, there are traffic jams midday around all the city's mosques.

Like many religions, Islam comes before and transcends the country in the eyes of its followers. It is an organizing set of principles. Islam is also inherently universalist and political. At its core, it has always been a global political project and idea. While this essence has weakened over the centuries, as the last few decades showed, it can reemerge with the right leaders, environments, and oxygen.

Islam has many components and religious dimensions, but as a political project, it has several key elements (again, a simplified view): a pan-Islamic consciousness, a system of social constraint, and the exercise of just power. Individual freedom is not always a prerequisite, and while capitalism is often integrated—after all, the Prophet Mohammed was a trader—it is not a given. Thus, a potential tension exists between Islam and an American-led order and Americanness.

Over the past century, the Muslim world has entertained the leading political ideas: Islam, collectivism, and America. Communism with embedded secularism was unsustainable (and hybrid Islamic-socialist projects also failed). Americanism is what has taken root in countries such as Malaysia and Turkey, albeit with Islamic cultural elements. Political Islam continues to find oxygen in the contestation of the status quo.

Curing Huntington’s Disease

In the 1990s, political theorist Samuel Huntington advanced the notion of a Clash of Civilizations, an inevitable conflict between Islam (alongside China) and America. However, the intertwined nature of Western and Islamic civilization, as well as many shared values between Muslims and people in the West, call this thesis into question. At the same time, organized Islam is predisposed to contest external and non-Islamic rule.

This means that the last two ideas on Earth, Islam, and America, will invariably be oppositional at times. In many ways, Islam is the world’s last ideological resort against a global order. However, in the modern era, Islam, as a political construct, always hits a wall. In the battle of ideas, as it stands today, Islam will invariably lose.

This is because today, America, as an idea, encourages openness, while Islam fosters closed-mindedness. It was not always this way. Openness was the hallmark of Islamic intellectual inquiry during its golden age. It is what drove Ibn Rushd to the Greek classics and Al Biruni to the stars. The spread of Islam was rooted locally through syncretic practices in India, Indonesia, and across Africa. Saints and other figures of import in other faiths were venerated. Openness also found its way to political rule and culture. This allowed for societies full of integration and innovation rather than exclusion and stagnation.

What choice is a closed Islam for Muslims today? It may be better to be subsumed into America and Americanism! This also brings the benefits of a global system and its associated prosperity.

The only other path is for a two-fold reality that seems implausible but perhaps is inevitable. Firstly, an evolutionary Islamic political frame must re-emerge, imbued with a sense of openness to ideas, innovation, and differences in practice. This will enable true step changes in leadership and development. While people may point to existing modern Muslim countries, they are not genuinely open or pushing the bounds. As long as the pulpits are controlled, the taboos unchallenged, and evolution and syncretism discouraged, there will not be ideological robustness that could then honestly confront modern Islamism and Americanism authentically and present a distinct ideological alternative.

Secondly, America, as a power, must accede to a compromise lest it seeks to undertake direct control of every Muslim country for time immemorial, which it cannot. Thus, the future will require balance and compromise. Hizballah, Hamas, the Taliban, and HTS. These groups, as they stand, are not the future. They cannot achieve long-term gains for their populations and are not alternatives to America.

Without Islamic alternatives, however, they will always garner support. But successors may emerge. They would have modern systems that rival Western ones. They may evolve forms of governance that are differentiated from British parliamentary ones. They may construct sovereignty differently.

Perhaps shura councils can outperform parliaments in effectiveness. Are caliphates inherently bad, and isn’t the American order a caliphate in all but name (with the leader of the free world as the caliph)? Even new technological innovations have some Islamic characteristics; Bitcoin is a type of successor to hawala (a supposition to be explored further in other articles).

There is a desire for global sameness in some corners of the West. This is folly. 1,400 years of Muslim civilizational ethos and Islamic consciousness will not disappear. The Westernized – or Americanized - Muslim plays a critical role in bridging the duality, holding the keys to both of the last two ideas on earth.

To Infinity Plus One

The coming years will give way to geopolitical and ideological evolution around the world. As the global system of states changes, countries will need to re-imagine governance. This may lead to geopolitical contestation as a first order but will also give way to fierce re-imagination of the nation and its place in a territory. Some countries will simply revert to rely on ethno-homogeneity and state power, akin to the trajectory of China today.

Where Islam is absent, countries that seek to eschew Americanism and desire open political systems may face greater challenges. Beyond the monopoly of force and ethnocentrism, what other choice is there? Statism and collectivism? This will eventually lead to vibrant political debates and perhaps ideologies of another kind.

In the world of tomorrow, America will have its place, and Islam—an open one—will, too. Each will have territory, and people will choose where to reside. But universal sameness will not be the song of the day.

In the face of this reality, there may be only one thing left to say.

God bless America and Islam.

The unfolding situation in Syria is moving at a dizzying pace, with a different city falling daily to the rebels. The overthrow of Bashar Al Assad was seen as a remote possibility in recent years. He was at the Arab-Islamic summit in Saudi Arabia last month, marking another triumphant return to the regional scene.

In a span of less than a week, all that bluster disappeared, and a half-century of family rule is headed for a shocking collapse. Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), a successor to multiple militant outfits, has led the charge across Syria. It now sits on the doorstep of Damascus. Ultimately, the success of the blitzkrieg assault has demonstrated that the Assad regime is a shell of what it portrayed to the outside and that the apparatus of 2018 that brought together Russia, Iran, and its proxies has fallen apart.

Who are the ‘rebels’?

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