With great fanfare, negotiators from Hamas, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar signed the “Comprehensive End of Gaza War” submitted by the Trump Administration on October 9, 2025.
The 20-point plan went into effect over the weekend. Spread across three phases, it is intended not just to lead to the release of the hostages but also to end the Gaza war that has been raging since Hamas’ brazen assault on October 7, 2023.
President Donald Trump, aboard Air Force One, proclaimed that this was no interim ceasefire but an end to the war, as he flew en route to Israel to meet with the initial hostages being released. Whether the agreement has staying power remains to be seen. The contours of the deal itself are broadly aligned around those previously proposed to both parties – Hamas and Israel – and also similar to analysis in Middle East in Crisis & Conflict: A Primer and elsewhere.
What enabled the agreement was the alignment of interests at the given time. For President Trump, domestic support for Israel was heavily flagging even in his own base, and becoming a political liability, eroding his reservoir of political goodwill. Israel also had very little left in terms of military targets. And Hamas, as well as its benefactors in Iran, had seen the Trump administration back Israel in its audacious assaults in the past year.
Everyone was ready for a deal. And people on the ground, Palestinians and Israelis, were exhausted by the never-ending war and were demanding a conclusion to the conflict. Yet the deal itself is a Rorschach test, and a piece of art, with many layers. Everyone from Stephen Bannon to Mark Levin to the Iranians is supportive. Why? It is important to understand the five layers in turn.
1. The agreement is open and fluid, but intended for the war itself to end
The finer points have yet to be decided that pertain to phases 2 and 3 of the deal. Here are the principal elements of the framework:
Hamas returns both live hostages and the bodies of the dead;
Israel releases Palestinian prisoners;
Israel withdraws from parts of the Gaza Strip;
Hamas leaders depart Gaza, and the movement disarms;
A new Palestinian governance mechanism is put in place; and
Reconstruction begins.
What is unclear is who would govern Gaza and how Hamas would disarm. Hamas clearly still maintains a monopoly of force in Gaza. Thus, any handover would have to be a matter of self-sacrifice or compulsion. Israel may choose to resume sporadic attacks if that process slows. Constant vigilance will be key, but there will be discontent regardless. In Israel, extremist elements of the Israeli government, like Ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich, will be on the back foot and may turn their attention to the West Bank.
2. A new long-term security architecture is being attempted in the region
President Trump has gone out of his way to praise regional countries, notably Turkey and President Erdogan. In many ways, this agreement acknowledges an emerging security architecture that harkens back to the decades of the Cold War: Iran, Turkey, and Israel. The challenge is that Iran is not operating at the behest of the United States.
Other countries remain relevant. The Gulf, while influential, plays the role of a financier and facilitator. Egypt itself is formidable only in its border areas and does not appear to project strength further afield.
As the United States continues its decade-long retrenchment that started under President Obama, countries will need to both build indigenous capabilities as well as find some type of rapprochement with the three countries of Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Yet these countries themselves will also need to find a balance with each other, and if they do not, they will go to war.
3. Regional geopolitics will take a backseat to the global backdrop
The United States and the Trump administration in particular have been mired in the Middle East, as all prior presidencies have been after professing a pivot to other geographies. The partial resolution of the Gaza crisis will enable more bandwidth to address Ukraine, renewed relations with Russia, and the nature of détente with China.
While the Iranian file remains open, the next grand bargain is more likely to be with one of the two outlying major powers of Russia or China. That does not necessarily mean an immediate alignment. The regional de-escalation happened after a very hot summer, including direct conflict with Iran. Similarly, globally, escalation will likely be a prelude to de-escalation.
One caveat is that for a quarter century, the American military has operated with two active major theaters, first Iraq and Afghanistan, and more recently, Ukraine and Gaza (albeit by proxy). The inertia of the apparatus will be hard to stop, and the biggest risk for American conflict is currently with Venezuela and in Latin America more broadly (i.e., a new front).
4. Domestic American politics will have to address the Israel question
American politics on both the right and left in recent months has become consumed, if not monopolized, by the issue of Israel. The internecine fights have reoriented factions and shifted coalitions. It has also been all-consuming on social media. Many groups – from across the spectrum – have used it as a mobilizing advantage.
There is public exhaustion with all things Israel. The Trump administration will need to move assertively on other aspects of the MAGA agenda. For the side that targeted the Israel issue with more ferocity, such as Matt Gaetz, Stephen Bannon, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, and Tucker Carlson, there will be increased focus on other populist concerns, including economics. A lot of corporatism has ascended in the Trump administration amidst the spotlight on the Gaza crisis and Israel.
On the left, without the mobilizing call of Gaza, which was a unifying one, it is unclear what other policy positions are as potent. It will force a more direct reckoning for party coherence, which, apart from the Gaza crisis, simply devolves into anti-Trumpism. This may mean coalescence around an economic populist message.
Significant capital was also used over the past two years in the capital by pro-Israeli groups. Once the dust settles in the region (if it does), then it may be that they will have to tread carefully in being as aggressive in targeting opponents or advancing very pro-Israeli policies, for a while.
5. This is a humanitarian moment first and foremost
In our world of power politics and realpolitik decision-making, it is easy to neglect the human dimension. Yet, the ability to have common cause and shared empathy is a great equalizer in an otherwise unequal world. The next weeks will see images and stories of reunited families in Israel and broken homes and dreams in Gaza as civilians return to rubble.
The response and reconstruction efforts offer a moment for humanistic impulses that can help restore balance in the American conversation at home and in regional discussions abroad. It can also go a long way towards creating a redefined sense of solidarity in a post-globalist world.
Even in this context, there will be a prevailing tension as certain figures will attempt to instrumentalize the deal to restore the ‘legitimacy’ of international institutions of the rules-based order. It will be up to those representing the interests of the people of Gaza to keep their needs, welfare, and future as primary above other debates.
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This deal was part art and part science, and there is no one read of this deal. Despite its abstractness and simplicity, it is much more significant than its detractors will claim. It is the first true breakthrough in 2025 on a major geopolitical file.
It would be wise for all to engage seriously with the implications and also to take advantage of the opportunity.