How Not To Avoid World War III

A shifting landscape of power and perceptions

In 2012, during the third presidential debate, then-President Barack Obama spiritedly took his opponent, Mitt Romney, to task:

“When you were asked, what's the biggest geopolitical threat facing America, you said Russia. And the 1980s are now calling to ask for their foreign policy back because, you know, the Cold War's been over for 20 years.”

Today, it is clear that geopolitical rivalry between great powers is alive and well on the global stage. That battle for supremacy means the prospect for conflict looms large on the horizon. Yet, the world has always been a dangerous place.

Nevertheless, avoiding the worst of outcomes—World War III—will take more than rose-tinted glasses and a glass of rosé on a Sunday. Despite all the punditry and prognostication of the dangers ahead in mainstream and social media, a combination of bombast and ineptitude seems to be all that prevails.

The path to peace remains as elusive as ever.

Past Americana

Since Pax Americana came crashing down with the fall of the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001, the doomsdayers and naysayers have been out in full force. The subsequent failures in Afghanistan and Iraq further revealed the weakness of the world’s superpower. The global financial crisis in 2008 exposed the limits of America’s financialized economy. The hyper-growth of political polarization since 2016 has highlighted real and devastating divisions at the heart of the empire.  

Juxtaposed to American decline has been the rise of the rest, if not a rival order. While the ragtag Islamist outfits of years past provided fodder for a Hollywoodesque image of enemies at the gate, the resurgence of Russia and the boldness of China constitute a formidable challenge. And there are many who have taken active notice. Realpolitikers and realists have resurfaced in think tank circles, with many declaring that an equitable multipolar world is already upon us.

Investor-cum-guru Ray Dalio pronounced in his treatise, Principles for a Changing World Order, that the decline of America was upon us, and the rise of China was seemingly inevitable. One order would give way to another. And like centuries past, conflict will be on the horizon when these divergent lines intersect.

Global Conflict and Its Discontents

The state of play on the geopolitical chessboard is perhaps a bit more mixed than many have laid out. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has not achieved anything similar to the Warsaw Pact mind reaching the integration of NATO. The BRICS, while expanding, appear to encompass economies of the American order more than dominions of China and Russia. Although Europe’s economic growth has stagnated, America’s has not. Today, its share of the global economy is at the same level as it was at the end of the Cold War.

In fact, despite all the developments of the last three decades, America remains a dominant force, albeit one beset with challenges. Therein lies the challenge. During the Cold War, the relative parity in capabilities between the Soviet Union and the United States meant that George Kennan’s strategy of containment, operating in the shadow of mutually assured destruction (MAD) in the nuclear age, succeeded in becoming the preeminent approach to preventing World War III while advancing geopolitical interests.

In the first half of the 20^th century, humanity saw over a hundred million souls perish in two catastrophic world wars. In the decades since, there have been genocides, ethnic cleansing, civil strife, inter-state confrontations, terrorism, and all manners of evil. Yet, a world war between global powers did not recur.

When the Soviet Union fell, mutually assured destruction as a principle, at least in terms of nuclear capabilities, remained in play. China and Russia are countries that have nuclear capabilities that could threaten the United States. Any prospect of nuclear conflict would be seismic and reach the levels of mutually assured destruction. Any form of direct conflict and confrontation could conceivably escalate to that level.

From MAD to AID

Since the end of the Cold War, America has moved to operate under the premise of American-induced destruction (AID) –America could induce the destruction of any country, including China and Russia. This enabled a broad move away from containment of expansionist tendencies – the Kennan approach in the Cold War – to outright encroachment and encirclement.

This induced destruction relies on a principle of exclusion from the American-led global system and economy. Any misstep by Russia and China would result in their economic obliteration. Of course, this could be deployed against any country, but the same threat was used against these larger powers. This created an American indulgence to project power against Russia and China despite the latter countries’ status as mega-nuclear powers.

Since the mid-2010s, it has become apparent that this post-Cold War posture is faltering. While Russia certainly cannot rival America’s economic strength, nor can China lead an alternative to the American-led order or system, both countries appear to withstand an assault based on system or economic exclusion.

With the declining potency of AID, the power dynamic that prevailed for the 25 years (until around 2015) since the end of the Cold War has been unraveling. It brings the possibility of sub-nuclear conflict between larger powers back on the table. That means that China and Russia may retaliate more directly in the face of American provocation.

Thus far, the pushback by Russia and China has been on the periphery or through proxies. In Syria, Russia pushed back on American intervention and solidified Bashar Al Assad’s grip on power. In the South China Sea, China has consistently ratcheted up military tensions with neighbors like the Philippines. The Ukraine War became the most significant battleground for potential direct confrontation. Still, it has remained in the realm of proxy warfare, with neither Russia nor the United States battling each other directly.

In the Middle East, the Gaza conflict has played out between Israel on one side, supplied by American munitions, and Hamas, regional militants, and Iran on the other side, allied with China and Russia (although to what extent they are with any side in the current conflict is debatable). As that conflict has escalated, the doomsday soothsayers have emerged in force, predicting World War III. Are they right?

The involvement of larger powers, either directly or indirectly, does not mean World War III is on the horizon. The conflict could widen inexorably, and it would still not mean it leads to anything resembling a world war or direct confrontation of great powers. At the same time, the American security establishment is operating on lessons learned in past conflicts from Syria to Libya that are already obsolete. In that sense, the prospects for World War III have never been higher.

Russia, China, and the United States all know that neither of them will seek to escalate to a nuclear confrontation. However, the United States’ ability to deploy economic obliteration and system exclusion against great powers has dissipated. The Ukraine conflict has shown that Russia can withstand the premise of AID. We are thus in unknown territory and at the beginning stages of a new security architecture for the world.

A nuclear confrontation in a global conflict remains off the table due to MAD, but conventional warfare, beyond proxy battles, is back on the table.

Matches and Tinderboxes

The whole world today seems to be a geopolitical tinderbox.  Distinct tinderboxes can be found in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, and Eastern Europe. All it takes next is a match to create a spark that can lead to a fire of escalation. Although World War III is a narrow possibility, this does not equate to probability. There are a lot of steps between where we find ourselves today and World War III tomorrow.

Military engagement between great powers would likely be preceded by proxy-to-power engagement. For example, a Ukrainian missile provided by a NATO country, such as Germany or Poland, could hit a Russian target. Russia would then retaliate against a NATO military base, and America would retaliate directly against Russia.

In the Middle East, smaller sparks may fly much more quickly. Iran could strike an Israeli military base with U.S. personnel. American forces would attack the source of the Iranian strike. Iran would then strike back at American forces. In this case, it could lead to a round of warships from Russia and possibly China coming to the region. Then, a renewed round of sparks would need to occur. The prospects for spiraling hostilities appear likely in the Middle East, but escalating to great power confrontation still seems several steps away. This has already been borne out in the past several months in some respects.

In Northeast Asia, China could make a military maneuver towards Taiwan, although China seems to still have significant moves it can undertake before making a military play. It is also actively probing and prodding other U.S. allies in the region. However, American military exercises in the South China Sea could easily lead to accidental engagement with Chinese warships. In some ways, the ‘randomness’ of that spark may be the most likely out of all three contexts to lead to great power conflict and potential world war.

In all three tinderboxes, the scenarios exist for direct confrontation. Yet, they are not inevitable or even first-order effects of current dynamics.

Searching for Self-Awareness in the Beltway

Even if direct military engagement between the United States and one of the larger powers – China and Russia – occurred, it would take all parties to continue the escalation to precipitate global conflict. Unfortunately, in Washington D.C., there may be, as hard as it is to believe, a lack of awareness of the actual decline of American power. The conflict in Ukraine may have only added to this bubbled hubris, building on the lack of real consequences from past interventions within the Middle East, particularly Iraq, Syria, and Libya, that disregarded the proxy interests of China and Russia and the sovereignty of its allies.

The sclerotic, bureaucratic, and kleptocratic nature of the American military-industrial complex creates further risks. SIGAR continues to investigate complete malfeasance and even the potential transferring of funds to organizations linked to the Taliban after 2021 by ‘accident.’ The United States has lost track of many billions of dollars being sent to Ukraine. And the Pentagon is incapable of conducting an audit on its trillion-dollar budget. The lead contractor, Boeing, is literally lost in space. The aftermath of Hamas’ assault on October 7 demonstrated further the inability of the U.S. to ‘win,’ de-escalate or control its own players on the board.

Russia and China, conversely, have a much tighter system of command and control and a clearer awareness of their capabilities or lack thereof. It could have been argued that this was not the case before the latest round of hostilities in Ukraine, in Russia’s case. Yet, the Ukrainian conflict has helped Putin ‘clean up’ by sidelining the Wagner Group, reorganizing the supply of ammunition, and fostering new military leadership.

The greater power, the United States, lacks the ability for responsive de-escalation, and its military leadership is seemingly unaware of its own decline and inabilities. Limited day-to-day political attention is paid to avoiding World War III, which is seen as a fringe possibility. In fact, precisely the opposite seems to be occurring inside the Beltway, where confrontation with China and Russia is enthusiastically encouraged.

The ‘will’ to pave an off-ramp from World War III is missing from the power equation.

They Don’t Really Care About Us

What should the rest of the world—countries, institutions, and individuals—be doing in response? While the prospect of World War III is the greatest it has perhaps ever been, preparing bunkers in New Zealand is a fool’s errand. At the same time, not having contingency plans for such scenarios would be foolish.

Without greater awareness in Washington, D.C., there is no clean-up in aisle war. Thus, a third country, such as Norway or perhaps the United Arab Emirates, may need to take the lead. An intermediary power, with strong relations with the great powers and convening ability and resources, is best suited to do this.

Further afield, individuals with influence should reduce force postures, not just on the battlefield but also on social media. It is imperative for people to stop advocating for open-ended conflicts with large power dimensions. It is easy to get into conflicts but hard to get out of them. The jingoistic fervor for forever war has become too embedded in the foreign policy consciousness of the Beltway elite since 9/11.

Stepping back, we will likely avert World War III in any near-term scenario. Living in a permanent state of doomsday is no way to live. Yet, the next time you find yourself leading the chant to war, big or small, you may want to keep this refrain handy:

War, huh, yeah

What is it good for?

Absolutely nothing.