Realpolitik and Pipe Dreams
Building Possibilities of Peace in the Holy Land
“The arc of the moral universe is long but it bends toward justice.”
- Martin Luther King Jr (Washington DC | March 31, 1968)
The famed civil rights leader uttered these famous words once again less than a week before he was assassinated. The arc of the moral universe may be long, but these days, it is unclear when it will bend toward justice. Our problems seem intractable. Conflicts persist indefinitely. More often than not, revolutions are thwarted by counter-revolutions. Liberation, oft-delayed, arrives stilted, with the victors transforming into despots.
Nowhere is this despair more entrenched than in the proverbial Holy Land. Nearly eight decades on, nothing but more death and destruction seems on offer. Palestinians remain dispossessed and occupied, without a state in a world of states. Every issue between Israel and the Palestinians is unresolved. Israelis sense they will never be secure from violence. The events of October 7 and the aftermath have only solidified the feeling that there is no end in sight for all parties.
Where is the moral arc?
[To skip ahead to the possibilities of peace, scroll down].
Our World (bereft) of Ideas
The conflict inhabits a world without a moral frame. We are living on the fumes of past dynamics and surviving by sloganeering for the future. Very few individuals and institutions are building - culturally, politically, and economically. In a world of financialized aspirations, the means have become the ends. Conferences are convened for revolutionary cosplay. What is needed on the ground for the masses gives way to the currents at play in the intellectual playgrounds of the (westernized) elite.
In the West, after decades of (market & monetary) monopoly, societies have it all, albeit unequally distributed. And when you have it all, you are in constant search for meaning beyond accumulating means. This has given way to nouveau practices of identity-based revolutionary pageantry on the one hand and drugs, suicide, and violence on the other hand. Empty hedonism abounds, while soulless mega-religion/amorphous spirituality is on the rebound.
What can be expected in the cities of Oz when the existential threats have disappeared? What would push cultural regeneration, political creativity, and aggressive, realpolitik-based global problem-solving? Where would the new ideas even come from – and what desperation would drive ideas to emerge and have the toughness to survive and move to action?
While bereft of ideation, post-Cold War Americana has never been more liberated, on an individual level, due to technology and decades of cultural production that has multiplied the zeitgeist. That energy has led to boundless micro-innovation and expression and machineries built around that. The tools at our disposal are beyond phenomenal. These tools and platforms can help drive unprecedented prosperity, human connection, and progress. They can also cause the opposite.
There is a newish debate now pitting effective accelerationism (e/acc) against the incumbent theory of good, (in)effective altruism (EA). It is a paradox that struggle creates the ideas that drive prosperity, and prosperity generates ideas that lead to struggle. Forced goodness, such as EA, during times of prosperity rarely work. Thus, shuffling technology at the service of an empty vision of altruism was destined to fall short. You cannot manufacture societal solutions from the city of Oz for the people beyond the wall.
Accelerationists would posit that the veneer of altruism only hands the greatest tools (and prosperity) in the history of humanity to the eventual service of totalitarian idealistic excesses that, by intention or lack thereof, cause even more harm. Yet, the acceleration of technology without a moral frame is no better than putting technology in the service of an ideologically deficient frame. Technological accelerationism simply becomes an overproduction of means, which is no better than an overproduction of the elite.
If then the means, technology, and prosperity must be put in the service of ideas – ideas that have resonance – and new ideas that have resonance will only emerge from true adversity, and that grander adversity is not to be found within the walls of Oz and the West, a conundrum does present itself: What if the ideas that emerge beyond the walls are worse and not better? Should the ideas found there be empowered? Not all those seeking to burn down Rome, even if trying to escape hardship, offer a better vision of the world.
The challenge is to pair positive dynamism, ideas, and movements developed in spaces of adversity with the tools and technologies from the oases of prosperity. This is important even for people living in prosperity and peace because, without ideological renewal, there is destined to be decay (look at history). There is no room for the splendid isolation of Marie Antoinettes if the world still wants to eat cake!
It is also important for people in places of adversity to have this meeting of minds, as ideas need to face opposition, be engaged in debate, and require the means to manifest in manifold ways. That openness (or robustness) was once found in elite capitals in the Bait al-Hikmas, Oxfords, and Harvards of the past. Al Farabiwent from Faryab to Baghdad. Rumi migrated from Balkh to Konya. Jamal al-Din Al Afghani made his way from Kunar eventually to England and Istanbul. It seems Afghanistan may be (as for all three) the birthplace of ideas and idea makers. But that’s another story.
The Frames of Our Time
In considering modern ideas, especially politically, it is essential to consider the world before 1991 (yesterday) and after 1991 (today). During the Cold War, there was assuredly existential adversity in the West due to the threat of nuclear war. In addition, internally, in America, for example, liberation struggles were still underway for large segments of the population. In Europe, the fundamental political nature of the societies was still being evolved. Thus, grand political ideas, both in scale and depth, emerged to try and address true challenges.
It is no wonder that the 1990s represented a political and cultural culmination in the West. Decades of idea and movement formation had crested, and boosted by unprecedented prosperity, led to creation after creation for a short period. That spirit of unbridled creativity was undoubtedly part of the life force of the Silicon Valley explosion, where there was a re-imagination of the architecture of human connection.
A range of political flourishing was driven by the open space that gave life to the ideas percolating in decades past. The Oslo Accords. The Good Friday agreement. The Rainbow Nation of South Africa. The re-constitution of Europe. Imaginative ideas to create new realities came to the fore.
While the 9/11 attacks gave the illusion of threat, the risk was, in fact, relatively low. Through subsequent decades, hardship (genuine existential hardship) disappeared from view at a societal level in the West. Even the global financial crisis, which challenged some European peripheries, came and went. The West’s monetary monopoly was too great. It may be one reason crypto-innovation started with existential re-imagination but was quickly subsumed by the excess of materialism in the society around it.
During ‘yesterday,’ before 1991, in the grassroots beyond the wall, in the face of adversity, three primary political frames of the time emerged militating for change, which seemed to absorb any ideas or idea-makers and became the basis for state and societal formation:
(1) ideological domination;
(2) collectivist control; and
(3) capitalist mimicry.
Ideological domination, while strong, limits the potential for inclusion, dynamism, and the human spirit. Combined with a totalitarian monopoly of force, it can be very powerful for a while. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, and most aggressive Islamists fit into this category. There is nothing novel here. Thus, the staying power in a world of change (and today, change is exponential) is limited as the potential for creating new prosperity is restricted. The advent of Islam was revolutionary and evolving; however, if not adapted for 15 centuries, it is simply stale and cannot deliver.
Collectivist control, as enacted by Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, and other communist forces, martials the collective human spirit. If Henry Ford proved one thing, it was that an assembly line of humans can achieve great things. Imagine developing an entire society and state that was an assembly line of humans. What if this became a system of states? That was effectively the Soviet Union (USSR). It becomes a tremendous force of humanity. Then, leadership decay eventually sets in. People become disillusioned. And the society frays. And this is what happened. In the aftermath, as the spirit and freedom of individuality had already been extinguished (often by totalitarian oppression), decline can be quick and almost impossible to escape.
Capitalist mimicry, in a world of the rising West, became the prevailing frame of yesterday. Lee Kwan Yew pursued capitalist mimicry within the Western system, as did many Southeast Asian nations eventually. And they did this very successfully. They understood that to achieve this, they had to take a revised mercantilist approach before allowing for a greater balance of trade and regulatory capture by the Western system. This required strong leadership that could solidify state dynamics (while still allowing for individual-based capitalism) and negotiate externally to ensure the right balance of trade.
This is an oversimplification, of course, and the reality is not so clear-cut. China has been caught in a tension of all three ideological phenomena. Within the Cold War period, from the grassroots, other creative frames did not fit so neatly into these three boxes. And many individuals and ideamakers tried to exist outside these principal frames. This included intellectuals such as Ali Shariati and leaders such as King Faisal.
Most of the rest of the world – outside the West - has been politically settled along the three frames as discussed. Regarding remaining intractable conflicts, political stalemates, and moments of transition, you still have reverberations of all three (ideological domination, collectivism, capitalist mimicry) within various movements and conflict zones. There is very little else to draw from. This is also true in Palestine.
Capitalist mimicry in the global East and South has become a runaway freight train. When it fails, it is due to an absence of strong leadership and failure to achieve the build-up of deep domestic capacity. Outside of Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, successful capitalist mimicry has struggled to take root. The United Arab Emirates is a clear example in recent times, and perhaps so is El Salvador today, of the mimicry working somewhat well once again. Ultimately, the latter two cases have various undercurrents of authoritarian dispositions (this requires a longer discussion).
In the decades of today (after 1991), there have been pseudo-ideas of change and cultural and political forces emerging from the West. They are frequently banal, often vapid continuations of the status quo and reverberations of the short-lived 1990s decade of action. Other countervailing ideas are increasingly bizarre, developed in isolation and prosperity, often in leading intellectual playgrounds like Ivy League universities. They include concepts such as neo-decolonization. Most of the underlying ideological essence is predicated on tearing down societies from places of prosperity rather than forging prosperity from times of adversity. They offer little to the global East and South (or the West) to build new movements, countries, and realities.
There is another bizarre phenomenon where quixotic political thinking seemingly emerges from beyond the wall but is not organic. Instead, the groups presenting the ideas are vessels for the funded ideological interests of the Western elite. There is limited sustainability or viability of ideas that are not sharpened in places of adversity, where they must attain broader support and then evolve from ideas to naturally occurring vehicles of action to create change. If this is done unnaturally, the movements and societies relying on them collapse or are funded to illogical extents until it makes unnatural and inefficient impacts.
Realpolitik for Less Death in the Holy Land
Where do movements for change come from if you are in Palestine or Israel or seeking to effect change there? Where are the new ideas? Today, most substantive ideas for change or novel approaches to the conflict appear to either echo the status quo or the tangents of quixotic Western circles.
As discussed, these ideas may be doomed to fail. The only alternative pathway is for organic ideas and ideamakers to emerge or take root within the Holy Land. It would have been difficult to see new thinking originating from within Israel before October 7. In South Africa, the existential threat of an end of apartheid led to a new paradigm of thinking for the white elite in the country. In that sense, October 7 may inadvertently bring new ideas to the fore in Israel (some will be dark, but there may be a sliver of light).
In Palestine, in contemporary times, new ideas and ideamakers have been captured by the first frame, ideological domination, notably via Islamist movements. It makes sense that this was the natural evolution from the other popular political frame in the 1960s and 1970s, collectivist control. Both frames were distinctly anti-Western. Again, this could be expected, as Zionism was seen as a phenomenon of the Western system.
While many Palestinians may want to look to the emerging East and South, the post-October 7 aftermath shows that these broad swaths of geography lack the open spaces, confidence, or dynamism to develop and offer new ideas with resonance. This may change, but nothing appears on the horizon. Furthermore, do not expect any novel frames (outside of the three discussed) to emerge yet from the global East & South, as most state systems are immersed in capitalist mimicry in the Western system.
In any case, a liberation movement seeking to create a novel undertaking (i.e., create a new state) and is also anti-system may be trying to do too much. The best approach for Palestinians in the current environment is indeed capitalist mimicry in the Western system. The case of Singapore and Lee Kwan demonstrates that orientation alone is insufficient (hence why Fayyadism failed); it also requires strong leadership, which is currently missing in Palestine.
The best way forward for Palestinian movements is to fit Palestine within the frame of capitalist mimicry in the Western system while also leveraging the current existential moment to empower the narrow non-status quo contingent in Israel that sees Palestinian self-determination as a road to peace.
Much of the responsibility for change, however, lies with Palestinians, simply because that’s how the nature of power works. Right now, the situation could continue indefinitely for Israel and other powers that be. For any day after to work for a just resolution of the conflict, the following pre-requisites are needed:
Palestinian movements ideologically are re-centered on capitalist mimicry away from ideological domination (i.e., Hamas/Islamism).
Palestinian leadership, including resistance movements, actively support the Western system yet maintain strong relations with the East.
Palestinian leadership that emerges is strong (a la Lee Kuan Yew, not Mahmoud Abbas).
If this occurred, there could be an integration and extrapolation of a Palestinian authority (not necessarily the actual Palestinian Authority) in the West Bank and Gaza. Without that turn from the Palestinians, it is hard-pressed to see Israel having its hand forced by Western powers.
In light of October 7, there are two currents in Israel, both militating for a renewal of existential security.
1) De facto ethnic cleansing of Palestinians through slow domination, intermittent evisceration, and expulsion;
OR
2) Full settlement of the issues at play.
The group supporting the second option is small and will remain so without change on the Palestinian side. There is a deeper need to assuage the concerns of Israelis that the existence on their borders of an integrated Palestinian entity won’t become hostile. Exhortations to the unfairness of these expectations are nice but ultimately a sideshow. Ignore the voices on the streets of Brooklyn, as ultimately, the world works on power and interest sets. And Israel has the power, so yes, its interest sets need to be responded to.
There are three counterarguments to consider. Firstly, one could argue, why can’t Hamas pull off a Taliban? The Taliban expelled the greatest power perhaps in the history of the world and have reconstituted complete control of their territory. Ultimately, while the Taliban were able to take over Afghanistan, they have no international recognition. In addition, Afghanistan has limited strategic centrality as a territory. This is not true for the Palestinian territories. If it did happen, and Hamas retained its rule, the best-case scenario would be what the Gaza Strip was before October 7 (semi-independence and forever semi-blockaded).
There is another argument that ideological sentiment in America will shift the blanket cover for Israel’s actions. This could be true. On one side of the spectrum, Israel could have less leeway. But that could cut two ways and could backfire a la Wilders; a resurgent right in America could become even more punitive regarding Palestinian aspirations for statehood. Ultimately, even more hostility towards Israel only determines the degree of impunity. In that scenario, with a more pro-Palestinian left, the best to be hoped for would be whatever 1999 Palestinian territories were. Not a solution. And certainly not statehood.
Finally, the dreams of Saladin have given way to some TikTok cross between Bella Hadid and Mohammed Kurd. There is this notion that online diaspora heroes will ride to victory in Jerusalem. Here is the ‘rub’. When Gandhi was facing incarceration and British threats, he did not flee to Britain. One has to be in the territory you seek to rule. And the diaspora is simply not there. There is a role to play, but it is to support, not lead from the outside (the exception is that there can be a hybrid model, but it needs to be integrated). This is not to discount the real and tragic reasons there is a diaspora and why many justifiably flee. However, no liberation was achieved from the outside.
Thus, the critical question is who is in the territory and can rule. There needs to be a leader with true grassroots strength. That leader may be slightly uncouth. And to find such a leader is ultimately difficult. They emerge and cannot be installed without an authentic pre-existing base. Past installations by the West of ‘technocrats’ in various territories likeAshraf Ghani and Salaam Fayyad haven’t panned out. They’re simply the New York salon version of what a palatable leader may look like. They also don’t work in practice. They cannot rule states. They have no coherent ideology beyond LinkedIn.
The Day After in Gaza
Ultimately, Israel will fall short of its goal of removing Hamas through military actions. It made a severe mistake in undertaking sustained military action on October 7. It could have built a War on Terror-style coalition. After the 9/11 attacks, America waited nearly a month before invading Afghanistan on - checks notes - October 7, 2001. Many analysts pointed out that Israel had unrealistic objectives and no endgame. Thus, Israel has been caught in an unending assault and deployment of military means. While Hamas’ capabilities have been degraded, and the collective punishment will assuredly have a deterrence effect, the goal of Hamas dismantlement will not be achieved militarily.
The continuing waterfall of massacres and war crimes – objectively, that is what they are – is untenable. In addition to a moral stain and humanitarian catastrophe, they will also create generational blowback. There is a point of no return that Israel could cross in the next month, where it will jeopardize significant prospects for any regional cooperation. With this in mind, Western powers, notably the United States, will pull Israel back towards a ceasefire. Yet, this ceasefire will be considered ‘interim’ and have a stated objective that a new Palestinian body will be installed in the Gaza Strip. In addition, there would be an agreement that Hamas would no longer be formally present in the territory. That would mean that any formal appearance by Hamas, militarily or politically, would be met by Israeli counteractions.
With all this in mind, how can progress towards a lasting solution be brought about in the day after, and what should various parties do to bring it about (Palestinians, Israelis, regional actors, the United States, and others)?
It appears that the sequence of steps required at the outset is as follows:
1. Bring about an end to the current crisis (easier said than done)
There needs to be a grand bargain put on the table by regional powers in conjunction with the United States, including a full prisoner exchange and removal of political and military control of the existing Hamas apparatus in Gaza. This was Hamas’ reality prior to 2006, and it can still evolve in that context (see below). The open question will be about its leadership, which will most likely need to relocate to an alternate country from Qatar. For the United States, it is better to have Hamas leadership in a Western-oriented country rather than Iran. A backdoor deal with Damascus may allow for Hamas to return there with heavy restrictions on activity.
2. Consolidate a Palestinian authority (either the PA or another)
While Israeli forces will not withdraw from the Gaza Strip (and, of course, not from the West Bank), there will need to be force and governance projection in the Palestinian territories. Israel is not prepared for a full re-occupation. No regional forces – mind American authorities – would like to play this role. Thus, it falls on the Palestinian Authority, or a new form of the Palestinian Authority, to play this role in both Gaza and the West Bank. Regional and Western governments are already preparing for this.
3. Enable a post-Hamas Hamas
No scenario ends with Hamas staying as it is, either in power or its current form. Yet, there is also no scenario in which Hamas disappears. It has a multi-decade presence within the Palestinian population. There must be an ‘off-ramp’ for the movement and its members. The best approach would be enabling a ‘new’ body with only a social and political frame to have legitimate status, akin to Sinn Fein. Of course, some in Israel may object, but that is not a realistic objection. There is no de-Baathification to come (and that did not work, by the way).
4. Choose one of the existing Palestinian leaders
While perfunctorily, a Palestinian authority can be established, the current sclerotic leadership needs to be removed and replaced. This can be done through fiat, elections, or simply re-routing of funding. Without the latter, Abbas would disappear tomorrow. There are only two clear options that would enable a solid transition: Mohammed Dahlan or Marwan Barghouti (the former a strongman more palatable to Israel, the latter a militant populist favored by Palestinians). Given space and open political processes, a third alternative could emerge. In the interim, a figure like Mustafa Barghouti could oversee a transition. But falling back to the technocratic hope will lead to a new Hamas taking the space a weak leader offers.
5. Project demilitarized power of the Palestinians
With an expanded Palestinian authority under new leadership, it would be important to expand its force projection. Ultimately, that force projection cannot threaten Israel but needs to develop a monopoly of force in the urban centers under its control. The security apparatus in the West Bank already operates in this manner.
6. Foster elections for the parliament and presidency
There will be flagging legitimacy if the prior steps do not lead to new elections that allow for renewed political representation across the board with the consent of Palestinians. This has not happened since 2006 (in terms of the parliament). This may or may not lead to a new Palestinian leader outside the ones mentioned above. It may confirm/cement the anointed leader’s status through electoral legitimacy.
7. Invest in reconstruction, development, and growth
As soon as there is a sustainable end to the current round of violence and Israeli bombardment, significant aid and recovery efforts will be underway. Yet the immediate actions will need to be met by long-term investment in reconstruction, development, and growth that gives a positive view of the emerging Palestinian leadership, authority, and dynamic. Without this, alternative/rejectionist forces will take root. This mechanism needs to be administered by the World Bank or a similar body (in terms of reconstruction and development). It cannot be subject to the daily whims of Israeli security authorities or border controls (the latter perhaps should be handled by regional parties).
Pipe Dreams for Peace
Where do the sublime seven steps take us? Back to 1999? Back to 2005? Back to 2015? Back to October 6, 2023? These steps, already perhaps unrealistic, would still be insufficient and deficient. This is obvious to even the casual observer. And that is why pipe dreams for peace are part of the realpolitik scenario. There is no sustainable status quo without the pipe dream of dual self-determination for both Israel and Palestine.
The glaring absence of any organized Palestinian advocacy in light of the aftermath of October 7 shows how defective the current leadership and organizational elements of the official Palestinian apparatus are. While reform can come from within, it is hard to see the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Palestinian Authority (PA), or any successor body standing on their own globally and having the dynamic resonance to militate for change and the Palestinian position.
A Palestinian Collective
The Palestinian diaspora and their partisans have filled the vacuum in media, social media, public squares, and political offices. While that energy can be positive (it can also be negative), it is low-return if not cultivated to full effect. It can also be ‘set aside’ by official actors. Thus, just like the Jewish community and Zionist movements before 1947, the Palestinian diaspora needs to enact an organized body representing its apolitical interests.
While the PLO perhaps is akin to the World Zionist Organization and the PA to the various bodies representing the Yishuv (and of course, we can speak to militant groups active and their similarities), a new body could still emerge. In 1936, the World Jewish Congress was founded. This effectively advocates for Jewish minorities around the world. A novel Palestinian organization is absent that advocates for Palestinian communities across the globe, harnesses their energies, and is present at advocacy moments.
This challenging undertaking falls on the Palestinian diaspora: to forge a new Palestinian Collective that can become the largest organization representing Palestinian interests globally. It could, in effect, also become independent from political interests and be funded by the Palestinian diaspora, which has significant wealth today.
The Palestinian Collective could also have its own humanitarian arm and easily generate hundreds of millions of dollars of aid for Palestinians rather than relying on existing organizations. It could create a media department with its own publications rather than depending on traditional media. It could have a scholarship program and help bring about a new generation of Palestinian leaders. It could have its own advocacy platform and help fund political support in Western capitals. It could have a global engagement body and convey the Palestinian perspective to stakeholders in the Middle East, parallel to the PA or PLO.
Whether through the Palestinian Collective or another organized effort, the Palestinian diaspora, unfair as it seems, needs to launch a dramatic a la Mandela push that advocates visibly for coexistence. Remember, Mandela did this after a century of apartheid and decades in prison himself. However, he knew this outreach was the key to creating a partner for the future on the other side. So he did it.
Yet, this reality needs to then play out in practice. How can this be achieved to demonstrate that the vast majority of Palestinian society is ready for co-existence with Israel in a non-hostile way? This is where things like the lovey-dovey Seeds of Peace and Abraham Accords come back into play. These are the settings where Israelis and Palestinians can interact in third-party contexts, allowing for the imagination of new possibilities.
Camp David 3
Ultimately, there will be no process that the United States does not lead as it is the main supporter and arms supplier for Israel. It has the requisite influence to bring both sides to the table. The article in Foreign Affairs by US National Security Advisory Jake Sullivan, published just prior to October 7 (and since edited), claimed unprecedented quiet in the region. There has to be, and there will be a Camp David 3; there will be no ‘quiet’ without it. It will happen whether it’s under President Biden, President Trump, or President X.
At this Summit, there will need to be a clear timeline for the Palestinian state at the onset with the broad contours defined. These contours already have copious details (not covered here) that many analysts have explored in-depth.
Basis of 242 & 338: The two resolutions ending the 1967 and 1973 wars provide the basis for the shape of a Palestinian state.
Demilitarized authority: For an indeterminate period, the Palestinian state will not be able to have offensive capabilities and instead would have its security guaranteed by a third party.
Settlers accepted: There is no scenario in which Israel will remove all the settlements and settlers, and thus, many of them will remain in place in a final deal.
Refugee solution: Without any right of return, especially related to family reunification, a deal will not be palatable to Palestinian interests; much of the nature of refugee return was outlined in negotiations in Taba (January 2001).
Jerusalem option: The idea that there will be no Palestinian formal presence in Jerusalem in a final status agreement is itself a pipe dream that many Israelis have; there will be a Jerusalem option for the Palestinians.
Land swaps: Given the thorny issue of Jerusalem, settlements, and various security requirements, there will not be a clean and clear border based on 242 and 338, and swaps will have to be numerous.
The above dimensions have all been heavily debated, delineated, and detailed. In prior rounds of discussion, Israeli and Palestinian negotiators have come to terms with most. The challenge is, in fact, not the details but the motivation.
Arab Peace Investment Dividend (APID)
Pipe dreams are not enough. Even if the United States is determined, the Palestinians are ready, and the Israelis are convinced, there will need to be extra motivation on the table. Real, tangible, ready-to-go motivation.
If the prior peace moves are a pipe dream, here is the pie-in-the-sky initiative: the Arab Peace Investment Dividend (APID). What is APID? It is a $1 trillion investment fund that will flow directly into the Israeli and Palestinian private sector the day after a peace deal is signed. With a 10-year time horizon, $100 billion will be funded and disbursed year-on-year. It will be the greatest investment dividend per capita in modern history.
The idea is for the APID to be formed immediately as a legal entity with a governance mechanism and for commitments to be binding as of today. In addition to sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) from the region, SWFs from East Asia (e.g. Temasek) and Europe (e.g. Norway) could be brought on board, as could pension funds in North America and DFIs more broadly from the West. There is no doubt that these funds could be mobilized and committed.
Unlike the Abraham Accords or the Deal of the Century, this is neither a conceptual dividend nor one that precedes peace. It is only activated upon the acceptance of a broad peace (along the lines of the Arab Peace Initiative). It shows actual skin in the game by global and regional actors in peace. And it demonstrates to Israelis and Palestinians alike the financial upside in a financial world.
However, the APID needs a leader to step up and take ownership. If it were the American President, it would not work. If it were a leader from Saudi Arabia, this would be a game changer.
What if the Pipe Dreams Burst?
In our world today, bereft of ideas, full of political stagnation, and materialistic obsessions, it may mean that the current conflict continues unabated, not just in the short-term but also in the long run. What is another decade for a crisis that will soon enter its ninth decade? Any number of scenarios illustrate the devastating consequences for those on the ground and the wider region – if not the world – should there not be a resolution. Suffice it to say everyone is aware of these consequences. Yet, that has not stopped things to this point.
There are two ways to see world events, especially if you are an institutional leader but also if you are a collection of individuals. Either they occur, or they are shaped. Ultimately, at some level, the outcome is shaped by the decisions of those in power today. The outcome is not set. Destiny may be the provenance of the divine, but it is up to humanity to play its role.
Will you play yours?