Syria
Who, What, When, Where, Why & How
This is the first post in the Topline series. Featured posts on Geopolitico look in-depth at complex dynamics beyond the day-to-day. The Topline provides quick perspectives and analysis on recent developments in the news.
The unfolding situation in Syria is moving at a dizzying pace, with a different city falling daily to the rebels. The overthrow of Bashar Al Assad was seen as a remote possibility in recent years. He was at the Arab-Islamic summit in Saudi Arabia last month, marking another triumphant return to the regional scene.
In a span of less than a week, all that bluster disappeared, and a half-century of family rule is headed for a shocking collapse. Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), a successor to multiple militant outfits, has led the charge across Syria. It now sits on the doorstep of Damascus. Ultimately, the success of the blitzkrieg assault has demonstrated that the Assad regime is a shell of what it portrayed to the outside and that the apparatus of 2018 that brought together Russia, Iran, and its proxies has fallen apart.
Who are the ‘rebels’?
Three primary groups on the ground constitute the rebel offensive:
Hayat Tahrir Al Sham—The successor group to nearly all the Islamist militant groups in Syria that fought on the ground since 2011. It is led by Ahmed Hussein al-Shar’a, known as Abu Mohammed Al Jolani, arguably now the most powerful man in Syria. HTS incorporated several groups, including the entity Jolani previously helmed, the Nusra Front (which also had multiple re-brands). At one point, the Nusra Front was part of Al Qaeda’s global architecture. The group has both Syrian and foreign fighters in its ranks.
Syrian National Army—The SNA is primarily backed by Turkey. It serves as a bulwark against Kurdish paramilitaries in the North. Various Turkic ethnic groups fill a significant portion of its ranks. However, it is not as effective as HTS.
Syrian Democratic Forces—The U.S. has backed the SDF, which has become a front coalition for the YPG, a Kurdish militant outfit. The Assad government has at times coordinated with the SDF, given the shared hostility with Turkey.
Who is on the other side?
The Syrian Arab Army (SAA) is the Assad government's primary fighting force. In recent days, the SAA has largely abandoned its positions. It seems to be standing on its own, unlike during the height of counterinsurgency efforts from 2014 to 2018. Back then, disparate groups came together under the command of the Iranian general Qassem Soleimeini to push back on militant groups. That coalition coordinated with Russia, which led the assault from the air.
During the Syrian Civil War in the 2010s, local militias, often ethnic or religiously centered, from Syria served alongside foreign groups on the ground. The SAA was not as involved in the fight in many locations. The Radwan Force of Hezbollah played a significant role. They were joined by paramilitary forces from Iraq who were both well-armed, well-trained, and highly motivated.
Today, as the SAA makes withdrawal after withdrawal from urban areas, border zones, and elsewhere, all these other groups that were critical during the civil war on the government side are nowhere to be found.
What has happened so far?
The situation on the ground may be markedly different by the time this post is published. At this point, led by HTS, the rebels have conquered the major urban cities of Aleppo and Hama and are knocking on the door of Homs. Certain border crossings with Jordan have also been seized. Meanwhile, the SDF has moved into the country's northeast, where the SAA has withdrawn. In a remarkable scene, Jolani was seen triumphantly walking the grounds of the famed Aleppo citadel.
The dizzying pace has seen the rebel opposition enter the cities of Daraa and Sweida in the South. There was limited rebel movement in coastal regime strongholds such as Lattakia and Tartous, but that could change suddenly. Ultimately, those two cities have a higher population of Alawites, a community that the Assad family hails from and is a backbone of the government.
Unlike the past civil war, Russian airstrikes have been fierce but limited. Iran has been unable to offer much support. Hezbollah has been sidelined. Iraqi paramilitaries have not crossed the frontiers. Regionally, despite initial support, not just from Iran but also Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, there has been little shoring up of the government. This is partly due to the shockingly precipitous collapse of Assad’s forces.
Why the rebel push now and how did it all unfold this way?
There is a lot of conjecture about the timing and why now. Certainly, Trump’s election and the countdown to his inauguration served as motivation to shift things on the ground. In addition, there was a breakdown in communication between Assad and the Turks about how to handle northern Syria. Finally, Israel had decimated Syria’s allies in Lebanon. Whether the U.S., through its intelligence agencies, also pushed the rebels to move is up for debate.
Whatever the reason for the timing, it is clear it was appropriate. Ultimately, there are two reasons why this has been such a rapid advance. First and foremost, the fighting apparatus that propped up the government in the 2010s has declined or is nonexistent. The local militias disbanded, and many men of fighting age left the country if they could. They were much more effective (even if often brutal) than the SAA.
Hezbollah was severely weakened in Lebanon in the recent conflict with Israel. It has limited capability or appetite to intervene. In addition, Israel has been hitting border crossings and other weapons supply routes over the past year that linked Syria and Hezbollah.
Iran itself has not been the same since 2020 following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. Soleimaini held the keys and was the architect of the so-called axis of resistance that brought together paramilitary forces in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and Iraq. He also closely coordinated with Russia. Since his death, Iran has continued to be a menace to U.S. interests and arm groups affiliated with its agenda but has increasingly been seen as feckless. In the past year, Israel has achieved significant successes against Iran with little retaliation. The most important example was the assassination of the Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in a secure guesthouse in the heart of Tehran during the inauguration of Iran’s president.
The second reason for the rebels’ success is the hollowness of the regime. After 2020, when it was clear that Assad was firmly back in power, he refused to reform the way the government ran the country. His rule quickly reverted to a family kleptocracy, with his image again plastered everywhere. Corruption was rife once again. The economy was in tatters. He refused compromises with anyone. He only half-heartedly engaged on a political roadmap with the UN Envoy to Syria, Geir Pederson.
By the time the rebel offensive began, in retrospect, it was already over for the regime. Internally, the government was a corrupt shell, and externally, no flotilla of saviors was coming. Thus, we see now that the country is on the verge of a complete rebel takeover.
What happens next?
The government will likely suffer further losses. However, it is unclear if it will give up Damascus, Tartous, and Lattakia without a last stand. There is palpable fear within the Alawite community, who would face brutality in the wake of a rebel takeover, even if Jolani were to persuade most fighters not to undertake actions of revenge. Thus, there are regional efforts to negotiate a peaceful regime transition. Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and Russia will attempt to find a political solution.
If that happens, there could be a relatively bloodless takeover of the remaining areas of Syria. If the government falls, there will not be much left to challenge rebel forces. It would then be up to Jolani and HTS to form a governing coalition to consolidate full control and stop infighting. A deal between HTS and SDF would be critical to this.
The post-Assad period would be one of alternating calm and localized skirmishes due to infighting and settling scores. It remains to be seen what an HTS-led government would look like. Still, it would be Islamist in nature, likely somewhere between the prior Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt and the Taliban, but with a western tinge that keeps schools open for girls. That being said, given its diverse coalition it may defer to localized rule and practices.
None of Syria’s neighbors want to see this. They do not want an uncontrollable Islamist government on their border that is partly supported by fighters from around the world. Thus, normalization is out of the question. Israel will keep a close eye on how things unfold. The United States will also seek to prevent Al Qaeda and ISIS from gaining a renewed footprint in the Levant.
A Closing Thought
Much will be written about not just the last 10 days or 10 years but also the last half century of Syria’s history. For the first time in 40 years, there will be open discussions on the 1982 massacre in Hama. Prisoners held for decades will emerge as free. Many people who lived their lives in exile will see a return never thought possible. There will be a catharsis for people who suffered at the hands of the Assad family.
The chaos of the aftermath, governance challenges, and the lack of a single power will undoubtedly feature prominently in the coming months. And if the fighting is fierce in the final attempt on the coast and Damascus, this will only be more pronounced. Syria is far from democracy and becoming a much sought after ‘success’ story.
In some ways, Syria’s greatest challenge is yet to come.