The Day After the Day After
The Day After the Day After
An interim requiem for the irregular intermediary and the dawn of a new dynamic
At the end of July 2024, the headlines from the Middle East began to come fast and furious, with an unprecedented sense of shock and awe. Previously, impossible feats of prowess were being pronounced daily. Amidst the macabre mayhem and unimaginable human loss lay the ruins of Israel’s most formidable foe and its myth-making frontman. Everyone was awakened to a new reality. The day after the day after had arrived.
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh assassinated in Tehran strike
Hezbollah pagers explode across Lebanon, causing thousands of injuries
Nasrallah’s death stuns Lebanon, as Israel pummels Beirut
The geopolitical landscape of Middle Earth – the area from Morocco to the tip of the Subcontinent – is being redefined by technological acceleration and geopolitical shifts. What Israel achieved with a series of decapitation strikes may echo events of years past, but it is dramatically different. It comes at the end of one era and the dawn of another.
Irregular intermediaries – often Islamist – constituted a pivotal geopolitical pole in the aftermath of the Cold War as a dominant feature of our world. As Al Qaeda faced its inevitable demise amidst the war on terror, Iran’s largess buttressed the growth of the irregular intermediary in inter-state relations. The killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is a signal that this era is over for now.
The last two decades had already seen declining operational space for these groups, with unmonitored failed states giving way to the ubiquity of drones, omnipresent surveillance, and assassination as a mundane tool of warfare. There is nowhere to hide, particularly if there is a threat to the American system. Hezbollah had managed to remain a sticky outlier. Its deep capacity, loyal cadre, and enmeshed mythology betrayed the emerging dynamic. The day after the day after is not just about the hollowing of Hezbollah’s potency but more so about the interim demise of the irregular intermediary.
From the shadows to the light
After the Cold War, irregular intermediaries were orphaned and had no guiding ideology. While mainly nationalist, they had intersected across borders through ideas and organization with others that had leftist(ish) and socialist underpinnings. This facilitated, for example, the training of the IRA in Libya and the solidarity between the PLO and the ANC. The collapse of the Soviet Union swept away the ideological north star and global logistics infrastructure for most of these groups.
As the bipolar world gave way to a unipolar world, the geographic space outside a unified order was shrinking. China was on the path to accession to the WTO. Russia was very much under American tutelage through the 1990s. The same decade, however, featured new state formation and re-negotiation.
In 1990, the United Nations had 159 members. By 2000, this had swelled to 189. In addition to new sovereign spaces, there was a raft of failing states, such as DRC, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Somalia, as notable examples. Some oppositional states, like Iraq, could not find their fit in a unipolar world. This geopolitical environment gave new spaces for irregular groups to operate in, find funding, and even build links.
Still, taking on a fully transnational nature would be challenging without a unifying or at least a centripetal ideology. Islamism arrived as an ideological umbrella at the right time. Both Shiite and Sunni Islamism exploded in the 1980s, first with the Islamic Revolution in Iran and then due to the war in Afghanistan. Once considered a spent force, groups like the Muslim Brotherhood consolidated a groundswell of grassroots support. This widespread backing created wide channels of funding.
In much of the Muslim world, rulers were hard-pressed to contain rising Islamism, which, if directed domestically, could become dangerous for the ruling class. Events like the siege of Mecca only pushed state actors like Saudi Arabia to back this formidable phenomenon; as a result, the emotions and energy—and financing and fighters—were directed outwards by the state. In the 1980s, this was done with the blessing of the United States. Broadly, Islamically-oriented forces were seen as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, globally and then across a myriad of countries, most prominently Afghanistan.
With the end of the Cold War, these forces found the oxygen to grow, expand, and consolidate. Unsurprisingly, Hezbollah went from strength to strength under Hassan Nasrallah’s leadership in the 1990s. It was also when Hamas rose in stature. Linkages developed between Shiite and Sunni Islamist forces throughout the world, excluding groups like Al Qaeda.
By the 2000s, these insurgent forces had established transnational networks and became intermediaries that could channel sovereign interests against adversaries. Outliers to the American order, like Iran, Russia, and China, indirectly and directly supported these groups and conferred legitimacy on them. Of course, it was still a ‘race’ for survival, as the war on terror had opened the floodgates of counteraction.
As much as America’s worldwide efforts curtailed these groups’ reach, they also gave them a new lease on life by emboldening broader support amongst people, creating new failed states, and opening up new fronts where countries of varying types may intermittently back these forces, from Syria to Iraq and beyond. Thus, by the late 2010s, the irregular intermediaries were not only still alive but were thriving and, in some cases, held territorial control. ISIS, itself, was a mere intermittent sideshow that collapsed as quickly as it conquered.
On October 8, the day after October 7, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the popular militias in Iraq had military capabilities that could rival states. Things, however, had turned within the global geopolitical landscape and also the technological capabilities of states. There were simply fewer failed states and spaces to operate from. This is one of the reasons why Hezbollah corralled more territory in Lebanon and the Houthis subsumed Yemen in recent years. The only way forward was to become the state.
Another challenge was the declining ability to operate transnationally. The disruption of global financial networks was devastating, and by 2024, almost total. Mobilizing funds from Nigeria for Hezbollah may have once worked, but it had been severely constricted. Travel of members and leaders from country to country was only possible with ‘permission.’ Hamas itself had its leadership in Qatar, where the United States maintains itsCentral Command. It is hard to be ‘independent’ while so closely monitored.
Yet, the far more significant challenge became technological acceleration. An irregular or insurgent group must hide from the light and operate in the shadows. For Hezbollah, this meant going subterranean and leveraging closed communications networks. Ultimately, this was not enough. Through integration with the American defense sector, Israel has developed advanced capabilities, not just to thwart missiles through the Iron Dome(and associated systems) but also to penetrate physically and digitally every network of an irregular intermediary as possible.
The assassination of Nasrallah was a surprise, but it was the logical evolution of an eventual path that is now cresting. Iran’s power comes from the now-bygone era, and the country will have to adapt to develop new capabilities. This raises questions about inter-state competition when outliers have lost a key ‘tool’ in the fight. The implications are many and multi-faceted.
Forever tomorrow, Jerusalem
Insurgencies evolve within zones of unresolved conflicts, vacuums of power, and circumstances of dispossession (physically or through exclusion). In the absence of a sovereign monopoly of force, non-state actors find it easy to mobilize; in some ways, their presence becomes a strange necessity. These irregular forces often supplant the state, first providing security and then effectively acting as informal governors. In Afghanistan, before the rise to the rise of the Taliban in the early 1990s, warlords playing this role were ubiquitous.
Over time, these warlords and armed groups need financial support. Only so much can happen through (voluntary or involuntary) contributions from local populations. The case of child soldiers was as much a function of economics as it provided low-cost personnel for many of these groups, particularly in Africa’s many civil conflicts through the 1990s and 2000s. Beyond this, illicit trade and participation in black market sectors have become dominant. The drug trade is the most obvious one of choice.
The longer a group exists, the more compounded the nature of its apparatus becomes. Financial networks are established to facilitate the collection, safeguarding, and movement of resources. Command and control structures become more important with greater sprawl. Thus, the groups become more entrenched and tougher to dislodge.
Yet, while unresolved conflicts and vacuums of power foster the ‘space’ to operate, they are not enough to mobilize popular or sustained support. Dispossession, physical or through exclusion in political processes, is a driving source of support over time. It brings to the fore core cadres and safe communities to operate from, and, more importantly, the groups become a last resort of protection for marginalized communities.
Palestinian irregular groups have been a feature of the Middle East over the last 80 years, first starting with fedayeen in the 1950s and evolving to various militant outfits affiliated with the PLO in the 1960s and 1970s, and then to Hamas and Islamic Jihad. This is a simplified reading, but only because the list of Palestinian militant groups is too long to capture here.
The complete collapse of the prevailing Palestinian group, Hamas, is very much on the cards; one only needs to see the position of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt as a spent force, as an example of a previously multifaceted tentacled body collapsing in the modern system. The idea, however, that global insurgencies and irregular groups will dissipate in the long run is a leap. And the notion that Palestinian resistance will disappear is also based on wishful assumptions. In the short term, however, this is precisely what may happen until a new dynamic is set.
The formation of insurgent groups and irregular intermediaries requires group identification. Some mercenary outfits emerge at the behest of a single funder but quickly disappear without that, as seen in the restoration of Afghanistan under Taliban leadership (and the lack of opponents); others establish totalitarian control in territories but have difficulty expanding their reach over time. Group identification in a world of migration is an existential challenge. Leaders and the intelligentsia can migrate and adopt new identities quickly.
The changing nature of migration will be a crucial modulating factor in how new irregular forces emerge, including Palestinian ones. And in Lebanon, if there is political marginalization of Shiites or Israel encroaches semi-permanently on Lebanese territory, the raison d'être for a replacement or reinvention of Hezbollah could be back on the table, even if it is unlikely to reach the same capabilities of past versions.
After Hamas’ eventual obliteration, something will also take its place. This is because the core driving aspects that led to its creation, particularly of Palestinian dispossession, remain. The nature of the group that replaces Hamas as the dominant anchor of Palestinian resistance to the status quo is an open question. Will it be Islamist? Will it manifest violently or non-violently? Will it deploy terrorist tactics? Can it achieve a transnational presence? Will it leverage the existing shell of past organizations of the PLO, Hamas, and Hezbollah, or create a new body in form and substance?
Subterranean superhighway
The assassination of Nasrallah dealt a heavy blow to the era of the transnational irregular intermediary. New weapons technology can reach the deep depths of the subterranean world. In the day after the day after, the gaps of sovereign reach in the world are more digital than physical, and this is where nascent irregular groups will congregate. Holding territory above ground is far too difficult. Conversely, the phenomenon of a digital-cum-subterranean world may only grow. Tomorrow’s tunnels will be deeper, and the digital moats will be more pronounced.
It is not difficult to imagine crisscrossing deep tunnels beneath borders that are immune to ground-penetrating radar (GPR), have geothermal energy sources, and are full of data centers. With advances in untethered telecommunications and decentralized finance, future irregular groups will be able to create transnational integrated systems. Physical congregation is also not required. This is perhaps where Hezbollah was headed, but it did not reach its intended destination fast enough.
Ideologically, Islamic militancy and leftist revolutionism are spent forces. Today is not 1979, and we have long passed the novelty phase of Islamism when its supporters saw its potential worth. For a new irregular group to achieve escape velocity beyond its borders and have a geopolitical impact, as Hezbollah did, it will need to differ in form and ideology. Technology capability and operational space without a governing ideology will not be enough.
Beyond Islamism, leftism, and concentrated nationalism, perhaps also a spent force, it is possible that an ideology will form syncretically and be more potent over the long term. The hybridity of the citizenry that is fostering new intersecting identities in London, Dubai, but also Beirut, Amman, and elsewhere means that something is likely to emerge to contest prevailing ideologies, whether Islamism or hypernationalism. This is, for now, speculation, especially given the intellectual dearth of ideologues and spaces in today’s world.
Unstating power
In 2024, America and strong states are at peak power. The system combines centralized power backed by technological acceleration in a way never before seen. The financial resources underpinned by a centralized dollar and integrated Western debt system have meant unlimited funds for weapons development and supply, as inefficient as they have been. It has also enabled the limitless financing of a global surveillance network.
The supercharged growth of government bureaucracies, with multilateral integration, has supported real-time coordination to deliver results around the world. War on terror structures layered over a quarter century have meant that numerous joint command centers have the infrastructure and coordination capabilities to deliver results.
This has been enhanced by technological advances, notably in telecommunications satellites, artificial intelligence, and drones, fostering global omnipresence and infinite computing capability for the United States and its allies. Anything anywhere is tracked, analyzed, and targeted. It is a zenith of power. Yet, the zenith may be the high point before the decline, and this is precisely where the American-led system may be.
Centralized power has created mass vulnerabilities. Dislodging centralized systems could hollow capabilities fast. It is likely where the new irregular groups in the digital depths will focus. While this may involve highly sophisticated cyber-attacks, it is much more likely that crude micro-drones with explosive charges will eventually be sent in swarms to power installations or even into space. Small tools will disable larger systems.
There is always a Maginot Line ready to be worked around.
A new arena of Country Kombat
The day after the day after challenges the notion of linearity people expect in history. Revolutionaries create revolutions. Potentates fall. Conflicts are resolved. Instead, with a thunderous thud, Israel is showing that strong state supremacy is a part of the new norm, and challenges to this supremacy are quickly falling by the wayside.
Amidst this demonstration of strength, countries will bandwagon to other strong states and seek to fortify their capabilities. First and foremost, investment in weapons technology will accelerate. Who would not want their own iron domes? The transnational linkages between states to develop new weapons will only grow. In the United States, this will lead to a more open and profound convergence between Silicon Valley and Washington, DC. The principal aspects to watch are the convergence of space, robotics, artificial intelligence, and new energy (including laser).
Few states will seek to confront the United States or American interests directly. The price will be too high, and such geopolitical moves will only be taken carefully, knowing the consequences. This is already the case, but the day after the day after only cements this reality. The idea of a consolidated global south revolt to challenge the empire is dead on arrival.
Intra-empire dynamics are another story. With the dissipation of irregular intermediaries and the growth of stronger weaponized states, the specter of interest-seeking between states rises with more peer-to-peer contestation. Sub-empire geopolitical rivalry will increase, and it will be up to the capital to choose a victor to back or let its vassals fight to the death.
For America itself, there is the chance that neo-conservative fetishes re-emerge to target smaller outliers like Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran. The line would, of course, stop with nuclear states, which raises the question of a re-emerging nuclear race. The decapitation of Hezbollah, as the primary deterrent at Iran’s disposal, means that nuclear weapons become an imperative for the Islamic regime.
The opening for Russia and China will also be smaller when further afield from their geographic zones. While conflagrations in their respective neighborhoods will be met with strength, there will be fewer irregular forces and small states to push into proxy battles with American interests in geographic zones around the world. With some sense of geopolitical balance, this could lead to large swaths of territory devoid of great power conflict or anti-Western insurgencies.
One caveat in a chaotic and uncertain world is that there may be too many priorities to pay attention to. With the proliferation of weapons globally and the accessibility of technology, there is the prospect of many micro-insurgencies and micro-groups emerging, even while larger shifts are underway. The world’s deadliest creature, after all, is the mosquito. Size doesn’t always matter.
Who’s there the day after the day after
It will be difficult for many to adapt to what is happening and stay ahead. We are stuck with the mantras of the past. Many structures—and names—will remain in circulation in this transitional period and betray an understanding of the new dynamic that has already arrived.
The events initiated by Israel’s bold actions beginning in the summer of 2024 signal a pivotal moment with far-reaching implications. Moreover, Israel (almost assuredly) acted in concert with the American imperium. This was always the eventual destination.
We have arrived at the doorstep of the day after the day after.
Knock. Knock.